

SNUPPS

Standardized Nuclear Unit  
Power Plant System

5 Choke Cherry Road  
Rockville, Maryland 20850  
(301) 869-8010



Nicholas A. Petrick  
Executive Director

SLNRC 81- 59      FILE: 0278.10  
SUBJ: IE Bulletin 81-02

Mr. James G. Keppler, Director  
Region III, Office of I&E  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Mr. Karl Seyfrit, Director  
Region IV, Office of I&E  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 1000, Parkway Central Plaza  
611 Ryan Plaza  
Arlington, Texas 76012

Docket Nos: STN 50-482, STN 50-483, and STN 50-486

- References: 1. SLNRC 80-54, dated November 26, 1980  
2. SLNRC 81-22, dated April 1, 1981  
3. SLNRC 81-46, dated June 19, 1981

Gentlemen:

This letter is submitted in response to the subject IE Bulletin for the SNUPPS Utilities, Kansas Gas and Electric Company and Union Electric Company.

The referenced letters reported the potential failure to close of Westinghouse-EMD valves in the SNUPPS design. These reports were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). IE Bulletin 81-02 has been reviewed and is applicable to SNUPPS.

The SNUPPS design does not include the Borg-Warner valves discussed in the Bulletin.

The attached table provides the information requested by the Bulletin with the exception of the corrective action and schedule for corrective action which are discussed below.

The corrective action required for the Westinghouse EMD valves involves some combination of the following items depending on system requirements

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
and the particular valve model:

1. Increasing the operator gear ratio to guarantee adequate thrust capacity at 80 percent voltage;
2. Rewiring the operator for limit closing control;
3. Changing the operator torque switch spring pack;
4. Changing to a larger foot-pound rated motor;
5. Changing to a larger size limit torque operator.

An exact schedule for the corrective action has not been determined. However for the SNUPPS plants, the action will be completed prior to fuel load.

Approximately 300 manhours have been expended investigating this matter and preparing this report. Manpower expenditures for the corrective action have not been determined.

Very truly yours,



Nicholas A. Petrick

RLS/vas  
Attachment

cc: J. K. Bryan	UE
G. L. Koester	KGE
D. T. McPhee	KCPL
W. Hansen	NRC/Cal
T. E. Vandel	NRC/WC
V. Stello, JR	Office of I&E, Washington, D.C. 20555
J. Konklin	NRC Region III

WESTINGHOUSE EMD VALVE INFORMATION

MAXIMUM  $\Delta P$  (PSID)  
AS FLOW APPROACHS ZERO

VALVE FUNCTION	VALVE LOCATION NUMBER	WEMD MODEL REFERENCE	EQUIP. SPEC.	INTERIM FUNCT. REQMT.	FINAL FUNCT. REQMT. (*)	$\Delta P$ (PSID) BELOW WHICH VALVE WILL CLOSE (AS SHIPPED)	VALVE CAPABILITY SATISFIES FUNCTION REQUIREMENT (AS SHIPPED)	POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES (**)
Chg. Line Isol.	8105	3GM88	2750	2700	2750	1500	NO	2, 3
	8106	3GM88	2750	2700	2750	1500	NO	2, 3
BIT Isol.	8801A,B	4GM88	2750	1200	0 (1)	750	YES	NA
SI Pump HL Recir. Isol.	8802A,B	4GM88	2750	1200	0 (2)	750	YES	NA
BIT Isol.	8803A,B	4GM88	750	1200	0 (1)	750	YES	NA
SI Pump Disch. Crossover	8821A,B	4GM87	1500	1500	1500 (3)	750	NO	2, 3
SI Pump CL Inj. Isol	8835	4GM88	2750	1200	0 (2)	750	YES	NA
PORV Block	8000A,B	3GM88	2750	--	2500	1500	NO	1

\* (1.) The safety function of the valve is to open.

(2.) Valve operation is required only for no flow (no  $\Delta P$ ) conditions.

(3.) Required after extended operation in hot leg recirculation mode during the switchover back to cold leg recirculation.

\*\* 1. (PORV Block Valves) Potential incomplete isolation of pressurizer PORV. This is not a safety issue per WCAP 9600.

2. Potential cavitation of a centrifugal charging pump or safety injection pump due to operation beyond maximum runout flow.

3. Potential degradation of safety injection flow below values given in SAR.