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 UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

INVESTIGATION REPORT NOS. 50-250/81-22 and 50-251/81-22

SUBJECT: Florida Power and Light Company
 Turkey Point 3 and 4
 Homestead, Florida 33030

Possible Falsification of Security Force Qualification Records

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 14-18, 1981

INVESTIGATORS: *J. L. Howell* 10-7-81
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 Enforcement and Investigation Staff
 Date Signed

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SECTION I

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT

TURKEY POINT 3 AND 4

SEPTEMBER 14-18, 1981

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A. BACKGROUND

On September 3, 1981, the Resident Inspector, Turkey Point 3 and 4, notified the Enforcement and Investigation Staff, Region II, by telephone that he had been notified by the FP&L Site Security Supervisor-Nuclear that the contract security agency had possibly falsified training documentation. During subsequent conversations between Region II and site security personnel it was learned that the contract training instructor verbally stated that he had falsified firearms certifications submitted to the State of Florida. A cursory licensee inquiry had established additional anomalies regarding firearms requirements and physical fitness testing criteria.

On September 4, 1981, the licensee notified Region II that a contingency force of properly qualified security personnel had been provided to the site by the contract security company and corrective action had been initiated to ensure that all current security force members were fully qualified.

B. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION

Based on the information provided by the licensee, an investigation was initiated on September 14, 1981 under the authority provided by Section 161c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The initial licensee concerns and statements made at the outset of this investigation identified the following specific alleged acts, omissions, or practices to be addressed:

1. The initial firearms qualification records of certain contract security force members may have been falsified and submitted to the State of Florida as certification of firearms proficiency.
2. The firearms qualification records of three (3) contract security force members may have been falsified to reflect proficiency with a particular weapon.
3. The firearms qualification records of certain contract security force members may have been falsified to reflect satisfactory completion of weapons firing during the hours of darkness.
4. The Physical Fitness Qualification Testing records of certain contract security force members may have been falsified to reflect satisfactory completion of the tests.

C. CONCLUSIONS

This investigation substantiated each of the four concerns and although the potential for violations of NRC requirements existed, none were identified.

The State of Florida requires certification of firearms proficiency for private security personnel, but the documents submitted to the State for this purpose are not the same as those provided for routine NRC review, nor do they reflect any information required by the NRC.

Although it was apparent that records were falsified by a contract security training instructor and subsequently submitted to the licensee to satisfy contractual obligations, the licensee identified the discrepancies at a point prior to that at which the NRC requirement exists. The security force members involved had not been assigned to positions requiring firearms and, in fact, were in a training status when the firearm concerns were identified.

Physical Fitness Qualification Testing of security force members is a requirement listed in the licensee's Training and Qualification Plan; however, this plan was accepted by the NRC on September 4, 1981 and a two year period of implementation is provided before full compliance is mandatory.

No evidence of culpability beyond that of the contractor's training instructor was noted during this investigation and no intent to provide fraudulent information to the NRC was established.

One additional area of concern regarding the training records of contract contingency security force members was noted by the investigators and is discussed in Paragraph II.C of this report.

D. MEETINGS WITH LICENSEE

The licensee was informed during an entrance interview on September 14, 1981, that an investigation had been initiated into licensee identified concerns relative to falsification of security force training records.

On September 18, 1981, the investigators met with the Turkey Point station manager, members of his staff, and representatives of the contract security force to discuss the concerns and investigation results. Although no specific violations of NRC requirements were identified during this investigation, the potential for such violations, had actions not been taken by licensee site security management, was discussed in detail.

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SECTION II

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

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