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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

> Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report

Gentlemen:

Attached is the Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report which is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12. This report provides the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failures for each diesel generator at Farley Nuclear Plant for 1990. Also provided is the information identified in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, 1977, for each failure.

Respectfully submitted,

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

J. D. Woodard

JDW/DRC:maf 12.78

Attachment

xc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. S. T. Hoffman

Mr. G. F. Maxwell



ANNUAL DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY DATA REPORT FOR 1990

This diesel generator (DG) reliability report for the year 1990 is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12. The table below shows the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failures for each of the five DGs at Farley Nuclear Plant.

TABLE

Diesel Generator	1-2A	18	28	10	20	Total
Valid Successful Tests	36	42	39	37	34	188
Invalid Tests	17	17	21	20	11	86
Valid Failures	0	0	2	0	0	2
Invalid Failures	0	0	0	0	0	0

The following paragraphs provide the information required by Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, 1977 for the valid failures identified above.

2B DG Failure on 07/09/90

At 1449 on 07/09/90, during a surveillance test, the 2B DG tripped. The trip occurred while swapping lubricating oil strainers.

During the surveillance, a high pressure differential was noted across the on-service set of lubricating oil strainers which indicated that the strainers were becoming clogged. (There are two sets of strainers in parallel.) The standby set of strainers was placed in service and the on-service set was cleaned, placed back in the strainer housing, and vented. However, it appears that the venting was not done adequately because when the operator switched back to the normal on-service set of strainers, oil pressure dropped momentarily and the DG tripped on low lubricating oil pressure.

Following an inspection of the DG and the oil strainers, the DG was tested successfully. The 2B DG was returned to service at 0140 on 07/10/90. The procedure for swapping the lubricating oil strainers (FNP-0-SOP-38.2) has been revised to provide additional guidance.

This was the first failure in the last 100 valid starts for this type of DG. No change in the surveillance schedule was necessary. The surveillance schedule remained at 14 days in accordance with Technical Specifications.

2B DG Failure on 11/26/90

At 0215 on 11/26/90, during a refueling outage, the 2B DG was started for normal surveillance. The lubricating oil pressure, which normally reaches between 95 and 100 psi, reached only approximately 54 psi. The lubricating oil strainers were swapped but the DG tripped due to low lubricating oil pressure. The low lube oil pressure was caused by swapping to a set of clogged strainers. The strainers were replaced and the DG was restarted with no problems. Lubricating oil pressure was normal. The DG was returned to service at 0707 on 11/26/90.

Investigation showed that both sets of strainers were clogged. A failed differential pressure gauge caused some confusion concerning when the strainers were clogged and needed to be cleaned. To improve awareness of the status of diesel generator lube oil strainers serial numbers have been placed on each strainer. FNP-O-SOP-38.2 has been revised to require recording strainer serial numbers when they are installed or removed. This revision will assist operators in determining an expected frequency of strainer cleaning so that clogging may be prevented. The strainer differential pressure gauges will be added to the Preventive Maintenance Program.

This was the second failure in the last 100 valid starts for this type of DG. No change in the surveillance schedule was necessary. The surveillance schedule remained at 14 days in accordance with Technical Specifications.