

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /1/2/2/9/8/0/ (8) /0/1/2/9/8/1/ (9)
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On December 29, 1980, with the Unit in Mode 5, three motor operated valves failed/
/0/3/ / to actuate during the Containment Depressurization Actuation Functional Test. /
/0/4/ / Since redundant valves provided similar functions to the failed valves the health/
/0/5/ / and safety of the general public were not affected. This is contrary to T.S. /
/0/6/ / 3.7.4.1, 3.6.2.2 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.d. Deviation Reports /
/0/7/ / submitted on 01-06-81. /
/0/8/ /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/0/	/S/B/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/A/ (13)	/V/A/L/V/E/X/ (14)	/B/ (15)
	LER/RO	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE
	REVISION NO.				

(17) REPORT NUMBER /8/1/ /-/ /0/0/4/ / \ / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME SUPPLIER	COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/B/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/A/ (25)	/A/1/8/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / MOV-SW-105C failed to operate because of a loose lead on the breaker/controller. /
/1/1/ / MOV-SW-108A failed to operate because of water in the motor and the cause for /
/1/2/ / MOV-RS-101A failure to operate is unknown. Each valve was repaired as required, /
/1/3/ / and will be retested prior to entry into Mode 4. /
/1/4/ /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /H/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ NA /	/ (30) /B/ (31)	/ Test Observation /
ACTIVITY	CONTENT			
RELEASED	OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)		LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/	/ NA /
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES				
NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)		
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /		
PERSONNEL INJURIES				
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)			
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /			
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)				
TYPE	DESCRIPTION			
/1/9/ /Z/ (42)	/ NA /			
PUBLICITY				

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/ /N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151
8111050708 810129
PDR ADOCK 05000338
S PDR

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 81-004/03L-0

Attachment. Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

Three motor operated valves failed to actuate during the CDA Functional Test. These valves are the service water to the component cooling Heat Exchangers Isolation Valve MOV-SW-108A, the casing cooling discharge to the outside Recirculation Spray Pumps Isolation Valve MOV-RS-101A and the Service Water Isolation to the Unit 1 Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers, MOV-SW-105C.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The functions of the failed valves were provided by redundant valves. MOV-SW-108B provided isolation of SW to the CC Heat Exchangers since it is located in series with MOV-SW-108A. MOV-RS-100A located in series with MOV-RS-101A provided isolation to the Outside Recirc. Spray pumps and MOV-SW-105D provided service water to the Recirc. Spray Heat Exchangers around MOV-SW-105C. Since no functions of a CDA were lost, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

MOV-SW-105C failed to operate because of a loose lead on the breaker/controller. MOV-SW-108A failed to operate because of water in the motor and the cause of MOV-RS-101A failure to operate is unknown.

Immediate Corrective Action

Upon completion of the Containment Depressurization Actuation Functional test and evaluation of results Maintenance Reports were issued and Deviation Reports were written. The valves were repaired and retested with satisfactory results.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The failed valves will be retested prior to entry into Mode 4.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No action is taken to prevent recurrence.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications.