



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-276/81-01

Licensee: Georgia Institute of Technology

Facility Name: AGN-201

Docket No. 50-276

License No. R-111

Inspector: *Paul Kelly for* 10/1/81
 C. Julian, Acting Section Chief, Resident and
 Reactor Project Inspection Date Signed
R. Butcher for 10/01/81
 R. Butcher, Project Inspector Date Signed
 Approved by: *Paul Kelly for* 10/1/81
 C. Julian, Acting Section Chief, Resident and
 Reactor Project Inspection Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on September 21, 1981

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 12 inspector-hours on site in the area of long term shutdown requirements.

Results

Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*J. N. Davidson, Reactor Supervisor
R. M. Boyd, Radiological Safety Officer
S. Millspaugh, Radiological Technician

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 21, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Operation

The AGN-201 has not been operated in over a year. A memorandum to the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) from the reactor supervisor showed that the AGN-201 had four operations for a total time of 3 3/4 hours from February 21, 1979 to December 5, 1980. There are no current licensed operators for the AGN-201 and discussions with the reactor supervisor indicated that there are no plans to license personnel or to make the AGN-201 operational. The Georgia Institute of Technology would like to dispose of the AGN-201 by giving it to someone or by decommissioning. The NSC meeting minutes dated December 10, 1980 directed Dr. J. N. Davidson to draft appropriate decommissioning procedures and concurrently, Dr. Monte V. Davis was to investigate the possibility of donating the AGN-201 system to a qualified user. Discussions with the licensee indicated that no qualified user has been found to accept the AGN-201 and the decommissioning procedures were not completed. The inspectors had no further questions.

6. Surveillance and Maintenance Requirements

Paragraph 5.1 thru 5.3 of the Technical Specifications (TS) define the surveillance requirements for the AGN-201 but paragraph 5.4 waive these

requirements if the reactor has not been brought critical during the specified test intervals. However, the surveillance requirements must be fulfilled prior to subsequent startup of the reactor. Since the reactor has not been operated in over a year the surveillances have not been accomplished. The licensee is aware that the surveillances would have to be accomplished prior to attempting a startup.

The licensee was questioned on maintenance activities and the inspectors were told that no maintenance activities are required.

The inspectors had no further questions.

7. Administrative Requirements

The reactor supervisor has maintained responsibility for the AGN-201 and the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) had the required personnel and the necessary quorum at NSC meetings. The NSC meeting minutes reflected the licensee intent to decommission the AGN-201 as discussed in paragraph 5. The inspectors had no comments.

8. Radiological Procedures

The licensee conducted monthly radiation and swipe surveys of the AGN-201 and its storage facilities. A film badge was located on the AGN-201 console for relative long term exposure in the area. The swipe surveys for the last year all indicated no appreciable contamination and the radiation levels were low. The storage area was enclosed by a locked fence with radiation area signs posted at the entrances.

9. Security

The AGN-201 is located inside a fence approximately 8 foot high with all entrance gates locked and keys to the area controlled. The inspectors found that the AGN-201 console had been moved within the storage area without the knowledge or consent of the reactor supervisor or the radiological safety officer. Discussions with the licensee indicate that movement of the console did not comprise a hazard from a radiological standpoint or potential damage to the AGN-201, however it is felt that this fact may not have been known by whoever moved the console. The licensee had not found out who was responsible for moving the console when the inspectors left the site but have committed to informing the inspectors when they do find out. This information has been turned over to the regional physical protection section for followup. The inspectors had no further questions.