


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WRITTEN TESTIMONY
OF
SHELDON C. PLOTKIN



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I. INTRODUCTION

My name is Sheldon C. Plotkin. I am president of Sheldon C. Plotkin & Associates, a Los Angeles consulting engineering firm. I received my Doctorate in Electrical Engineering from the University of California at Berkeley in 1956. Since then I have worked and written extensively in the fields of transportation and communications analysis, systems analysis and safety evaluation. In 1971 I formed Sheldon C. Plotkin & Associates. We perform accident and safety analyses, systems development and accident reconstruction, analyzing component failures and human factor dynamics, and the relationship between them.

My work experience includes applications of mathematical models to highway and vehicular systems. I have worked closely with highway and traffic engineers who have supplied information concerning applicable required specifications and recommended practices from the Traffic Department of the California Department of Transportation. In my work with highway and traffic engineers, I have performed the basic systems and safety analyses, relying on them only for the information concerning safety standards, as noted above. I have analyzed, for example, many multiple vehicular accidents, considering elements of highway design, driver performance, human factor response to accident conditions, etc. I have written a text on the subject, entitled

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1 My background includes development of a study on
2 automated highways, advanced computer-controlled applications
3 for automobile diagnosis, and numerous other systems and safety
4 analysis projects. Attached to this testimony is a biography
5 and partial list of publications, to be incorporated herein.
6

7 II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

8 I have been asked to review the Applicants' and the
9 local jurisdictions' plans for evacuation to determine whether,
10 based upon my professional judgment as a systems safety engineer,
11 the populations within the EPZ plume exposure pathway would
12 be justified in believing that they were reasonably assured
13 that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the
14 event of a radiological emergency. "Adequate protective measures"
15 implies the choice of the protective measure which will protect
16 the health and safety of the populations at risk. When the
17 protective measure of choice is evacuation, there must be a
18 reasonable expectation that evacuation will result in a so-
19 called "dose savings," i.e., the populations at risk should
20 receive significantly less radiation due to protective actions
21 taken than they would if it were not taken. As has been stated
22 in NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 at page 6, "The overall
23 objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings
24 (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of
25 accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of
26 Protective Action Guides (PAGs)." Based upon my analysis of the
27 Applicants' Plan's time estimate for evacuation of a sector of the
28

1 plume exposure pathway EPZ under certain accident scenarios,
2 I have concluded that under many possible accident scenarios
3 for which persons responsible for choosing the appropriate
4 protective measure might conclude that evacuation is the
5 protective action of choice, evacuation would, in fact, expose
6 the evacuating populations to unacceptable levels of radiation,
7 causing injury and death.

8 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E IV. requires the Applicant
9 to submit plans which "provide an analysis of the time required
10 to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various
11 sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for
12 transient and permanent populations." As part of Applicants'
13 Emergency Plan, such an analysis is included. It is the analy-
14 sis of this time estimate which leads to my conclusion that
15 populations for whom evacuation may be selected would not, in
16 fact, be afforded dose savings, since they would be exposed to
17 radiation far in excess of the PAGs.

18 The exposure of these populations to radiation in
19 excess of the PAGs would come about, in part, due to flaws
20 of the time study, the "Wilbur Smith Study," which will be
21 detailed later. As is stated in NUREG 0654 , Appendix 4, p.4-1,
22 it is important to provide (accurate) updated time estimates ,
23 "Because the evacuation time estimates will be used by those
24 emergency response personnel charged with recommending and
25 deciding on protective actions during an emergency..." It
26 follows that decisions whether to evacuate or not will be as
27 sound as the data upon which they are based. The Wilbur Smith
28 Study which I have analyzed is seriously flawed, and cannot

1 be relied upon to produce accurate time estimates concerning
2 the time required to evacuate the various populations of the
3 plume exposure pathway EPZ. If relied upon for any serious
4 accident in which it is important to have a reasonably accurate
5 assessment of the time available for carrying out the
6 appropriate protective action, it will result in serious and
7 life threatening miscalculations of the time available for
8 taking such action.

9
10 III. ANALYTICAL APPROACH FOR DETERMINING CANCERS PER PERSON

11 A. Identification of Pertinent Parameters for Analysis

12 The Los Angeles Federation of Scientists Committee
13 on Evacuation Time Study participated with me in studying the
14 Wilbur Smith and Associates time estimates. We identified the
15 following parameters for analysis of radiation effects:

- 16 1. Core inventory released
- 17 2. Wind speed
- 18 3. Wind direction.
- 19 4. Number of persons at risk
- 20 5. Volume of plume
- 21 6. Radioactivity of plume following release

22 b. Assumptions Made

23 This study group adopted certain assumptions, which are
24 identified as follows:

25 ///

26 ///

- 1 1. The plume was assumed to travel for one hour before
2 its radiological effects were taken into account.
- 3 2. Radionuclides in the plume were assumed to be
4 homogeneously distributed within it.
- 5 3. Evacuation was assumed to be constant at the exits
6 from the EPZ plume exposure pathway.
- 7 4. A one per cent (1%) release of the core inventory
8 was considered to be a representative serious
9 accident.
- 10 5. A wind condition of a South East wind (SE) which
11 creates a 22 1/2° plume of a relatively constant
12 twenty meter (20 m.) height was assumed.

13 C. Results of the Study

14 Using the Wilbur Smith and Associates adverse weather
15 time estimate for the evacuation of the Northern Sector, plume
16 Exposure pathway EPZ, 6.25 hrs., we concluded that there would
17 be 2.0 to 8.4 cancers per persons as a result of radiation exposure.

18 Using the Los Angeles Federation of Scientists' Worst
19 case time estimate for the evacuation of the Northern Sector,
20 plume exposure pathway EPZ of 28 hrs., we achieved a result of
21 9 to 35 cancers per person as a result of radiation exposure.
22 The results of this study have caused me to conclude that even
23 if the Wilbur Smith and Associates Study were cured of its
24 flaws, there is no reason to expect that populations within the
25 plume exposure pathway EPZ could be evacuated in time to prevent
26 widespread injury and death from radiation under a large
27 number of accident scenarios.

1 D. Methodology

2 To consider the effects of the above mentioned parameters
3 on the health of the population at risk, we used the NRC's
4 NUREG 0490 data for summarizing various atmospheric release
5 categories representing hypothetical accidents at a PWR to
6 calculate upper and lower bounds for radiological damage
7 corresponding to release categories PWR 1 and PWR 9, respectively.
8 The NRC worst case (PWR 1) gives releases that range from a high
9 of 90% for noble gases to a low of 0.3% for the rare earths and
10 and for the related radionuclides. For the least case accidents
11 (PWR 9) releases ranged from a high of 3×10^{-4} or 0.0003%
12 to 0%.

13 Our calculated damage estimates for a 1% release (within
14 NRC Categories PWR 1 - 9) are 178,700 to 3,127,250 total
15 cancers among the 89,350 persons, all of whom were assumed to
16 be adults, at risk in the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The
17 intervening scenarios, including PWR 2 through PWR 8 releases,
18 have been evaluated for only those radionuclides which make
19 the most significant contributions to the overall radiological
20 damage to the exposed population according to our uniform release
21 scenario.

22 In our scenario, we considered the circumstances and
23 results based upon a uniform release of 1% of the core inventory
24 and calculated the corresponding radiological damage to the
25 persons at risk of exposure in the EPZ plume exposure pathway.
26 Our use of the 1% release figure is justified since it is
27 well within the range of releases postulated in the NRC figures

1 for postulated releases ranging from PWR 1 through PWR 9.

2 In our 1% release scenario, we also worked out the
3 damage that would result from three (3) different evacuation
4 times. For all other variables except evacuation times,
5 changes in radiological damage effect were directly or
6 inversely proportional to the assumed values of the given
7 parameters.

8 Our cancer estimates are based upon long term effects
9 of exposures to radiation in large amounts over a relatively
10 short period of exposure. A time frame of 50 years was used
11 to permit the cancer to develop. Obviously, not all of the
12 expected cancers will develop, since the very lethal ones will
13 claim their hosts' lives before the subsequent ones can. Also,
14 the long period of time will permit other intervening causes
15 of death to prevent the actual development of cancer in some
16 cases.

17 IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE WILBUR SMITH AND ASSOCIATES TIME ASSESSMENT

18 A. Inconsistencies with NUREG 0654 Appendix 4, p. 4-1

19 I have studied the Wilbur Smith study and the NUREG
20 document just mentioned, and I have noted some ways in which
21 the Wilbur Smith study does not meet the requirements of the
22 NUREG guidelines, i.e., is inconsistent with it. A partial
23 list follows, which I intend to supplement with a more complete
24 list as an Exhibit.

- 25 1. NUREG 0654 Appendix 4, Section 1 part B requires that
26 analyses of time assessments provide all assumptions
27 used in the analysis. Only a partial statement is made.
28 page 7.

1 2. NUREG 0654 requires that the analyses include a
2 source for obtaining further data or documentation
3 if computer models have been used. No such source
4 is provided in the Wilbur Smith study.

5 B. Unsubstantiated Assumptions, Stated and Unstated in the
6 Wilbur Smith Study. A brief list follows, which I shall
7 supplement with an exhibit.

- 8 1. All vehicles in the plume exposure pathway EPZ
9 have enough fuel to exit the EPZ.
10 2. No major roadway accidents will occur.
11 3. Spontaneous evacuation outside the area being
12 evacuated will not materially interfere with
13 evacuation.
14 4. Driver behaviors under conditions in which a threat
15 to health is perceived will not have a negative
16 impact on evacuation times.
17 5. No earthquake induced destruction of roadway
18 networks has occurred.

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20 V. A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO TIME ASSESSMENT USING A
21 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING METHOD

22 Using a systems engineering method, and taking into account
23 pertinent assumptions, a more realistic, and necessarily
24 pessimistic time assessment for evacuation is obtained. The
25 factors to be included in the system are:

- 26 1. Road network
27 2. Number of vehicles

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- 3. Condition of vehicles
- 4. Human factors under adverse circumstances
- 5. Condition of roads
- 6. Population to be evacuated
- 7. Adverse weather
- 8. Occupants per vehicle
- 9. Highway failure modes.

I have examined a severe earthquake scenario, and an accident under adverse weather but without earthquake conditions, using a systems engineering approach. The earthquake scenario yielded a one week period for evacuating the entire Northern sector of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The adverse weather scenario without earthquake yielded a 28 hr. evacuation time estimate.

The extended evacuation times which would be necessary under many accident scenarios plus the doses of radiation which would be contained in the plume exposure pathway EPZ would result in radiation injury and death of unprecedented magnitude in time of peace.

1 Biographical Data Re Sheldon C. Plotkin

2
3 Education BSEE University of Colorado 1946
4 BS Aeronautical Engineering University of Colorado, 1949
5 PhD Electrical Engineering University of California at Berkeley,
6 1956

6 Professional Experience

7 Private consulting practice 1971 to present
8 RAND Corporation 1969-71 Santa Monica, Calif. Senior engineer
9 in Engineering Sciences Dept., worked on various systems,
10 including communication and transportation
11 TRW Systems 1967-69 Redondo Beach. Automatic Highway and
12 high speed ground transportation development, large scale
13 failure modes, automobile safety studies, train air suspension,
14 civil system developments
15 Hughes Aircraft Company 1961-67 Staff engineer for G&C Advanced
16 Systems Laboratory and mathematics consultation department.
17 Dynamic analyses, advanced control system design, communication
18 system analyses, mathematical modeling, automobile systems
19 development. (Originated infra red radar system concept for
20 vehicle control.
21 University of Southern California 1958-61 Los Angeles
22 Assistant Professor in charge of graduate and undergraduate
23 electronics courses, redesign of electrical engineering labs.
24 Hoffman Electronics Corporation, 1959 to 1961 Consultant in
25 Communications Systems Department
26 Energy Systems (Formerly Levinthal Electronic Products), 1956-58.
27 Senior Project Engineer at Palo Alto for design and safety of
28 high voltage, high power pulse modulators
University of California at Berkeley 1950-56. Teaching assistant
1950-54 in EE Dept. Project Engineer Cosmic Ray Lab in charge
of equipment and operation
U.S. Naval Missile Test Center 1949-50 Point Magu Conduct and
evaluation of missile tests as Aero and Electrical engineer
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1946-47 New Mexico Design
and construction of electronic material

22 Professional Affiliations

23 Registered Professional Safety Engineer, S.S.S., E.E.E., Pi Mu
24 Epsilon, Eta Kappa Nu, Sigma Xi, Los Angeles Federation of
25 Scientists.

25 Publications and Seminars

26 Several hundred papers, reports, and intra-company documents
27 Accident and Product Failure Analyses (book)
28 "Introduction to Accident, Safety and Forensic Engineering."
(seminar)

Biography, continued

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Military Service

Apprentice Seaman, U.S. Navy V-12 program, 1944-46
Lt. J.G. Naval Reserve (inactive) 1946 -approx 1953

Court Testimony

Vehicular accident reconstruction and design; slip and fall;
human impact; electrical explosion; electronic circuitry;
high voltage; escalator safety; elevator operation; highway
design; pattern recognition; production equipment design
and operation; human factor perception and dynamics.

Deposition and Reports

Fires; tire fabrication and design; test equipment; vehicle
characteristics; criminal evidence.

PUBLICATIONS (Partial List)

"A Feasibility Study of High Power Magnetic Modulators," Final Report, Contract No. AF30(602)-1177, October 1956.

"Discontinuous Transition Time Between Stable States in Ferroresonant Circuits," Trans. AIEE Pt. 1 (Communication and Electronics), Vol. 76, pp. 410-421, September 1957.

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"A New Approach to Electrical Engineering Laboratories," Trans. IRE-PG on Education, Vol. E-4, No. 1, pp. 9-11, March 1961.

"On Limitations of Broad-Band Impedance Matching Without Transformers," Trans. IRE-PGCT, Vol. CT-9, No. 2, pp. 125-132, June 1962. Co-author Dr. N. Nahi.

"Improving the Linearity of the Steady State Gain Characteristic by Use of Nonlinear Feedback," Trans. AIEE Pt. 2 (Applications and Industry), Vol. 81, pp. 277-282, November 1962. Co-author Dr. N. Nahi.

"On Nonlinear AGC," Proc. IRE (Correspondence), Vol. 51, p. 380, February 1963.

"Refined Method for Calculating Satellite Interference from Microwave Transmitters," Report No. 2, Contract No. NASw-495, HRL, Malibu, Calif., November 1962. Co-author Dr. S. G. Lutz.

"The Coverage Overlap Area with Satellites of Equal Height," Report No. 3, Contract No. NASw-495, HRL, Malibu, Calif., December 1962. Co-authors Dr. S. G. Lutz and Dr. G. Korosheski.

"A Feasibility Study of Satellite Communication in the 15-20 Gc. Frequency Range," Report No. 4, Contract No. NASw-495, HRL, Malibu, Calif., January 1963. Co-author Dr. S. G. Lutz.

"Preliminary Study of Modulation Systems for Satellite Communication," Report No. 6R, Contract No. NASw-495, HRL, Malibu, Calif., June 1963.

"Preliminary Study of Companders for Satellite Communication," informal report on Contract No. NASw-495, HRL, Malibu, Calif., May 1963.

"Some Overall Aspects of Automatic Checkout for Aerospace Systems," Proc. Systems Engineering Conf., N.Y., June 8-11, 1964. Co-authors R. H. Lauschner and Dr. V. Mayper, Jr.

"FM Bandwidth as a Function of Distortion and Modulation Index," IEEE Trans. on Com. Tech., Vol. COM-15, No. 3, pp. 467-470, June 1967.

"External Prison Security Study, Phase I," Final Report, State of Calif., Contract No. 1235, TRW, Redondo Beach, Calif., April 1968.

"Automation of the Highways, An Overview," IEEE Trans. on Veh. Tech., VT-18, August 1969.