

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION  
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

DOCKETED  
USNRC

Before Administrative Judge Gary L. Milhoff <sup>81</sup> NOV -4 A10:14  
as Special Master <sup>CR2</sup>

In the Matter of )  
 )  
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289  
 ) (Restart)  
(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Reopened Proceeding)  
Station, Unit No. 1 )

OFFICE OF SECRETARY  
DOCKETING & SERVICE  
BRANCH

AAMODT TESTIMONY OF  
PROFESSOR CHARLES HOLZINGER  
AND PROFESSOR BRUCE MOLHOLT

B111060377 B11102  
PDR ADLOCK 05000289  
Q PDR

## SUMMARY

The purpose of this testimony is to shed light on the extent of cheating in Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator examinations at the TMI-1 facility since the March 1979 Unit 2 accident. The extent of cheating is viewed from two perspectives, the number of operators who may have been involved and the degree of cooperation between O and W.

TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR BRUCE MOLHOLT

Summary statement

Senior reactor operators O and W cheated extensively on their requalification tests 24 April 1981. There was exact coincidence in 87 percent of their answers, right down to the misspellings. Apparently, sometimes O copied W, sometimes W copied O.

There were 67 separate questions or parts of questions addressed on the SRO "B" exam. I have not graded 5 of these, which are figures. Of the remaining 62 questions or parts of questions, 54 were answered by O and W in identical or nearly identical fashion. I conclude that these two senior reactor operators collaborated on 87 percent of their answers.

A few examples of identical copy are given below:

Answers to question N 2 b

W

N. 2 b You cool down the plant by increasing your steaming rate in the OTSG and lowering the pressure which lowers the saturation Temperature.

O

D- 2b - You cool down the plant by increasing your steaming rate in the OTSG and lowering the pressure which lowers the set temp accordingly.

Answers to question N 4 c

W

(C) I would immediately select the two 2 operable NSCCW pumps for E.S. Making sure of physical separation. I would call the duty superintendent, Supervisor of Ops

O

4S we would immediately Select the two 2 operable NSCCW pumps for E.S. with the 43 selector switch. I would CALL THE Duty Superintendent, the Supervisor of Ops

27 Oct 81

A few additional copies of nearly identical copy are given below in which the major change is that O writes in 2d person, W in 3d person:

## Answers to question J 2

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| W | An RW P for carbon is needed when the concentration is $> 3 \times 10^{-1}$ ucpcc with no alpha present, or when you are $> 25\%$ of mfc. |
| O | You need an RAP for carbon when the concentration is $> 3 \times 10^{-1}$ ucpcc with no alpha present or when you are $> 25\%$ of mfc.    |

Sometimes they misspell the same word:

Question L3a

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| W | in hands. When the rod drops you will get an asymmetrical rod alarm & |
| O | in hand. When the rod drops you will get an asymmetrical rod alarm &  |

Insight is gained as to who is copying whom when O can't read W's handwriting and "collapsing" becomes "collopsing":

Question N5b

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| W | cause the pressure to increase thus<br>colloping the steam in the pressure in |
| O | cause the pressure to increase<br>thus collopsing the steam in the pressure.  |

But then, sometimes W can't read O's handwriting (which is generally worse) either, as when "vacuum," with an ambiguous first "u" by O, becomes "vaccum" in W's answer:

Question N3b Subcold as you were with a better vacuum

You won't be as subcold as you were with a better vacuum

Sometimes it appeared to me as if W were giving answers orally to O containing words which O can't spell. These words were then spelled correctly and legibly in W's answer, but misspelled in O's answer. Examples are:

<u>Part</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>O</u>
I	6a,c 6c	xenon affected	zenon effected
K	1a 3	asymptotically affect	acsomptically effect
L	4a	orifice	orfice

These I believe to be examples where W is giving answers to O, perhaps orally. At least once O can't understand what W is driving at at all, undoubtedly here in a written answer and substitutes his own word rather than copy something nonsensible:

<u>Part</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>O</u>
M	2	collorates (for correlates)	determines (!)

And, at least once, W copies O's misspelled word as something else:

<u>Part</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>O</u>
J	5a.	injecting (food!)	injesting (for ingesting)

#### Summary statement

Senior reactor operators O and W cheated extensively on their requalification tests 24 April 1981. There was exact coincidence in 87 percent of their answers, right down to the misspellings. Apparently, sometimes O copied W, sometimes W copied O.

There is little evidence that the other four senior reactor operators sitting in this room, but not at the same table, were involved in this cheating by operators O and W.

BRUCE MOLHOLT, Ph.D.

Birth- November 5, 1940, Menasha, WI

Ph.D.- 1967, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN (Microbiology)

Postdoctoral Fellowships

- 1967-69 USPHS, Department of Microbial Genetics, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden.
- 1972-73 NATO, Department of Molecular Genetics, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium.

Positions

- 1969-72 Asst Professor of Microbiology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
- 1973-74 Charge de Recherches, Department of Molecular Biology, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
- 1974-75 Research Associate, Department of Molecular Genetics, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, West Germany.
- 1975-76 Exchange Scientist of US National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Biochemistry, Prague, Czechoslovakia.
- 1976-78 Associate Professor of Microbiology and Surgery, Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
- 1979-  
present Science Director, Environmental Cancer Prevention Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Publications

Twenty articles on molecular genetics.

Genetic Predisposition to Cancer in Man (with A.G. Knudson).

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR CHARLES HOLZINGER

The Aamodts received in response to discovery requests of the Licensee the PQS and ATTS RO and SRO mock exams, the Category T and Category T makeup exams, and weekly cold licensing requalification exams. The PQS and ATTS tests were provided lacking information with regard to seating arrangements, and except where the exams were dated, no indication of what candidates sat together in a given room. A further hindrance to an investigation of collusion among examinees was the fact that in some undetermined number of instances the Category T and weekly exams were take-home, unproctored and/or open book. Nevertheless, several groups of exams were assembled for analysis which, after a question-by-question analysis, yielded sufficient numbers of examples of similar responses to support the view that collusion of some sort had occurred. There were no fewer than 14 candidates who appeared to be engaged in collusion of some sort.

These forms of collusion did not follow the blatant mode of copying observed in O and W. However, since the essay-type answers to questions on the papers were characteristically very dissimilar between candidates, similarities between essay type responses, especially when there were multiple examples of such similarities between two individuals, indicate a high probability that collusion of some sort has taken place.

Several examples follow.

FOIAIZED CORRESPONDENCE

ATTS RO EXAM GIVEN 4/1/81--FOLLOWING SEVEN PAGES.

Analysis of this set of examinations shows collusion among U, B and Q. See the attached reproductions of Alc (page 1), A3 and A4 (page 2), B2 (pages 3 and 4) and Cl (pages 5 and 6). It should be noted that overall, any given set of essay-type answers are characteristically dissimilar, emphasizing the uniqueness of any similar pairs of answers. Note the distinctly different answers of three randomly selected papers (HH, BB, E) to questions Alc (page 1) and B2 (page 4).



Charles W. Meltzer

RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

Title of Specialization:

Area: North America

Subjects: Human Biology and Evolution; The American Indian; Psychological Anthropology

Courses currently taught: Evolution of Man; Psychological Anthropology; The American Indian; Anthropological Theory

Education:

Franklin and Marshall College, 1939-1941 (No degree)

University of Chicago, 1945-1949

Degree: M.A. in Sociology

Topic: "Acceptance-Rejection of Belief in Equality of Opportunity"

Harvard University, 1951-1952; 1958; Department of Social Relations

Teaching Positions:

Harvard University, Department of Social Relations, Teaching Fellow, 1943.

Franklin and Marshall College, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Instructor, 1949-1953

Assistant Professor, 1953-1958

Associate Professor, 1958-1966

Franklin and Marshall College, Department of Anthropology

Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department, 1966-1968

Professor and Chairman of the Department, 1968 to present

Stanford University, Visiting Associate Professor of Anthropology, 1968  
University of Utah, Visiting Associate Professor of Anthropology,  
Summer 1976.

Publications:

"The Iroquois Site: A Susquehanna Rock Cemetery," in Pennsylvania Archaeological Federations Bulletin, No. 17, January 1953.

With John Witthoft and W. Fred Kinsey, "A Susquehannock Cemetery: The Iroquois Site," in Susquehanna Miscellany, published by the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1959.


"Some Observations on the Partisanship of Aboriginal Cherokee Personality Traits," in Symposium on Cherokee and Iroquois Culture, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 189, Washington, 1961.

"Archaeological Report, Limerick Generating Station Site, Montgomery and Chester Counties, Pa.," Archae-Herd No. 82697, York, Pa., 1972.

"Archaeological Report, Wilson Generating Station Site, Lancaster County, Pa.," Archae-Herd No. 82698, York, Pa., 1972.

Associations:

President, Anthropological Association  
Editorial Committee for the Anthropology of Culture  
Editorial Committee of University Publishers  
Editor of Anthropological Society  
Editorial Committee of Division  
Pennsylvania Sociological Society  
Secretary for American Anthropology  
Secretary for Applied Anthropology  
Secretary for Demographic Anthropology



Q negative over core life due to boron depletion  
I & buildup of more resonance capture peaks (RC) due  
 $\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  to  $\frac{^{240}_{94}\text{Pu}}$  buildup. Thus increasing the stability of  
the reactor

c) Mod coefficient becomes more positive

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  core life due to less lower energy  $\gamma$ -ray  
radioactive product buildup.

a) Over core life  $\text{Pu-240}$  builds into the core

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  while  $\nu$ -ray remains constant. With more  $\text{Pu-240}$   
this will increase the chances of  $\beta$  capture in

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  resonance peaks while the  $\beta$  is being moderated

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  Over core life mod temp. and gets more neg due to  
increased  $\text{Pu-240}$  buildup and decreased boron content.  
Lower boron gives less feedback when coolant heats up.

c. At operating temperatures and EOC boron concentration

we have a.  $-0.77 \times 10^{-4} \text{ eV/K/F}^\circ$  reactivity coefficient value

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  and  $-2.63 \times 10^{-4} \text{ eV/K/F}^\circ$  with EOC Boron Concentration (0.17 ppm)

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  The reactivity change per  $^\circ\text{F}$  increase in moderator temperature  
becomes more negative due to the increase in  $\text{Pu-240}$  in the  
core, the boron reduction, and the increase in additional fission  
product inventory with resonance capture peaks.

a.) The effect is called moderator temp. coeff  
and gets more negative over core life

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  EOC  $0.77 \times 10^{-4} \text{ eV/K/F}^\circ$  EOC  $-2.63 \times 10^{-4} \text{ eV/K/F}^\circ$  Due to

$\frac{1.0}{1.0}$  boron dilution and buildup of  $\text{Pu-240}$  + other  
fission products prime with RC peaks.

the shutdown margin would be shut down by all the rods inserted except the higher numbered ones stuck at the top and Group rods were to stay right where they are.

B3) a). The amount of reactivity which the reactor is shut down by or would be shut down by from its present condition assuming all  rods inserted except group 8 and the  shutdown margin is the amount of reactivity which must be added to the core to be critical with no motion of group 8, and the most  condition stuck out. What you added causes dep to be exponen.

fission and  
B4) Be in building due to the decay of Iodine and is being removed by decay or absorption on  Root.

B4) The rate of build up iodine decay is equal to the   $f_{\text{I}} \cdot \lambda_{\text{I}} \cdot \rho_{\text{I}} \cdot V_{\text{I}}$  plus dep  of xenon)

2/2

Get into a downcomer leg where it  
pitched on the way down to the left  
of the OTSG. Flows up the OTSG where  
it is heated undergoes an expansion at  
the top.


Emergency FW enters near the top of the  
OTSG right onto the tube bundle to  
cool the RCS.

(a) the main feed is introduced into the OTSG  
by the main feed ring which is  $\approx 50\%$  up the  
OTSG on the outside with nozzles that penetrate  
the OTSG and spray downward into the  
downcomer allowing some preheat of the water  
by operating steam

The emergency feed is introduced by the emergency  
feed ring at the top of the OTSG.  
Feed nozzles spray water directly onto the  
tubes of the OTSG.

(b) Main feed enters a feeding about the center  
of the OTSG just below where the main steam  
lines top off. It enters at the top of the down  
comer region of OTSG which located on outer cir-  
ference of OTSG (bit inside of OTSG) & draws steam  
from the Generator to push the FW prior  
to reaching the tube sheet & tubes of OTSG thus limiting  
the thermal stress on the tube sheet & tubes & inc  
allowance to use downstream to  $\leq 17$  bar

When feed water is introduced into the  
 tube section from a tube port (which is  
 located on the outer part of the tube sheet) and is  
 directed down along the outside (of the tube)  
 and goes through the tube sheet and up  
 around the tube to be heated by Primary water.  
 Every feed is introduced much higher into  
 the steam generator and it is sprayed directly  
 on to the OTS6 tubes then down. It  
 is not perfectly involved.



EFW Enters Tube Area High in CTS6  
 Main FW Enters Down Comde

B-2 a) Auxiliary feedwater enters the OTS6 higher  
 than main feedwater and feed enters the upper  
 end of the OTS6 and is sprayed directly on the  
 tubes. Main feedwater enters lower and goes down  
 the downcomer before entering the lower tube  
 section. This preheats the water before entering lower  
 the area. As primary steam need for preheat  
 b) Aux feed is arranged in this way to promote

(5)

$$\Delta P = \left[ \frac{P_1}{P_2} - 1 \right] = \frac{210 - 100}{100} = 1.1$$

Note: 100cc's per device

$\frac{1}{n}$

95% on 6P S

$$75\% = 0.1 < 0.01 = \Delta P$$

$$\longrightarrow -210 - 100 = \Delta P$$

$$550\text{m} \longrightarrow (7 - 1) = \Delta P$$

$$100 = P^2 \quad 210 = P$$

$n$

$$\frac{7}{1-1} = P \quad \frac{1}{1-1} = P$$

$$\frac{1}{20} \cdot \frac{210 - 100}{100 - 1} = \frac{110}{199}$$

$$\frac{1}{1-1} = P$$

$$\Delta P = P^2 = P' = P''$$

$$3000 \text{ cPSi}$$

$$1500 \text{ cPSi}$$

$$K^2 = 0.94$$

95% of S

(1)

Q

C-1  $\frac{1-1}{11} = 75\%$

$$-1 \quad \frac{CR_1}{CR_2} \cdot \frac{(1-K_2)}{(1-K_1)} \quad CR_1 = 1500 \text{ cfs} \quad K_1 = .988 \\ CR_2 = 3000 \text{ cfs}$$

$$\frac{1.6}{2} \quad \frac{1500}{3000} = \frac{(1-K_2)}{(1-.988)}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} = \frac{1-K_2}{.012}$$

$$.006 = 1-K_2$$

$$K_2 = 1 - .006 = .994$$

$$\rho_2 = \frac{K_2 - 1}{K_2} = \frac{.994 - 1}{.994} = -0.006036$$

$$\rho_1 = \frac{K_1 - 1}{K_1} = \frac{.988 - 1}{.988} = -.012145$$

$$\Delta P = \rho_2 - \rho_1 = (-0.006036) - (-0.012145)$$

$$\Delta P = .00611$$

L should be %

.611%

$$(-2.7) + (.00611) = -2.69389 \quad (-2.7) + (.6) = -2.1$$

Gr 5 new position is -51%  $-2.1\% \approx 95\% \text{ on Gr 5}$

⑥

F7) Because you will carbon up the  
valves and also unused fuel will  
accumulate in the exhaust manifold  
and eventually ignite causing a fire.  
→ diesel engine does not have valves!

IF IT DOESN'T, IT'S A REALLY  
NOVEL ENGINE!

RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

FOLLOWING 6 PAGES.

EXAMPLES OF COLLUSION ATION

A, P, V & T ON AITS RO EXAM 9/2/81



9.4/12

78.3

✓ - 4 - 1

B1a Main Fw block (Fw-v-5) opens when SV (Fw-v-16)  
is 90% open and closes when Fw-v-16 is ~~50%~~  
~~70~~ closed when in auto

1.5/12 Main Fw control valve (Fw-v-17) opens after SV Fw  
control valve is open when in auto

9.1/12 = 75.8

P-412121

B-1 a) The Main Fw Block  
valve opens at 90% open  
1.75/12 on the startup Fw control  
valve automatically and close  
automatically at ~~50%~~ 70 on the  
startup Fw control valve

1.8/1

SAME ELEMENTS, ORDER  
" UNIQUE E&E

①

0.5/1

in the suction from the  
R.B. sump by Foreign  
material could restrict  
flow, or shifting suction  
to the sump with more  
than 3' in the BWST  
could result in insufficient  
Net positive suction head  
for the decay heat pumps.  
High activity in sump fluid.

(P-2)

Failure of DH-P1 R or S

Failure of DH-V-6 R or S to open DH suction from RB-  
sump

Failure of DH-V-7 R or S to open DH to my pump suction

Failure of DH-V-8 R or S to close DH suction from BWST

contaminated Sump fluid

5/1

ELAERATE, SIMILAR ELEMENTS,

Y-1 DISHT.

(3)

process for the respective sides were S.P.  
+ b.p.s. Normally the bypass valve  
will contracting at ~~675 psig~~ + 10% of  
at low loads will starting up. As the  
the Turbine starts to take over, the pressure  
drops and the bypass valve close to maintain  
pressure. When the bypass valve get start  
and ULD is  $\geq 15\%$ , the b.p.s will auto  
shift to + 75 psig. Other condition  
  
22/3  
pressure increase

B4 The turbine bypass valve will close  
to maintain turb. header pres. setpoint  
plus 10% b.p.s (normally 895 psig). The  
parameter it controls is turbine  
header pres. even though it is sensing  
tr.gen. pres. The b.p.s is shifted to  
+75% when the turb. is reset, ULD  
is  $\geq 15\%$ , & 3. All bypass valves are  
closed  
  
not quite true

long P response

22/3

D-3 This can be caused by changes in the reference junction temperature where the thermocouple is attached to the circuit since they are calibrated at a certain reference junction temperature if you change it you introduce error.

5/  
2

P

This can happen during a LOCA or Steam Break on the RB as temperatures are elevated under those conditions and the junctions are in the RB.

Physical Damage, Multiple False Junctions

03 The type of failure is usually associated with a loss of reference junction against which the thermocouple measures thermionic current due to ambient conditions only. This loss of reference junction would probably be associated with extremely high temp / moisture content conditions such as may exist in RB following a LOCA multiple or false junctions.

V

5/  
2

ATTS - POEXAM 4/2/81

D.3) we have found two problems at one point  
[A] like distorted or as due to high resistance  
at junctions and the other are due to  
reference junction changes in the  
envirn when the reference junction is placed  
on track plane due to loss of contact  
on steam looks near the junction  
Multiple or False Junctions - thermal currenct Differ.

"A" APPEARS TO HAVE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING  
OF THIS LIMITED VIEW OF THE SITUATION →  
"P" & "V" APPEAR TO HAVE RECEIVED  
THIS INFORMATION FROM "A"

⑤

F-4. a. Prior to starting the 3rd reactor coolant pump  
must be > Rod oper. curve of  
figure #1, Have ICCW running,  
and plot 1/M. Second vent must  
be complete.

D  
1.0  
2.0  
2.5

b. After resetting the ~~low pressure~~  
systems in RPS when coming out  
of S/P02-1 ~~Reactor~~ See IP02-1 P02 ~~E~~ 4.0

Low Pressure  
~~High Pressure~~  
See A.


F-4 prior to starting the 3rd RCP which  
actually starts the shutdown, the rods withdrawn.

You must monitor counts and plot  
them for the withdrawal. SO ~~Excess~~ <sup>start</sup> Hi PWR @ 4.25%  
when RPS pressure = 165 - you must  
insert rods - increase pressure, then <sup>to 1900psi</sup> SECP.  
Reset the RPS (do out of ~~Excess~~ <sup>Hi PWR to</sup> 104.75%)  
and then safety rods must be withdrawn again -  
watch counts and plot them.  
Maintain <1% SDM

1.0  
2.0

(6)

FOLLOWING TWO POSSIBLE  
EXAMPLES OF COLLUSION BETWEEN  
F AND X ON EPO "A" EXAM.



SCA  
F

Re trip would be reduced due to reduction in time at EOL would incite a larger amount of positive reactivity.

c) The Power deficit sets more with core age mainly due to the leakage coefficient becoming more

(AB) ii This makes our shutdown margin smaller after a trip since the shutdown after the trip will add more positive reactivity at EOL than be


I ④ c) i. Power Deficit becomes more negative over core life because it is a function of moderator aging. It is affected by the leakage coefficient which starts out below negative over core life due to the build up of Pu-240 + fission products. Another factor causing power deficit to be more negative at EOL than BOL is the flux distribution that is also plan over core life.

SCA  
X

①

(12)

1) Only secondary  
The basis for ~~1.0~~<sup>1.5</sup> ~~year~~ is in  
not receiving system integrity is in  
and ~~1.0~~<sup>1.5</sup> limit for ~~1.0~~<sup>1.5</sup> is so you  
~~not exceed 1.5 R in the at site~~  
~~boundary or a load rejection and the~~  
~~negative lift.~~




T. ⑥ a) Primary to secondary peak rate - must  
not be  $> 1 \text{ gpm}$

Secondary system activity must  
not exceed  $1.0 \text{ gpm}/\text{mi}^2$

(12)

The 1.0 gpm limit on discharge will  
be determined by minimizing uncontrolled releases of  
effluent activity from the secondary plant

The  $1.0 \text{ gpm}$  limit is based on  
not exceeding  $1.5 \text{ R}$  dose at the  
site boundary on a load rejection.



(2)

RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

FOLLOWING 4 PAGES


EXAMPLES OF COLLUSION BETWEEN

CC & P ON PQS PO EXAM 4/2/80




0.5 liquid is away from the saturation or the  
A-1-0 phase condition.

E-0.5 °For °C that a fluid is below  
its saturation temp for the pressure  
it is at

B-4-a  Possible operating source of heat sink  
to recover the core in the event of a loss  
of coolant accident until the emergency  
injection systems are operating and providing  
cooling (boiled water) to the core.

B-4-9  on a large loss to provide a  
possible injection source to recover  
the core in the time required to  
start HP injection & LP injection



C-5. Solid plant operation indications  
1) pressure level - fuel scale  
2) Water pressure - reading very slightly  
    above setpoint  
3) Primary temperature due to saturation  
    due to cold water in primary (boiling point)  
4) RCT level increasing from low down

C-5.  to verify solid after feeding up  
assuming plant instrumentation  
is working OK.

P20 level 1 to 400" followed by  
(when tank filled) **BEST COPY AVAILABLE**

1.0 a rapid increase of 100-200 PSI over  
saturation pressure for P20 temp.  
assuming no leak in line & etc

radioactivity with a change in  $\mu$  or  $L/D$   
can flow.



C.6.a. 2)  ${}^{14}\text{Nd} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{14}\text{Pm} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{149}\text{Sm}$  What find?



- C.6.a. 3) Krypton-85 comes from the fusion process  
as a daughter product.

C.6.b. 1. The半衰期 for the beta decay of krypton

C.6.b. 2.  $T_{1/2} = 10^{10}$  years for the beta decay of krypton

C.6.b. 3. Expenses

0.5



3) Krypton-85 comes from fission  
 $T_{1/2} = 10$  years

2)

CC

steam generators on the vertical section  
of console 'cc' about 3 feet to the left of  
the power range meter. 0.5

D.3.b. 50% on the operating range according for the  
steam generators on the vertical section  
of console 'cc' below the startup range  
meters 0.5

D-3-a. " on startup range read on  
 P 0.5 console C.L.

D-3-b 50% on operating range read on  
0.5 startup. according console C.L.

NOTE: CC & CC LOOKS  
LIKE 'CL' - WHICH P ONLY,  
IN THIS GROUP OF TESTS, WROTE

CC

and stem cover region with visibility  
there was less moderation and reflection  
of neutrons and an increase in the fast  
neutrons to be seen by the detectors

- (DE) b. Viding in the case. (stem is  
not as good a reflector & moderator  
of  $\alpha$ 's and more expected to be  
seen on the IR detectors)

1.0

④

FOLLOWING 2 PAGES

LIST EXAMPLES OF COPYING BY O&W  
ON AITS PO & SPO EXAMS

WE HAVE NOT COPIED ACTUAL ANSWERS

BECAUSE OF THEIR EXTREMELY OBVIOUS

SIMILARITIES.



Similarity in O and W on ATT'S Exam on 4/3/81

- See I 1 a      }  
I 1 b      } Striking similarity in spelling  
I 2      } makes conclusion a necessary conclusion  
J 2  
J 3  
J 4      See that grades seemed to change with  
J 5  
K 1 a  
K 6 d  
L 3      Note same grammatical error, "natural"  
L 4  
M 2  
M 3 a  
M 3 b  
N 1      See similarity in spelling error  
N 2  
N 3

Semantics in cases of O and W on ATTS Exam on 4/2/51

A 2      "you are seeing"

A 3

A 6

B2a

C1c

C2

C3

C4

C5

D1a and b

D3

D4

E3

F1

F6

G1

G3

G5

H1

H2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'81 NOV -4 A10:14

ers

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

OFFICE OF SECRETARY

DOCKETING & SERVICE

BRANCH

Before Administrative Judge Gary L. Milhollin  
as Special Master

in the Matter of )  
 )  
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-28c  
 ) (Restart)  
(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Reopened Proceeding)  
Station, Unit 1 )

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