

HAZARDS ANALYSIS BY THE RESEARCH AND POWER REACTOR SAFETY BRANCHDIVISION OF LICENSING AND REGULATIONIN THE MATTER OFYANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANYPROPOSED CHANGE NO. 12DOCKET NO. 50-29

JAN 10 1962

Introduction

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3.A of License No. DPR-3, as amended, Yankee Atomic Electric Company in Proposed Change No. 12 dated December 14, 1961, requested authorization to add two 1½" capped stem isolation valves in the spray line to the pressurizer. One of the proposed isolation valves would be located in the spray line at its connection to No. 2 Main Coolant Loop piping, and the other would be located in the spray line adjacent to its connection to the top of the pressurizer. If authorized, Yankee intends to make this change at the time of the next refueling operation.

Discussion

The addition of the two valves, as proposed by Yankee, would permit isolation of the pressurizer solenoid spray valve and the hand control spray valve from the main coolant system. This arrangement would eliminate the need for depressurizing the primary system in the event that maintenance of the spray line and its associated valves becomes necessary and would, accordingly, facilitate maintenance of the spray line system. The valves could, however, inadvertently be in a closed condition at a time when the reactor is operating at power, thereby adversely affecting the safety of operation. For this reason, we believe that it is important that the existing Operating Procedures be revised so as to insure that the valves will be in an open condition any time the reactor is to be operated at a substantial level of power. Change No. 18, which involves a revision of certain of Yankee's Normal Plant Operating Instructions, has been authorized with the following incorporated as one of the Precautions listed under Operating Instruction No. 504A2, Plant Startup and Shutdown: "The pressurizer spray line shall not be isolated when the reactor power level is greater than 5 Mw thermal". With such procedures in effect, we believe that it would be highly unlikely that the presence of the isolation valves in the spray line would have any adverse effect on the safety of operation of the reactor.

Conclusion

In view of the above, we have concluded that Proposed Change No. 12 does not present significant hazards considerations not described or implicit in the

license application as amended to June 23, 1961. We have further concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public would not be endangered by operation of the facility as proposed.

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Date: MAY 16 1962