

- (4) The following labeling discrepancies were noted on the E1010 schematic drawings:
- (a) E1010/Pg.NB23, auxiliary relay K-80 is labeled "Close RHR Head Spray, Suction and Shutdown Cooling Injection Valves." This relay actually operates only the inboard RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valve. (50-358/81-22-07)
  - (b) E1010/Pg.NB29, auxiliary relay K29 and K30 logic includes contacts from 1E31-N012A and B which are labeled "OPENS ON HI WTR LEV." These contacts actually represent a high flow rate containment isolation signal for the RHR shutdown cooling suction line. (50-358/81-22-08)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

6. Review of Valve Packing Leak Detection Requirements Inside Containment

The inspector reviewed the plant design with respect to provision for identification of valve packing leakage inside the primary containment. This included a review of regulatory requirements, FSAR commitments, design specifications, design drawings, and the as built condition of the plant. This review was initiated in response to Section 5.b(2)(b) of this inspection report.

a. Documentation Reviewed

- (1) 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 30
- (2) Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR
- (3) GE Design Specification 22A2817, Revision 03, Residual Heat Removal System
- (4) GE Design Specification Data Sheet 22A2817AJ, Revision 05, Residual Heat Removal System
- (5) S&L Piping and Instrument Detail Drawings (various)
  - (a) P&ID M-21, Main Steam System
  - (b) P&ID M-49, High Pressure Core Spray
  - (c) P&ID M-50, Low Pressure Core Spray
  - (d) P&ID M-51, Residual Heat Removal System
  - (e) P&ID M-52, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
  - (f) P&ID M-83, Nuclear Boiler System
  - (g) P&ID M-84, Leak Detection System

b. Findings

- (1) 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 30 requires, "Components which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to the highest quality standards practical. Means shall be provided for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the

location of the source of reactor coolant leakage." The Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR, Paragraph 5.2.7.1.2.j states, "Valve Packing Leakage - Valve stem packing leaks of power-operated valves in the nuclear boiler system, high-pressure core spray, low-pressure core spray, reactor core isolation cooling system, residual heat removal system, and recirculation system are detected by monitoring packing leakoff for high temperature and are annunciated by an alarm in the control room."

The inspector reviewed the aforementioned system P&ID drawings and identified the following discrepancies:

- (a) RHR System Head Spray Inboard Containment Isolation Check Valve 1E51F066 is provided with leak-detection capability but no provision has been made to utilize it.
- (b) Main Steam Line Drain Inboard Containment Isolation Valve 1B21F016 (nuclear boiler system) is identified on Drawing M-21, Sheet 4 as being provided with leak detection capability (line 1LD49A 3/4 referenced to M-84 Sheet 3). Review of M-84 Sheet 3 revealed that no provision had been made for leak detection on this valve. A field check of the as-built condition verified that line 1LD49A 3/4 was not installed.
- (c) Main steamline vent (head vent and vent to radwaste) Valves 1B21F001, F002, F005 and RCIC steamline drain Valve 1E51F076 are reactor coolant pressure boundary valves, power-operated, and located inside the primary containment which are not provided with leak detection capability.

These items are unresolved pending review by the licensee and by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing. (50-358/81-22-09)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

## 7. Plant Tours

The inspectors conducted frequent plant tours throughout this inspection period. The below listed items were identified and the licensee is taking or has taken appropriate corrective action:

- a. A diesel generator building roof drain was plugged, causing water to fall on safety-related cable trays in the 'B' diesel generator room. This drain was immediately cleared by licensee personnel.
- b. The following items were noted during a tour of the service water pump structure:
  - (1) Scaffold being supported by ESS Division I and II boxes JBPB56 and JBPB57.