Docket No. 50-206

Bulletin No. 80-06

Southern California Edison Company

P. O. BOX 800
2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE
ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770

J. G. HAYNES
MANAGER OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

TELEPHONE
(213) 572-1742

August 6, 1981



U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1990 North California Boulevard
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director

DOCKET No. 50-206
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1

Dear Sir:

IE BULLETIN 80-06
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF)
RESET CONTROLS

Reference is made to your correspondence of March 13, 1980, forwarding IE Bulletin 80-06, and to our initial response dated June 9, 1980. In that response, we stated that a test demonstrating the validity of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Reset Controls drawing review would be performed prior to return to power. This test was performed on May 9, 1981. This letter transmits the results of that test.

All components remained in their safety conditions following reset of the safety injection sequencers, with the exception of FCV 1112, the SI annunciator, the event recorder, and MOV 1100 B, C, and D. These components returned to their normal conditions. The behavior of FCV 1112, the SI annunciator, and the event recorder were in accordance with our drawing review. As discussed in our June 9, 1980 letter, no corrective action is required for these components. The failure of MOV 1100 B, C, and D to remain in the Emergency Mode on ESF reset was not predicted by the original drawing review. A subsequent review has revealed that these valves should have been expected to behave as they did.

The valves in question operate during safety injection to switch charging pump suction from the Volume Control Tank (VCT) to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT). ESF reset would cause these valves to return to normal. This would cause the charging pumps to be drawing from a potentially unborated source of water. Upon low level in the VCT, the valves would again operate to switch suction to the RWT.

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The temporary corrective action for this situation was, prior to return to power operation, to revise the loss of coolant Emergency Operating Instruction to require placing MOV 1100 B, C, and D controls in the emergency lineup manually prior to resetting the Safety Injection sequencers. This will prevent their return to normal upon ESF reset and will preserve positive operator control of the system. This temporary corrective action is acceptable since (1) it involves only subsequent operator action and can be readily performed from the control room and (2) ESF reset requires manual action and cannot occur automatically. Therefore, no credit for immediate operator action need be taken. This temporary corrective action was completed prior to return to power.

The permanent corrective action will be to modify the control circuitry for MOV 1100 B, C, and D to incorporate a seal in/reset function on ESF actuation. This action is scheduled to be completed during the next refueling outage.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Subscribed on this 6 day of Aug, 1981.

Very truly yours,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

By J. G. Haynes
J. G. Haynes
Manager of Nuclear Operation

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 6th day of August 1981

Agnes Crabtree
Notary Public in and for the County
of Los Angeles, State of California

OFFICIAL SEAL
AGNES CRABTREE
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Commission Exp. Aug. 27, 1982

WGR:RN:0031

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection

L. F. Miller - USNRC Resident Inspector

D. M. Crutchfield