

March 18, 1994

Docket No. 50-341

The Detroit Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. D. R. Gipson
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Generation
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport MI 48166

Dear Mr. Gipson:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated February 11, 1994. Your letter responded to our Inspection Report 50-341/93019, dated January 14, 1994, which transmitted a Notice of Violation (NOV) concerning requalification examination security controls, and identified two additional concerns regarding administration of annual simulator examinations to individual operators against established standards, and documentation of plant control and reactivity manipulation training.

Concerning the reactivity manipulation training, you indicated Detroit Edison would develop a course plan containing control manipulations and credit would be given only to those licensees who perform, direct or directly participate in each control manipulation. Concerning the annual simulator examinations for individual operators, you indicated that Detroit Edison will revise the appropriate procedures to ensure that the individual evaluations as well as overall crew evaluations are performed and documented during each annual operating examination. Both of these actions are acceptable. Implementation of the changes will be evaluated during subsequent inspections at Fermi Station.

Your letter indicated that Detroit Edison does not agree with the NOV. You indicated that details of the examination process, including examination security, are addressed in Nuclear Training Procedure NTP-TQ1-07, "Examinations", and the Operations Training Program Guidelines (OTGs) referenced in NTP-TQ1-07. You further stated that the OTGs require the use of NRC security agreements only for NRC administered examinations.

Your position is understood. However, CP-OP-232 requires the simulator examination to be "... administered annually as a minimum, developed and administered as described in NUREG 1021, ES-604." There is no statement indicating that security is excluded from the development and administration of the examination. NUREG 1021 is the procedure used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 55.49 which states "...[the facility and licensees] shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part [55]." ES-604, section C.1.b, states "The simulator operator will

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be expected to sign a security agreement at the time that the chief examiner determines that he or she has access to specialized knowledge of any part of the examination." ES-604, section C.1.e further states "Utility managers engaged in the examination review will be subject to signing a security agreement." Furthermore, during the licensed operator requalification program inspection (341/93019(DRS)) the inspectors noted the following additional examples of weak examination security:

- No effort was made to close the simulator gallery during simulator setups and examination administration.
- Two candidates waited in the control room for their job performance measures (JPMs). They were able to observe parts of the JPMs being administered to the first three operators. The two waiting candidates received the same JPMs.
- The candidates left open or did not return reference material when finished during the open-reference examination. This possibly provided answers to other candidates.
- Interviews of the operators showed them to be unaware of any formal examination security for non-NRC-administered requalification examinations.

Thus you failed to adequately prevent your instructors from engaging in activities that could compromise the integrity of the examination by not following CP-OP-232 and executing ES-604 in its entirety, including examination security. The NOV remains as written and at the level assigned.

To ensure compliance with 10 CFR 55.49, as documented in your correspondence dated February 11, 1994, we understand Detroit Edison (Fermi Station) will complete the following:

- 1) Detroit Edison will revise applicable training procedures to prohibit personnel who prepare the Licensed Operator Requalification annual examinations (or otherwise become knowledgeable of their content) from otherwise examining, instructing or tutoring licensees.
- 2) Personnel involved in the development, review, or administration of the annual examinations will be required to review these procedures prior to gaining specific knowledge of the content of the examination.
- 3) Examinees will be briefed on examination security requirements to make them aware of the sensitivity of this issue.
- 4) Applicable procedures will prescribe the actions to be taken if it is believed that a disclosure has occurred.

March 18, 1994

It is understood that the procedure revisions will be completed and issued by August 31, 1994, and Operations Training instructors will be trained on the new procedures prior to October 31, 1994. Implementation of the changes will be evaluated during subsequent inspections at Fermi Station. No additional response to the NOV is required.

Sincerely,

original signed by

Geoffrey E. Grant, Director
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure: Ltr dtd 2/22/94

cc w/enclosure:

J. A. Tibai, Principal

Compliance Engineer

P. A. Marquardt, Corporate

Legal Department

OC/LFDCB

Resident Inspector, RIII

James R. Padgett, Michigan Public

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cc M. King
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Go File

February 11, 1994
NRC-94-0007

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

References: 1) Fermi 2
NRC Docket No. 50-341
NRC License No. NPF-43
2) NRC Inspection Report 50-341/93019,
dated January 14, 1994

Subject: Response to Notice of Violation 93-019-01

Enclosed is the response to the Notice of Violation contained in Reference 2. While Detroit Edison agrees that our Licensed Operator Requalification examination security controls should be strengthened to reduce the chance of inadvertent disclosure or compromise of annual examinations, Detroit Edison does not agree that the weaknesses noted have resulted in a violation. The enclosure to this letter provides the basis for the company position, and it describes our planned actions to strengthen exam security.

Reference 2 also identified two concerns regarding annual simulator examination of individual operators against established standards and documentation of plant control and reactivity manipulation training. As requested, a response to these concerns is also enclosed.

If there are any questions regarding this response, please contact Joseph Conen, Senior Compliance Engineer, at (313) 586-1960.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

cc: T. G. Colburn
J. B. Martin
M. P. Phillips
K. R. Riemer
Region III

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Statement of Violation 93-019-01

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions and procedures.

Licensee procedure CP-OP-232, "Annual Requalification Examination," Rev. 2, section 3.4.2.3, requires annual administration of a simulator test as described in the Examiner Standards in NUREG 1021.

NUREG 1021, Section ES-601.C.4.b states, in part,

"Facility representatives who acquire specific knowledge of the NRC examinations will sign Form ES-601-1, 'Examination Security Agreement,' or a reasonable facsimile, before their examination involvement begins and again after the examination process is complete (i.e., the exit meeting). Facility representatives who sign Form ES-601-1 document their adherence to the following security restrictions:

-They shall not participate in any facility requalification training programs (e.g., instruction, examination, or tutoring) involving the licensees selected for the examination."

Contrary to the above, the licensed operator requalification training supervisor, who was knowledgeable of the exam, administered practice scenarios during the week of November 22, 1993, to one operating crew selected for examination the week of November 29, 1993. The supervisor avoided giving planned exam scenarios but purposely selected scenarios that were similar.

Detroit Edison Response

While Detroit Edison acknowledges that exam security controls should be strengthened to reduce the chance of inadvertent exam disclosure or compromise, Detroit Edison does not agree that these weaknesses constitute a violation

Basis for Detroit Edison Position

This violation was issued for failure to implement the requirements of form ES-601-1, Examination Security, contained in NRC Examiner Standard ES-601. This was characterized as a procedural violation because Fermi Course Plan CP-OP-232 states in part, "Simulator Performance - developed and administered as described in ES-601."

This statement occurs in section 3.4.2.3 of CP-OP-232, a subsection from Section 3.4, "Course Content". The context of this statement is that it is a "description" of the Simulator Performance unit, one of the units which must be passed "by criteria established in ES-601". The intent of this statement is that our utility administered annual exam consists of the same type of examination the NRC uses for "NRC Requalification Program Evaluations". ES-601 refers to ES-604 on the required content, conduct, and grading criteria for the Simulator Performance examination. CP-OP-232 is not intended to cover the details of the examination process.

Details of the examination process, including examination security, are addressed in Nuclear Training Procedure NTP-TQ1-07, Examinations, and the Operations Training Program Guidelines (OTG's) referenced in NTP-TQ1-07. This procedure prohibits disclosure of examination information to trainees, but it does not bar personnel with knowledge of examination material from conducting training. No disclosure of examination material occurred.

Procedure NTP-TQ1-07 also states that "security agreements shall be developed and completed as necessary for Operations Training. Such agreements shall be controlled by the Operations Training guideline." While security agreements would prohibit anyone with specific knowledge of NRC examinations from instruction of licensees selected for the examination, Operation Training Guidelines (OTG) require the use of NRC security agreements only for NRC administered examinations. This is consistent with NUREG 1021, Section ES-601.C.4. None of these documents requires the use of the security agreement for a utility administered exam. Security agreements were not used for this or any of the other requalification exams which were not administered by the NRC, nor are security agreements used for other examinations administered during the course of the year, even though instructors remain prohibited from disclosing examination information to trainees.

Based on the above information, Detroit Edison never intended that the security agreement requirement for NRC examinations be applied to utility administered annual examinations. This includes the restriction in the security agreement which prohibits instructors with knowledge of examination materials from participating in the instruction of exam candidates.

Secondly, the Notice of Violation states, in part, that "the licensed operator requalification supervisor, who was knowledgeable of the exam, administered practice scenarios during the week of November 22, 1993, to one operating crew selected for examination the week of November 29, 1993." This is a true statement. The Notice of Violation goes on to say that "the supervisor avoided giving planned exam scenarios but purposely selected scenarios that were similar." It is true that the supervisor selected scenarios to avoid using the planned exam scenarios for the practice session. The second part of the statement, however, could be misconstrued in that it implies that the training supervisor used his knowledge of the exam to select similar scenarios.

The main similarity between the scenarios selected for the practice sessions and those selected for the examination is that most of the practice scenarios included either ATWS or LOCA casualties, and the exam scenarios included an ATWS and a LOCA casualty. The fact is, however, that over 90% of the evaluation scenarios used during 1993 contained either an ATWS or a LOCA in order to fully test operators' mastery of all legs of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's). This was simply a continuation of the same pattern followed throughout the year and was in no way intended to be nor did it result in any revelation to the examinees of the content of the scenarios to be used in the examination.

In fact, the scenarios used for the practice sessions were purposely selected to avoid using the examination scenarios, which could have been unknowingly used had another instructor conducted the practice sessions. Also, in the scenarios used for the practice session, the events leading up to these major plant casualties were not similar to those used in the exam.

The NRC inspectors concurred at the time of the examination and during the exit meeting that there was not any question as to the integrity of the examination or the intention of the supervisor.

Actions Planned to Improve Examination Security

The current procedural guidance on examination security adequately addresses intentional disclosure of the content of an examination to the examinees. However, as noted in the notice of violation and in the other examples of weak exam security discussed in section 2.1.1.A of the referenced inspection report, the potential for inadvertent disclosure of examination material exists.

In order to prevent training personnel from inadvertently disclosing examination materials, the applicable training procedures will be revised to prohibit personnel who prepare the Licensed Operator Requalification annual examinations (or otherwise become knowledgeable of their content) from otherwise examining, instructing, or tutoring licensees who will take the exam once they have obtained specific knowledge of the examination material. Personnel involved in the development, review, or administration of the annual exam will be required to review these procedures prior to gaining specific knowledge of the content of the examination. We will also brief the examinees on examination security requirements to make them aware of the sensitivity of this issue. This will allow the examinees to help ensure that examinations are not compromised. These procedures will also prescribe the actions to be taken if it is believed that a disclosure has occurred. These procedure revisions will be completed by August 31, 1994 to support preparations for the 1994 requalification examinations.

To ensure Operations Training Instructors are aware of the weaknesses identified during this inspection, training will be conducted that will include a review of the events as they occurred during the examination, the expected conduct of the examination, and the procedural changes implemented as a result. This training will be completed by October 31, 1994 to support the 1994 requalification examinations.

Detroit Edison believes that these actions will improve our performance on examination security and will ensure appropriate security controls are in place for annual utility administered licensed operator requalification examinations.

Response to Open Item 93019-02 Concerning Control Manipulations

During routine training and evaluation simulator sessions conducted in the two year requalification cycle, the operators are rotated through the various shift positions required by their operating licenses. Individual operators are challenged in various positions for different combinations of the control and reactivity manipulations. Critiques of their performance are conducted and comments from these critiques are entered into a computer data base for tracking. Comments can also be added to the data base at the request of the operators if they feel the need to review any aspect of their performance in either the simulator or the plant. These comments are periodically reviewed with the operators. Additionally, tracking of these comments allows the instructor to assign licensees to simulator positions which exercise skills or functions that had previously been identified as needing improvement.

Deficiencies noted in operator performance from operation of the plant are also used to determine training needs. Critiques, Lessons Learned, Deviation Event Reports, and written and verbal communication with Operations Department personnel are all mechanisms to inform Nuclear Training of these deficiencies.

The use of the performance tracking data base and review of plant event data allows us to tailor training to address identified needs instead of training on evolutions on a fixed periodicity.

At the end of each year each licensed operator is examined using a dynamic simulator evaluation and Job Performance Measures (JPM). These two portions of the annual examination ensure mastery in the performance of a sampling of the control and reactivity manipulations for each operator.

The Licensed Operator Requalification Program ensures the licensed operators can perform all necessary activities through training focused on areas of identified need and evaluation of a sampling of these activities. Implementation of this Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) based program as allowed by 10 CFR 55.59 emphasizes and utilizes feedback and evaluation processes to maintain the high operator performance standards required by Detroit Edison and the NRC. Prior to adoption of this approach, tracking of the control and reactivity manipulations described in 10 CFR 55.59 was performed. At that time credit was assigned to all members of the crew for evolutions included in a given simulator scenario. Currently, the control and reactivity manipulations are not tracked and tallied; instead, trainee mastery of control manipulations is evaluated on the sampling basis described above. To strengthen this process, Detroit Edison will develop a course plan containing control manipulations. Credit will be given only to those licensees who perform, direct (SRO), or directly participate in each control manipulation. This course plan will be in place by May 31, 1994.

Response to Unresolved Item 93019-03 Concerning Individual Annual
Operating Examinations

Annual dynamic simulator operating tests are conducted as required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The selection of the evaluation scenarios to be used for the exam is based on the sample plan created for the exam. This sample plan ensures that the licensees are examined on a sample from all the operating skills and abilities required of an operator and the operating crew. This selection of the scenarios ensures a sample of the items listed in 10 CFR 55.45 (a)(2) through (13) are tested to the extent possible.

NUREG 1021 Section ES-604 contains provisions for dealing with an individual who "demonstrates significant deficiencies performing a critical task." These provisions include the possibility of conducting an additional scenario or JPM to obtain additional information on the abilities of the licensee. ES-604 goes on to say that individual follow up is conducted if a licensee has significant performance deficiencies linked to a Critical Task (CT) and that upon completion of the evaluation a competency grading worksheet is completed.

Detroit Edison uses a similar process in that during the simulator evaluation, the evaluators critique the performance of the crew against the performance standards established in each scenario. If significant individual performance deficiencies are noted, corrective actions are taken. This may include removing the licensee from operator duties until he has been properly remediated and reexamined to determine that the deficiency has been corrected.

The crew's performance during the examination was satisfactory with no noted significant individual performance deficiencies. Therefore the facility evaluators concluded the evaluation as "all pass, team pass." This is a term frequently used to convey to the operators their overall performance in the scenario. Comments on individual performance were still reviewed with the crew and entered into the data base for further tracking and action. This process did not explicitly demonstrate to the NRC inspectors that objective evaluation of each individual occurred during the dynamic simulator examination.

The scenarios include a matrix which identifies the crew critical tasks that are expected to be observed during the evaluation. The matrix identifies which member(s) of the crew is expected to accomplish the task, and each task has objective success criteria. During the evaluation, the individual performance of each task, including the critical tasks is evaluated. Also, if a task is not performed by the expected licensee, the instructors consider why this may have happened to determine if further assessment or remediation of that licensee is required. Detroit Edison will revise the appropriate procedures to ensure that the individual evaluations as well as overall crew evaluations are performed and documented during each annual operating examination as required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). This will be completed by August 31, 1994.