

SGPR;DRK
50-334

MAR 24 1982

DISTRIBUTION:

SGPR r/f
NMSS r/f
Case File
DRKunze ✓
PStarcher
RDiggs

MEMORANDUM FOR: C. J. Heltemes, Deputy Director
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of
Operational Data

FROM: George W. McCorkle, Chief
Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch
Division of Safeguards, NMSS

SUBJECT: INFORMATION REGARDING BEAVER VALLEY

Enclosed is information requested by Mr. Paul Bobe of your staff for use in answering questions regarding the Beaver Valley incident. This information was provided to Mr. Bobe by telephone on March 24, 1982.

Contact on this matter is Mr. Douglas Kunze (x74010).

151

George W. McCorkle, Chief
Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch
Division of Safeguards, NMSS

cc: J. R. Miller, SSPB, NRR
W. B. Brown, SB, DRSI, IE

8302070192 821221
PDR FUIA
SHOLLY82-530 PDR

OFFICE	SGPR	SGPR				
NAME	DKunze/cw	GMcCorkle				
DATE	3/27/82	3/24/82				24

DRAFT BEAVER VALLEY RESPONSE QUESTION 48A

Reference: NUREG-0090 Vol. 4, No. 3 Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences.

#81-3 Misalignment of High Head Safety Injection Isolation Valve.

Question: Comment briefly on the significance of the two abnormal occurrences at nuclear power plants reported to the Congress on March 10, 1982. Do these incidents raise more serious concerns with reactor safety at other plants?

Response: The NRC investigation concluded that the Beaver Valley incident was a possible isolated act of sabotage rather than operator error. In the wake of the event, Duquesne Light Company has modified and strengthened its procedures at Beaver Valley to assure that a similar act does not occur in the future. Following an assessment of details related to this incident the staff has concluded that the licensee had in place a combination of security and safety programs and procedures which assured prompt identification and correction of deficiencies. The programs and procedures utilized at Beaver Valley are similar in scope to those at other sites. These programs and procedures provide assurance that human or hardware failures will be promptly identified and corrected, thus, mitigating the impact of these failures on the safe operation of power reactors.

Point of Contact: Robert F. Burnett
427-4010