	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1	W I P B H I 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 57 CAT 58
CON'T 0 1 7 8	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 6 7 1 2 1 1 8 2 8 0 1 1 1 1 8 3 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 During normal surveillance of operating parameters at 2240, the operator
0 3	noted that steam generator pressure transmitter 1PT-469 was indicating
0 4	higher than other channels. A frozen sensing line was suspected and con-
0 5	firmed. Other pressure instrument channels were operating normally. This
0 6	event is reported under Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.B.2, as the re-
0 7	dundancy requirement was not met until the channel was tripped. Similar,
0 8	events were reported as LER's 76-13, 77-13 and 81-20.
7 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
10	The event was caused by inadequate interim piping insulation during in-
11	stallation of a modification to the heat tracing system. The instrument
1 2	was placed in the tripped position and the sensing line was thawed with
1 3	a welding machine and kept open by periodic blowdown. The modified heat
1 4 7 8	tracing system was energized on 12/16/82.
1 5	STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 OPERATOR ODSERVATION 32 OPERATOR ODSE
	ELEASED OF RELEASE N/A AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) PERSONNEL EXPOSURES AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) N/A
7 8	9 PERSONNEL IN HIBES 13 80
1 8	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) 9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
1 9	Z 42 N/A 8201210195 830111
2 0	PDR ADDCK 05000266 PDR S PDR ADDCK 05000266 PDR 68 69 80 5
	NAME OF PREPARER PHONE:

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 82-027/03L-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Docket No. 50-266

During normal operation, at 2240 hours on December 11, 1982 during normal surveillance of indicating parameters, the operator noted that steam generator pressure transmitter 1PT-469 was indicating higher than other channels. This indication is characteristic of freezing in a sensing line which was immediately suspected, since a modification of the heat tracing freeze protection system was incomplete at the time of the event. instrument channel inputs were placed in the tripped status in accordance with procedure and the required redundancy restored with the remaining two instruments. Attempts to blow down the sensing line were unsuccessful. The sensing line was successfully thawed using a welding machine, and the line was periodically blown down thereafter to prevent freezing. The instrument was returned to service at 0140 hours on December 12, 1982. Similar events were reported as Licensee Event Report Nos. 76-13, 77-13, and 81-20.

The cause of the freeze-up was due to inadequate interim insulation installed during modifications of the heat-tracing freeze protection system. The installation was originally expected to be completed during the refueling outage prior to startup. However, due to delays in engineering and the delivery of materials, installation could not begin until December 10, 1982. The new heat tracing equipment was energized on December 16 and the installation of the final wrap of insulation is expected to be complete by January 14, 1983.