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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

JCP&L / GPU

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July 27, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-30/01T-0

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-30/01T-0 in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a.2 and 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

J. T. Carroll, Jr.
Director Station Operations

JTC:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

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S1/1

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-30/01T-0

Report Date

July 27, 1981

Occurrence Date

July 14, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

The failure of reactor building main exhaust valve V-28-22 to close resulted in a violation of Secondary Containment integrity as defined by the Technical Specifications, section 1.14C and a violation of Technical Specifications 3.5.B.1. The plant was also operating in a degraded mode as permitted by a limiting condition of operation as given in Technical Specifications section 3.5.B.3 when Standby Gas Treatment System #I failed to start.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 6.9.2.a.2 and 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters

Power:	Reactor	1409 MWt
	Generator	370 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation	11.1×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater	4.18×10^6 lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

On Tuesday, July 14, at 1910 hours, Standby Gas Treatment System #I failed to start during performance of required surveillance. At the same time reactor building main exhaust valve V-28-22 failed to close. However, valve V-28-21, the reactor building main exhaust valve in series with V-28-22, closed as it should have. At 1930 hours the testing of SGTS II was completed and SGTS II was demonstrated operable. The flow sensor for SGTS I was worked on and at approximately 2315 hours SGTS I was demonstrated operable, but V-28-22 still failed to close.

On Wednesday, July 15, at approximately 0830 hours, the reactor building ventilation was secured and SGTS II was initiated. Again V-28-22 failed to close and upon recognition of a Technical Specification violation, an orderly plant shutdown was commenced at 0840 hours. At 1018 hours, valve V-28-22 was manually closed and the shutdown was halted.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of SGTS I failure to start was due to a problem with the pitot tube flow sensor. The cause of the failure of V-28-22 to close was due to a faulty solenoid. The inability of V-28-22 to isolate was not immediately recognized as a Technical Specification violation.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Standby Gas Treatment System is designed to filter and exhaust reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions. Upon initiation of either SGTS, valves V-28-21 and V-28-22 will automatically close to isolate the reactor building exhaust.

The safety significance of this occurrence is minimized by the fact that the redundant SGTS was operable. It is also minimized because valve V-28-21 performed its function of isolating the reactor building exhaust. Although section 1.14C of the Technical Specifications requires both V-28-21 and V-28-22 to be closed to satisfy secondary containment integrity requirements, the closure of one of the valves functionally meets the requirements of isolating the reactor building exhaust.

Corrective Action

In an attempt to properly line up SGTS I, the belts on exhaust fan EF 1-8 were checked and found in order (EF1-8 exhausts from SGTS I to the stack). The flow sensor for SGTS I was adjusted to properly sense full flow. A reactor shutdown was initiated and subsequently valve V-28-22 was manually closed and secured. The plunger and spring actuator assembly of the solenoid which controls the air operator of V-28-22 was replaced, which corrected the problem with valve V-28-22. Valve V-28-22 was cycled and demonstrated to be operable at approximately 1530 hours on July 15, 1981.

Failure Data

Solenoid
Manufacturer: ASCO
Type: 3/4 inch, single actuator, 4-way valve