

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

January 14, 1983

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 82-060

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-060 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(c) as a result of not performing the monthly surveillance requirement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, Table 4.3-7, Item 22.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD:dwf
Attachment

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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 15, 1982, with the Plant in Mode 1, it was discovered that the Licensee had not been in total compliance with Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.6, (Table 4.3-7, Item 22) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6. A channel check of the Acoustical Monitors was performed per Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 135.001, "Post Accident Monitoring Instruments Channel Check," rather than a monthly verification of the Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indicator. The verification of valve position had not been documented since the Plant's entry into Mode 3 on September 30, 1982.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

There were no adverse consequences from this event. Using STP-135.001 the operability of the Acoustic Monitor, which would have activated an alarm in the Control Room if flow had been detected downstream of the safety valves, was verified on a monthly basis.

CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of the occurrence was due to personnel error. The procedure was not revised when Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 was changed to include Safety Valve Position Indication, just prior to license issue. The specification was changed due to our desire to use Position Indication Switches, versus the Acoustic Monitor, to meet NUREG 0737 requirements.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

STP-135.001 was revised on December 21, 1982, to include the verification of Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indication on a monthly basis while in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The applicable portion of the procedure dealing with the safety valves was satisfactorily performed on the same day.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The Licensee plans no additional action in regards to this event.