# Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Petition Review Board Meeting: Oceansiders

**Against San Onofre Corruption** 

Docket Number: OEDO-19-00454

Location: Rockville, Maryland

#

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### UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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# PETITION REVIEW BOARD

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DISCUSSION WITH PETITIONER SEEKING ENFORCEMENT

ACTION AGAINST SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

[SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 2 AND 3

(SONGS) 2.206 PETITION OEDO-19-00454]

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### WEDNESDAY

JANUARY 22, 2019

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The Petition Review Board met in the TWFN 7-D-30, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD, at 1:00 p.m., Kevin Williams, Chair, presiding.

# **PRESENT**

KEVIN WILLIAMS, Chair, PRB, NRC

ANDREA KOCK, NRC

DAN DOYLE, NRC

CHRIS ALLEN, NRC

JON WOODFIELD, NRC

MARLAYNA DOELL, NRC

PERRY BUCKBERG, NRC

ROB CARPENTER, NRC

SOPHIE HOLIDAY, NRC

STEPHANIE ANDERSON, NRC

LATIF HAMDAN, NRC

RICHARD CHANG, NRC

ANDREW HON, NRC

JAMES RUBENSTONE, NRC

ZAHIRA CRUZ, NRC

# ALSO PRESENT

AL BATES, Southern California Edison

MARK MORGAN, Southern California Edison

DERRICK BRYCE, Southern California Edison

WILLIAM WIEGEL III, Oceansiders Against San Onofre

Corruption

WILLIAM WIEGEL, JR., Oceansiders Against San Onofre Corruption

TORGAN JOHNSON, Oceansiders Against San Onofre Corruption

DONNA GILMORE, Oceansiders Against San Onofre Corruption

SUE GARCIA, San Diego Gas & Electric
ALLEN TRIAL, San Diego Gas & Electric

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1 1:00 p.m. 2 MR. ALLEN: Mr. Weigel? Yes, sir. 3 MR. WIEGEL: 4 MR. ALLEN: I just wanted to ask a question as a point of going forward. 5 The name of your organization is Oceansiders Against San Onofre 6 Corruption. As we go through the introductions and 7 the preliminary statements, do you have any objections 8 to being referred to simply as Oceansiders? 9 10 MR. WIEGEL: No, that's fine. Okay. Thank you. 11 MR. ALLEN: 12 MR. ALLEN: Okav. Ιf there's no 13 objections then, we'll go ahead and get started with the meeting then. So I'd like to thank everybody for 14 15 attending this meeting. The purpose of today's 16 meeting is to provide the petitioner, Oceansiders 17 Corruption, Against San Onofre also known 18 Oceansiders, an opportunity to address the Petition 19 Review Board, or PRB, regarding their petition to stop spent fuel loading activities at SONGS and to relocate 20 21 the spent fuel to a less densely-populated area not on 22 a military installation. 23 My name is Chris Allen. I'm a project manager in the Division of Fuel Management in the 24

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

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I'm

also the petition manager for this petition.

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The PRB Chairman is Kevin Williams, Deputy Director in the Division of Material Safety and Security, State and Tribal Programs, in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. This is a Category 1 meeting. The public is invited to observe this meeting and will have one or more opportunities to communicate with the NRC after the business portion but before the meeting is adjourned.

I'd ask that you please silence your cell phones at this time, as not to interrupt the meeting or any of its speakers. There is a sign-up sheet around the room, and I'll ask everybody in attendance in the room to please fill that out.

As part of the Petition Review Board's review of this petition, Oceansiders has requested this opportunity to address the PRB. This meeting was scheduled to begin at 1:00 Eastern time and, after introductory remarks, we'll allow Oceansiders minutes to address the Board. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by a court reporter. The transcript will become a supplement to the petition. Since this transcript will also be made publicly available, no sensitive or proprietary information should be

1	presented.
2	I'd like to open the meeting with
3	introductions. As I stated, the PRB Chair is Kevin
4	Williams, and we'll go around the rest of the room in
5	this direction, please.
6	MR. WOODFIELD: Okay. My name is Jon
7	Woodfield. I'm an inspector in NMSS, the Division of
8	Fuel Management, the Inspections Oversight Branch.
9	MR. BUCKBERG: I'm Perry Buckberg. I'm
10	the Agency 2.206 Petition Process Coordinator.
11	MR. CARPENTER: Robert Carpenter, NRC,
12	Office of General Counsel.
13	MS. HOLIDAY: Sophie Holiday, Office of
14	Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Enforcement
15	Coordinator.
16	MR. DOYLE: I'm Dan Doyle. I'm the Acting
17	Chief of Storage, Transportation, and Licensing
18	Branch, Division of Fuel Management, NMSS.
19	MR. RUBENSTONE: My name is James
20	Rubenstone. I'm the Chief of Material Control and
21	Accounting Branch in the Division of Fuel Management
22	in NMSS.
23	MR. CHANG: Richard Chang, NMSS, Reactor
24	Decommissioning Branch.
25	MR. ALLEN: Would NRC personnel on the

1	phone please introduce yourselves?
2	OPERATIONS OFFICER: Headquarters
3	Operations Officer, NRC.
4	MS. KOCK: This is Andrea Kock. I'm the
5	Director of the Division of Fuel Management at the
6	NRC.
7	MS. ANDERSON: Stephanie Anderson, Health
8	Physicist, NRC, Region IV office.
9	MS. CRUZ: Zahira Cruz, Project Manager,
10	Reactor Decommissioning, NRC.
11	MS. DOELL: This is Marlayna Doell. I'm
12	also a project manager in Reactor Decommissioning for
13	the NRC.
14	MR. HAMDAN: Latif Hamdan, Division of
15	Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
16	Safeguards. I'm also the 2.206 petition coordinator
17	for the office.
18	MR. ALLEN: Thank you very much. Are
19	there any representatives of the licensee on the
20	phone?
21	MR. BATES: Yes. This is Al Bates,
22	Regulatory Manager, representing Southern California
23	Edison. Here with me is Mark Morgan from our
24	Regulatory Affairs Department and Derrick Bryce, our
25	legal counsel.

1	MR. ALLEN: Thank you very much.
2	Oceansiders, would you please introduce yourselves for
3	the record?
4	MR. WIEGEL: Yes, this is William Wiegel,
5	III, Oceansiders Against San Onofre Corruption.
6	MR. WIEGEL: I'm William Wiegel, Jr.
7	MR. JOHNSON: Torgan Johnson.
8	MS. GILMORE: Donna Gilmore, San Onofre
9	Safety also.
10	MR. ALLEN: Although it's not required for
11	members of the public to introduce yourself, are there
12	any members of the public on the phone that would like
13	to introduce themselves at this time? Hearing none.
14	I want to emphasize that we each need to
15	speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the court
16	reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. If
17	you do have something that you would like to say,
18	please state your name for the record.
19	For those dialing into the meeting, please
20	remember to mute your phones to minimize any
21	background noise or distractions. If you don't have a
22	mute button, you can mute your phone by pressing the
23	keys *6, and if you would like to speak you can unmute
24	the phone by pressing *6.
25	At this time, I will turn it over to the

1 PRB Chairman, Kevin Williams. 2 MR. WILLIAMS: Welcome to this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by Oceansiders 3 Against San Onofre Corruption. From here on, I will 4 reference them as Oceansiders. 5 I'd like to first share some background on 6 Section 2.206 of Title X of the Code 7 NRC's process. of Federal Regulations describes the petition process, 8 which is the primary mechanism for the public to 9 10 request enforcement action by the NRC in a public 11 process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC 12 Sorry to interrupt, but we 13 MR. WIEGEL: 14 are having a hard time hearing the gentleman speaking. 15 MR. WILLIAMS: I'm going to move over. 16 Can you hear me better now? 17 MR. WIEGEL: Yes, that is better. 18 MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. For the sake of argument, I'll start over. 19 Welcome to this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by Oceansiders 20 21 Against San Onofre Corruption. Hereafter, I will 22 refer to them as Oceansiders. 23 I'd like to first share some background on our process. Section 2.206 of Title X of the Code of 24 25 Federal Regulations describes the petition process,

which is the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition the NRC to take enforcement type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, the NRC could modify, suspend, or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem.

The NRC staff guidance for the disposition of a 2.206 petition request is in Management Directive 8.11, which is publicly available. The purpose of today's meeting is to give Oceansiders an opportunity to provide any additional explanation and support for the petition after having received the PRB's initial assessment.

This public meeting is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for Oceansiders or other members of the public to question or examine the PRB on the merits or the issues presented in the petition request. Oceansiders will have 35 minutes for their presentation. The NRC staff in attendance may ask clarifying questions in order to better understand Oceansiders' presentation and to reach a reasoned decision on whether or not to accept Oceansiders'

request for review under the 2.206 process.

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No decisions regarding the merits of this petition will be made at this meeting. The meeting will be transcribed, and the transcript will be made publicly available.

Following this meeting, the PRB will consider the supplemental information presented during the meeting together with the original application in making its final recommendation on whether to accept the petition for review. Oceansiders will be informed of the final recommendation.

I would like to summarize the scope of the petition under consideration and the NRC activities to date. On August 3rd, 2019, Oceansiders submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding concerns spent fuel loading activities at Specifically, Oceansiders requested that the NRC issue an immediate cease and desist to Southern California Edison and require the permit holder procure safer thick-walled, easily in transportable canisters, and relocate them to a temporary storage site further away from densely-populated areas and not on a military installation.

On December 20th, 2019, the petition manager contacted Oceansiders to inform them of the

PRB's initial assessment that the petition does not meet Management Directive 8.11, Section 3.c.1 criteria for a petition evaluation because NRC staff has continued to carefully regulate the licensee's spent fuel loading activities at SONGS, including the review of the fuel storage facility design; inspections encompassing the physical facility, as well as the licensee's operational performance; and appropriate enforcement actions.

Regarding Oceansiders' concern about the environmental impacts of the spent fuel loading activities, NRC staff concluded that these activities are bounded by previously-issued generic environmental impact statements and did not find any deviations from previously-issued environmental statements for SONGS.

The petition manager also offered Oceansiders an opportunity to address the PRB to clarify or supplement the petition in response to this assessment, and Oceansiders accepted the invitation. As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript that will be made publicly available. Thank you.

At this time, I will turn it over to

Oceansiders to allow you they opportunity to provide any information you believe the PRB should consider as part of this petition. You have 35 minutes for your presentation.

MR. WIEGEL: Thank you for that. This is William Wiegel, III, and I would like to begin with addressing the response dated December 20th, 2019. The first paragraph about response identifies that, based on the PRB's initial assessment, it appeared that all of the issues raised in our petition have already been the subject of NRC staff review and did not raise concerns with the NRC staff not considered and resolved or not appropriately addressed in the 2.206 process. Accordingly, the preliminary decision was not to accept the petition.

The first item we wish to present as the petitioner, a petitioner request for the documentation that the NRC had conducted third-party verified ASMEcompliant investigations into the field conditions of the Holtec canisters in response to an admission by Dr. Chris Singh at the 1/19/19 NRC pre-decisional enforcement conference webinar where Dr. Singh admitted record to, quote, manufacturing incompetence, end quote, of Holtec equipment currently the admission directly in use at site. This

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invalidates all Holtec warranties and claims of safety and directly calls into question whether the canisters installed actually conformed to the certificate of compliance and technical specifications that referenced further in the NRC's response where they state, as a result of NRC staff remains confident that the reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public's health and safety is maintained for as long as fuel is stored in accordance with the requirements of the SONGS license, the certificate of compliance for the Holtec systems, and other typical requirements. We have a situation where there's a direct contradiction to the certificate of compliance, as admitted to by Holtec's own employee, Dr. Chris Singh, where he admitted to the manufacturing incompetence and states there is no information available to the public showing any investigation into the manufacturing incompetence claims stated by Dr. Therefore, we have no way to see if the steel was manufactured to the adequate standards required under this permit.

In order for this admission of the non-compliance with the certificate of compliance and technical specifications, the NRC has a legal responsibility to hold them to the burden of proof by

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means of third-party verified ASME compliant test results documenting the steel they manufactured and subsequent use of the canisters that meets these requirements in the certificate of compliance. Until such time as an independent ASME-certified third-party testing laboratory can be procured by the licensee to verify the condition of the manufactured steel used to build the canisters under this permit, the NRC will be unable to meet its Directive 8.11-02 objective that state to ensure the public health and safety through the prompt and thorough evaluation of any potential problem addressed by the petition filed under the CFR 2.206 process and immediately place a cease and desist on the project until that can be secured.

The second issue we would like to bring up is the response that the NRC staff has continued to carefully regulate the licensee's decommissioning activities at SONGS including review of the fuel storage facility design inspections and appropriate enforcement actions. Specifically, the NRC performed a thorough review of UMAX independent spent fuel storage installation designs at the time the entity approved in 2017 through public rulemaking. In addition, NRC staff from Headquarters Region IV continuously performs oversight to ensure the storage

of spent nuclear fuel does not pose a threat to public
health and safety. The NRC inspections of
decommissioning activities are documented and
inspection reports are publicly available.
Inspections at SONGS is specifically considered events
described in the petition regarding licensee's fuel
loading operations, potential scratching of the fuel
canisters, and training of SDG&E employees at NRC's
response include a detailed assessment of the
significant events, specific enforcement actions, and
subsequent consideration of corrective actions.
However, this statement directly contradicts the
following statement made by employees at the $1/24/19$
webinar in which Scott Morris addressed the process to
determine what punitive actions, if any, were going to
be taken against Edison, who stated management failed
to recognize the complexity and risk associated with
long-duration fuel transfer campaign while using a
relatively new system design. Morris then posed a
question to Southern California Edison of how do you
justify that if you get caught, and Edison admitted
that it was guilty of poor planning, a lack of senior
management, and oversight. As previously stated, any
assertion of their ability to move forward without
further incident is not credible and presents a clear

threat to public safety.

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PRB's statements directly contradict the assessment made by the regional administrator and the assumption of trust for Southern California Edison and its contractors to self-correct and police are not only therefore flagrantly irresponsible and directly violates NRC's own mission statements. For example, the NRC putting more trust in the licensee while ignoring its own personnel acts with overseeing the safety of the project is evident in an article published by the LA Times in which a federal inspector found many of the waste filled cans had been scraped and scratched when they were lowered into the interim storage facility. That article is referenced for the Board to review in detail.

For the sake of time, I'm going to move forward into the third item where, again, the NRC states that they remain confident with a reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety is maintained for as long as the fuel is stored in accordance with the requirements of the SONGS licensee's certificate of compliance for the Holtec system and other applicable requirements. The agency is committed to ensuring the continuation of its ongoing regulatory oversight at the facility, as

reflected in the NRC's rigorous review of the fuel storage design at SONGS, together with its well-documented inspection and enforcement of the activities.

As previously stated, Holtec has admitted it is in breach of the certificate of compliance. Additionally, this Southern California Edison document titled SONGS HI-STORM MPC visual assessment report is recently released after being obtained by a FOIA request which exposes Southern California Edison conducted a visual assessment that was not a formal inspection or an activity qualified to ASME Sections 7 and/or 16 or, I'm sorry, 11. 3, 5, and 11. Pardon me.

In spite of this fact, the conclusions section stated the scope of the visual assessment is considered adequate. Therefore, even with incidental contact during downloading operations, the SONGS HI-STORM MPCs remain in compliance with all applicable ASME boiler and pressure vessel code requirements. This inspection was not done to ASME qualifications, and the margin of error in the report could put the SONGS HI-STORM MPC standard of .175 inches of available margin for localized losses of shell thickness out of compliance with all applicable ASME

boiler and pressure vessel code requirements.

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We hereby request the NRC call for an immediate cease and desist order for the project until such time as an independent third-party ASME Section 3, 5, and 11 test occurs and confirms that the SONGS Hi-STORM MPC standards for .175 inches of available margin for localized losses of shell thickness is complied with. The NRC's acceptance of these non-ASME sections for an otherwise qualified visual inspection report as satisfactory downloading operations of the canister is a violation of their mission statement and warrants an immediate cease and desist be issued.

Regarding item number four, response regarding the concern about the siting of the facility and environmental impacts, the paragraph, you also requested that the NRC relocate spent fuel away from military bases. Staff concluded that, pursuant to MD Section 2.A.2, the request is not appropriate for the 2.206 process because it's outside the NRC's jurisdiction. law 88-82 referenced in the decision vests authority in the Secretary of Navy to determine the appropriateness of granting an easement for purpose of siting a nuclear power plant, including all its purposes. Therefore, the NRC lacks the of

jurisdiction to take the specific action the petitioner requests.

We hereby request documentation from the NRC that shows correspondence from the Secretary of Navy where approval was granted for the licensee to place an unsecured ISFSI on a military installation with no engineering or protective consideration in its ballistic impact or other potential enemy attacks. Ιf no documentation can be produced, we hereby request the NRC conduct an immediate full factual hearing to document whether the Navy considers the ISFSI adequately hardened to withstand enemy attacks in a time of war since military bases are legitimate under Laws of War. The NRC has the demonstrated the clear rightness of the need for the Secretary of Navy to have jurisdiction over the appropriateness of this location but has not showed its due diligence in securing more approval for the safety element of the approval process. Therefore, until such times as written approval has been procured from the Secretary of the Navy, an immediate cease and desist must be placed on the project due to elevated levels from active conflict areas, international and domestically. Failure to do so will document complicity by the NRC in what amounts to a

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potential weapon of mass destruction being intentionally or unintentionally developed for enemy use against the United States in a time of declared or undeclared war on an active military installation.

In addition this, we would also like to redirect attention to concerns of jurisdiction brought up by W.L. Whittenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, the Marine Corps installation base, and the letter of Joseph Street of the Coastal Commission where he stated, for a SONGS site, the instrument at issue is the easement in which the federal agency retains even more rights to access the site subject to the easement than it does with a lease to be addressed by the Federal District Court in Manchester. The Navy and United States Marine Corps understand the Commission's reliance on the California Coastal Commission versus Granite Rock Company case to assert jurisdiction under the California Coastal Act over this federal property. The federal property in the Granite Rock, though, was under the proprietorial jurisdiction where state law generally applies. The SONGS site, on the other hand, is under exclusive federal jurisdiction where the state generally does not apply. Thus, it is the Navy and the United States Marine Corps' position that the Commission only has jurisdiction over the SONGS site

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through the different key provisions of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act; and, therefore, the Navy and the United States Marine Corps object to the Commission requiring or issuing a coastal development permit under the California Coastal Act, the proposed action at hand, or for any other proposed action at the SONGS site.

Until such time that the NRC had procured a letter of authorization, they are actually acting in direct opposition of these statements by W.L. Whittenberg that were given to the Coastal Commission in collaboration with the approval of this permit.

MR. WIEGEL: This is William Wiegel, Jr., and I have 20 years experience as a judge advocate in the Air Force. I'm very concerned about the fact that the NRC used a blanket environmental impact statement to cover the largest nuclear waste dump privately run in the nation, which is on a military installation. There are no other nuclear power plants on military installations in the United States, and I have seen no documentation regarding any analysis on the part of the NRC to provide authorization for public policy that would allow for a nuclear waste dump, and, in this case, it's one which contains enough radioactive cesium-137 to be equivalent to over hundred

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Chernobyls or 700 nuclear missiles, take your pick, and to allow that on a military installation.

And one of the things that needs to be addressed is the fact that military installations have a different unique status under international law regarding the laws of war. And if you put something on a military installation, it's likely to get hit by your enemy in a time of war. And no one can say how long that material is going to be at San Onofre, but no one can say that we won't be at war within the next 40 years or 50 years or however long it stays out there.

And my concern is that no effort was made to separately engineer that facility so that it would be hardened. If you know anything about the military, you know that they're very good at hardening sites to protect them against enemy attack. If you look at how we handle our chemical emissions in this country, we scatter them out in hardened sites where they're not all clustered together. The engineering on this where you utilize, as Lee Brookhart of your own NRC organization said, the ASME standards are not met for pressure vessels. Well, guess what? Missiles provide a lot of concussion and could easily rupture one of those canisters.

There's been no analysis and no public policy effort to say that a military installation is an appropriate place to put that level of radioactive material, particularly when we have, within 50 miles we have eight and a half million people that live out here. It's unconscionable that the NRC would have done this and done it in the manner that they did. You guys really need to have a full hearing on this particular issue, and I would suggest that you ask the Navy to help bail you out at this point and figure out how to harden that site, build a dome over it or do whatever. Thank you.

MS. GILMORE: This is Donna Gilmore. There's no reason for the NRC to give exemption to ASME nuclear pressure vessel standards for storage and transport. There are other systems that have that certification, and we need to protect our military and all our resources, and there's nothing more critical than doing that now. And I hope that you re-evaluate your decision on this. Take a look at the Swiss system if you want to learn what a good design is and explain why you are rejecting ASME N3-certified systems that are in hardened facilities.

MR. JOHNSON: This is Torgan Johnson. I've been looking at this ISFSI presented to the

public after the early shutdown of the two reactors. What I notice, along with a number of other people, planners, the first thing was a red flag was the siting of this thing. You couldn't have picked a worse site location-wise just from the environmental and natural hazards risk of this site.

The second thing that's come to light was looking at the design of this system. My background is architecture and urban planning, and I would say that, as I've attended all these meetings through the CEP and NRC meetings related to this ISFSI, there's a cumulative number of red flags that the public has identified. And what I see in these discussions about the licensing approval process and then overlooking the safety concerns and waiving safety regulations is that you have a cumulative effect of all of these things now at the site, and maybe the most glaring one was Southern California Edison's address of a near drop event was portrayed as a worker training issue and not a hardware issue. And it parallels very much what we've just seen with the Boeing issue with the 737 Max 8 issue. I think there was an immediate response to blame the pilots for what, essentially, was a hardware issue and a software issue.

We have the same problem here at San

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Onofre where workers on site, some of them from the
construction industry who had very little training,
very little understanding of the risks, and absolutely
no procedures in place to be able to deal with ar
accident, had confronted a near drop of one of these
50-ton canisters, not once but twice. In listening to
the whistleblower's discussion at a TDP meeting, he
said there's absolutely no safety on site. And the
safety is both proper training and having the right
staff to handle this waste but also to have the right
hardware. And I think what we have is we have a
system now where, from my perspective, and I've built
a lot of big projects, there's so many red flags that
have been overlooked or downplayed or just ignored
that you now have a string of issues that cumulatively
point to an absolutely defective system for which
there's no justification for continuing to use the
system. I don't understand why Southern California
Edison is willing to take these risks. Their judgment
has been very poor in the past. My hometown of Malibu
was just burned to the ground based on Southern
California Edison's judgment on their electric
infrastructure and something as small as a re-closer
on their electrical grid. If a small re-closer car
burn down an entire half of the town of Malibu,

imagine what 3.6 million pounds of high-level radioactive waste located upwind of 8.5 million people is going to do in defective canisters that can't be inspected, that can't be reopened. We can repackage this waste if there's a problem with it.

What I see is Edison stepping into a huge PR disaster. You almost had it on August 8th and again, I believe, on July 22nd of 2018, a huge PR disaster which I don't know how Edison internally is making decisions about risk, but I think that this looks like a massive blunder in the process. two near drops are synonymous with the two crashed 737 And if there's no way to deal with what almost happened twice, either with a hot cell or now I know Edison is moving forward to deconstruct the spent fuel pools, this is the only two known ways of dealing with what almost happened twice. I think there's no option but to stop the system, reevaluate, bring in third parties. It's in Edison's best interests, and it's in the NRC's best interests to not have an That near drop was just a couple hundred accident. yards from the transportation spine, the backbone of California's transportation system. It's about 200 yards from the near drop event. That would have shut off the I-45. It would have backed up all that

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traffic and moved it over to the I-15 for the north/south transportation, shutting off the Amtrak Let me just tell you, from a system there, too. planning perspective, and I've done lot of transportation planning, you can't move that level of service and expect that to be picked up on the I-15. You've got to shut off the transportation up and down the coast here just from the drop, that one event. Not to mention, there was no procedure for pulling these things back in and how to deal with it when it's dropped and it's damaged.

So this is a concerned citizen looking at a system going terribly wrong. It's not a complex really a question of is issue. It's regulating in а way that it's looking at the cumulative effects of all these things that have been brought to your attention. And if you're Edison's management, walking upper into another public relations and physical disaster created by poor judgment, in our opinion, this is a setup for an accident that nobody wants to experience.

So what we're really asking for is that you, the NRC, take this more seriously, combine all the things that we've looked at, from the shims being defective, to the canister damage. They're not only

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damaged when they're dropped into these vaults, they're damaged when they're pulled back out of these vaults. So you're doubling the scratching and damage and the carbon steel, the stainless steel contact, which is the initiation for the damage that we're concerned about.

This is a planned disaster, and I would add to the Wiegels' concerns about terrorism. From an architect and planner's perspective, we have error compounded, which the term that comes to mind is errorism, which can be as bad, if not worse, than terrorism because it's condoned by your process of waiving safety regulations, knowingly waiving these regulations that, through technicalities, Edison is allowed to proceed and Holtec is allowed to proceed. I think it's in Holtec's best interest to put the brakes on this system and reevaluate. But it doesn't seem that there's a brake system in this process for the public.

I wonder where the NRC's protection of the public comes into play through the regulatory process because really, from what I'm seeing, from reducing emergency planning zones, waiving safety regulations, not applying the ASME pressure vessel N3 requirements to these canisters, that the public is not being

represented at all. That's really what we're doing is protecting a utility that's putting the region in danger and actually their continued existence in danger. I don't think that they want to have another disaster on their hands. They almost did, and they didn't want to listen.

So it's the public's concern cumulatively that you look at all these things individually and you bring in the proper risk analysis to say when you have this many problems it's a red flag and you stop the In construction, we stop things for far less defects and problems. stop these We immediately when we see them on the site. I'm shocked to see the system proceeding, and I'm shocked to see the NRC's unwillingness or inability to stop this system when so many things, as you've heard this morning, have been known for a very long time.

MR. WIEGEL: This is William Weigel, III. So we're going to summarize now. So based upon the inspection information presented today, in addition to the previous information that's been presented to the NRC, it is very clear this is an opportunity for the NRC to dispel all of the talk of them being an captured regulatory agency in favor of the licensees and demonstrate to the public that they take their

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mission statement seriously and call out these direct violations of the certificate of compliance, which was one of the criteria issued to us in response as to why this was not going to be heard under the 2.206 We've given you direct evidence today that it is, in fact, out of compliance until such time as proven otherwise based on the statements from the manufacturer of these vessels themselves. There is no excuse for not taking this up under the 2.206 process. It's unconscionable that that would not move forward for the public hearing to be given to all concerned citizens and all of the activists that have worked very hard to show all of the examples of illusion and obfuscation from existing laws, removing, exempting. The evidence speaks for itself in this situation, and there's no excuse to not move forward with the 2.206 process given all of this information.

This information will make it to the public, and the PR disaster that will result from it can be avoided by just continuing to honor commitment of protecting the public safety and hear 2.206 this in the process, as it meets the requirements as we've proven with our original and subsequent information presented, including presentation today.

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Again, we appreciate the opportunity to have this conversation with you, but we, again, compel you with everything possible to do the right thing here and to not continue the stereotype of captured regulatory agencies. It can't continue this way if we want to have any hope for the future, and this situation it's hard to even process that it's gotten this point, considering what's on the line: personal property, public property, and just the flow of goods and services from the southern border to the northern border of the Northwest to the Southern California region.

I will now give opportunity to anyone else on our side that's going to make any final comments, and then we will consider this a close to our time. We will go ahead and conclude our Anyone else? presentation at this time and turn it over to the NRC.

MR. WILLIAMS: I'd like to thank William Wiegel, III, William Wiegel, Jr., Donna Gilmore, and Torgan Johnson for your comments. At this time, does the NRC staff here at Headquarters have any questions for Oceansiders? Are there any questions from the NRC staff that are on the phone? Does the licensee have any questions to Oceansiders?

> This is Al Bates from Southern MR. BATES:

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1 California Edison. We have no questions or comments. 2 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Al. Before I 3 conclude the meeting, members of the public 4 provide comments regarding the petition and questions about the 2.206 petition process. 5 as stated at the opening, the purpose of this meeting 6 7 is not to provide an opportunity for Oceansiders or the public to question or examine the PRB regarding 8 the merits of the petition request. 9 10 Are there any members of the public that 11 have any comments or questions? 12 MR. WIEGEL: I do. I'm a member of the 13 My name is Joshua Wiegel. I was just sitting public. in on this meeting to help record and kind of all this 14 15 has brought to my attention right now, so I quess my 16 only question or comment would be for the NRC more so 17 than California Edison is any of this evidence that was brought up new to you guys? Because it sounds 18 19 like there's no comments, there's no questions, and you guys are all aware of all this; is that correct? 20 I'm sorry. 21 Could you WILLIAMS: 22 repeat your question? Again, 23 MR. WIEGEL: Yes. just as concerned member of the public and just hearing this 24

for the first time, it sounded like pretty compelling

1	information. And with no comment from the NRC and no
2	comment from Southern California Edison, my question
3	would be are you all aware of these things already?
4	Is this not new information?
5	MR. WILLIAMS: So the purpose of this
6	meeting is for Oceansiders to provide any new or
7	additional information that hasn't already been
8	provided to the PRB for its consideration. So we're
9	in listening mode
LO	MR. WIEGEL: Thank you for opening this to
L1	the public, and I apologize for getting off topic
L2	then. Thank you.
L3	MR. WILLIAMS: Oh, no problem. We welcome
L4	any questions there. Is there any other member of the
L5	public that would like to make a comment or has a
L6	question? So I think my question is for William
L7	Wiegel, III. The information that was presented by
L8	Oceansiders, do you intend to provide that to the NRC?
L9	MR. WIEGEL: We have submitted that
20	information. I submitted that on Monday to Chris
21	Allen via email.
22	MR. WILLIAMS: Oh.
23	MR. WIEGEL: So that information has been
24	presented.
25	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. I apologize. I have

1	not been able to review it
2	MR. WIEGEL: No problem.
3	MR. WILLIAMS: and see if there's
4	anything new.
5	MR. WIEGEL: No problem at all.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: So for the purpose of this
7	meeting, I'd like to thank Oceansiders Against San
8	Onofre Corruption for taking the time to provide the
9	NRC staff with clarifying information on the petition
10	that you've submitted. Before we close, does the
11	court reporter need any additional information for the
12	meeting transcript?
13	COURT REPORTER: No.
14	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. With that, this
15	meeting is concluded and we will be terminating the
16	phone connection. Thank you and enjoy the rest of
17	your day.
18	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
19	off the record at 1:50 p.m.)