


October 28, 1981

Dr. John H. Buck
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Dr. W. Reed Johnson
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Thomas S. Moore, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555



In the Matter of
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-275 O.L. and 50-323 O.L.

Dear Members of the Board:

The enclosed preliminary notification concerning recent developments at Diablo Canyon involving the containment building annulus region is being provided the boards and parties pursuant to your telephone request of October 27, 1981.

William J. Olmstead
Deputy Chief Hearing Counsel

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure:
Service List

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OFFICE	OELD				
SURNAME	WOlmstead; amb.	8110300175	811028		
DATE	10/28/81	PDR I&E	PDR		
		PNO-V-81-059			

his preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or valuation, and is basically all that is known by IE staff on this date.

Elmer

FACILITY: Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Unit Nos. 1 & 2
Docket Nos. 50-275 & 50-323
San Luis Obispo County, California

SUBJECT: INCORRECT SEISMIC ANALYSIS
(Ref.: PNO-V-81-50 & 81-50A, Entitled
Inoperability of the Residual Heat Removal
System - Incorrect Seismic Analysis)

Licensee Emergency Classification:
Notification of Unusual Event:
 Alert
 Site Area Emergency
 General Emergency
 Not Applicable

Representatives of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement continued, through the week of October 19-23, 1981, their inspection of activities related to the Hosgri reanalysis within the containment building annulus area and the PG&E interface with John A. Blume and Associates.

On October 22, 1981, inspectors from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement determined that, in addition to the improper application of the diagram as reported to the NRC by PG&E on September 29, 1981, the weights listed on the diagram and used as an input to John A. Blume and Associates for their development of response spectra, could not be verified as being accurate. PG&E representatives recalculated the weights, using current as-built drawings, and determined the new weights to be different.

As a result of the above, PG&E representatives requested John A. Blume and Associates to develop new response spectra to assist in their determination of the effect of these weight differences on hanger design. Blume has completed the development of these new spectra and they show a general shift to lower peak acceleration and lower frequencies in about one half (11 out of 20) of the frame spectrum curves. In the other nine spectrum curves the peak acceleration is generally increased while the frequency of this acceleration is unchanged. Because of these changes in spectrum curves, PG&E personnel are currently performing calculations to determine the effects on hanger design. As of 9 AM P.S.T. on October 26, 1981, PG&E analysts have performed two sample calculations using "worst case" spectra. One calculation indicates no changes are required, while the second calculation indicates a maximum pipe support load increase of 80%.

PG&E's current plans are to perform a complete review of the Blume model used for spectrum response curve calculations, and thoroughly validate the input information being utilized by Blume. This work is not expected to be completed until October 28, 1981, at which time PG&E would expect to have a more complete understanding of the overall effect of this error on hanger design.

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463-3738

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Dope
8110290237

NOS 10-29-81 JCS

October 26, 1981

Because of the identification of this weight error, in conjunction with the improper application of the annulus diagram, and recent NRC findings that other safety related service contractors (in addition to John A. Blume and Associates) had questionable quality assurance controls in effect prior to 1978, a representative from the NRC Region V office met with PG&E officials on Friday, October 23, 1981, and requested that they be prepared by Thursday, October 29, 1981, to justify why the NRC should not require the independent verification effort being conducted by Dr. Cloud, be broadened to include non-seismic safety related service type contractor work.

A meeting has been tentatively scheduled for NRC representatives (NRR and IE) to meet with PG&E officials at their offices in San Francisco to hear their justification for not broadening Dr. Cloud's independent verification effort, to be updated regarding the effect of the weight error on hanger design, and to review any other information that has been developed by PG&E since October 23, 1981.

This information is current as of 10:30 AM P.S.T. on October 26, 1981.