NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	V A S P S 1 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)	
	LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	CAT	

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 (7)	1 0 0 5 8 1 (8)	1 0 3 0 8 1 (9)
		DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the reactor coolant at approximately 200°F, and heating up, TV-CC-109A

0 3 (Component Cooling to RHR) isolation valve would not close. The trip valve was

0 4 isolated by closing the downstream manual isolation valve. Since the integrity of

0 5 the component cooling water piping inside of the containment was maintained, an

0 6 isolation barrier between inside containment and the environment was maintained.

0 7 Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected. This

0 8 event is contrary to T.S.3.8.A.1 and reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(2).

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	W B (11)	E (12)	X (13)	V A L V O P (14)	D (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 1	—	0 5 9	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	F 1 3 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 A mechanical cause for this valve failing to close could not be determined. Operating

1 1 air was disconnected from the top of the diaphram operator and the air line observed

1 2 to blow clear. The air line was reconnected and the pneumatic operator was found to

1 3 operate correctly. The valve was cycled several times satisfactorily and was

1 4 returned to service.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	G (28)	0 0 0 (29)	N/A	A (31)	Operational Event

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	N/A

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0	N (44)	

NRC USE ONLY

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PDR ADOCK 05000280
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(804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 81-059/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 10-05-81

TITLE OF THE EVENT: TV-CC-109A WOULD NOT CLOSE

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With the reactor coolant at approximately 200^{0}F, and heating up, TV-CC-109A (Component cooling isolation valve to residual heat removal) would not close. The valve was manually isolated by closing the downstream manual isolation valve. This event is contrary to T.S.3.8.A.1 and reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

The Design Bases for the containment isolation system is that during accident conditions, at least two barriers exist between the atmosphere outside the containment structure and the atmosphere inside the containment. Failure of one valve or barrier will not prevent isolation of the containment.

Component cooling water piping is separated from the reactor coolant system, or a connecting system, and the containment atmosphere, by a closed valve under adminsitrative control and a membrane barrier.

Since the integrity of the membrane barrier, the component cooling water piping inside containment, was maintained, an isolation barrier between the inside of the containment structure and the environment was maintained during this event. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The valve malfunction could not be attributed to any mechanical problem. The valve operated satisfactorily following the disconnectior and reconnection of its air line.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to manually isolate the valve and station an operator at the valve for Administrative control.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Maintenance department verified the air supply to the valve and verified the pneumatic operator functioning correctly. The valve was cycled several times satisfactorily and returned to service.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Since the valve cycled satisfactorily, no additional action is deemed necessary.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATION:

None.