

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | O | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5  
8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 58  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 | R | E | P | O | R | T | S | O | U | R | C | E | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 9  
8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80  
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  
0 2 | (NP-33-80-75) On 8/23/80 at 0230 hours, the control room operator discovered that the  
0 3 | indicating lights on the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) indication panel for  
0 4 | damper HV5442 were not lit. The disconnect switch and supply breaker were checked  
0 5 | and attempts to stroke the valve were unsuccessful. HV5442 was declared inoperable.  
0 6 | Being an SFAS actuated damper, the station entered the action statement of T.S.  
0 7 | 3.3.2.1. There was no danger to the public or station personnel. The damper failed  
0 8 | in its safety position, closed. 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE: I B (11) CAUSE CODE: E (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: F (13) COMPONENT CODE: C K T B R K (14) COMP. SUBCODE: X (15) VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)  
17 | LER NO REPORT NUMBER: 8 1 (21) EVENT YEAR: 8 1 (22) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 6 3 (24) OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 (28) REPORT TYPE: X (30) REVISION NO.: 1 (32)  
ACTION TAKEN: X (18) FUTURE ACTION: C (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) HOURS: 0 0 0 0 (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  
1 0 | The cause was the failure of a fuse in the control circuit for HV5442. After declaring  
1 1 | HV5442 inoperable, the supply breaker was opened to assure failing HV5442 in the  
1 2 | closed position. Under Maintenance Work Order 80-3053, the blown fuse was discovered  
1 3 | and replaced. After closing the supply breaker, indication of damper position re-  
1 4 | turned. Damper HV5442 was declared operable at 1300 hours on 8/25/80. 80

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: H (26) % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) OTHER STATUS: NA (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Control Room observation (32)

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z (33) Z (34) NA (35) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA (36) LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA (36)

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) TYPE: Z (38) DESCRIPTION: NA (39)

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) DESCRIPTION: NA (41)

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z (42) DESCRIPTION: NA (43)

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) DESCRIPTION: NA (45)

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-75

DATE OF EVENT: August 23, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Damper HV5442 inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 0230 hours on August 23, 1980, the control room operator discovered that the indicating lights on the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) indication panel for damper HV5442 were not lit, indicating it was closed. Damper HV5442 provides part of the isolation for the non-Q ventilation piping passing through Emergency Core Cooling System Room No. 115. This isolation would be required in the event of a break in that piping which would otherwise prevent the emergency ventilation system from maintaining an adequate negative pressure in the room. A check of the disconnect switch and supply breaker revealed normal conditions and attempts to stroke the damper locally and remotely were unsuccessful, so damper HV5442 was declared inoperable.

Being an Incident Level #1 actuated damper, the station entered Action Statement 10 of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1. This technical specification requires this functional unit to be operable in all modes. The action statement requirements were satisfied by opening the control breaker with the damper in its safety position, closed.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the occurrence was the failure of a fuse in the control circuit for HV5442.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The damper failed in its safety position, closed.

Corrective Action: After declaring HV5442 inoperable, the supply breaker was opened failing HV5442 in the closed position, which is the required position in the event of an SFAS signal. Troubleshooting commenced under Maintenance Work Order 80-3053 on August 25, 1980. A blown fuse was discovered in the control circuit and was replaced. The maintenance was completed at 1043 hours on August 25, 1980. After closing the supply breaker, indication of damper position returned, and the damper was cycled several times to demonstrate operability. Damper HV5442 was officially declared operable at 1300 hours on August 25, 1980. Maintenance Work Order 81-1882 has been initiated to conduct a more thorough investigation of possible specific causes for the fuse failure.

Failure Data: There has been no other incident where an SFAS actuated damper was declared inoperable due to a blown fuse.