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NJK-83-2

January 3, 1983

Mr. Edson G. Case, Deputy Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Case:

Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of December, 1982, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY  
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis  
Station Superintendent

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Enclosure

cc: T. J. Rausch

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M-4-1-80-31

Drywell Cooler, RBCCW Pump Trip Logic Change

Description

In December, 1980, a Unit Two scram and Group 1 Isolation occurred. The electromatic relief valves were used to control Reactor pressure. As a result, the Drywell exceeded 2 psig due to the heating of the air from the relief valve discharge lines. The high pressure initiated the Core Spray System and tripped the Drywell Coolers and RBCCW Pumps; thus, eliminating any method of cooling the Drywell and reducing the pressure. This modification eliminates the 2 psig trip of the coolers and pumps. The coolers and RBCCW Pumps will only trip on a loss of off-site power, via Bus 13 and Bus 14 undervoltage relays. The Drywell Coolers are designed to operate up to approximately 5 psig. The coolers should be manually tripped if pressure rapidly exceeds 5 psig to prevent damage to the Drywell Coolers.

Evaluation

The 2 psig trip of the Drywell Coolers and RBCCW Pumps was originally installed to prevent the blower motors from overheating due to the higher air density. Their operation will have no affect on the capability of the Core Spray System. This modification will not affect the existing automatic load shed features of the circuitry that are initiated by a loss of off-site power.

## CRD Thermal Sleeve Removal

M-4-1-79-5

### Description

The control rod drive return line nozzle thermal sleeve was removed to provide access for a dye penetrant test of the nozzle inner radius and bore, and of the vessel wall below the nozzle. This inspection is in accordance with NUREG-0312.

### Evaluation

The thermal sleeve provided no structural strength. The CRD System is operated with the return line isolated. The operating condition is less severe than the analyzed condition with the thermal sleeve and cold return flow; the original stress reports are still valid.

M-4-1-78-33

ESS UPS

### Description

The Unit One ESS MG Set has been removed and replaced by an uninterruptible power supply (UPS). It has a rating of 35 KVA, and consists of a static inverter, static switch, rectifier and regulator.

### Evaluation

The reliability of the power supply is increased providing a more reliable ESS Bus. The new system is qualified as Class 1E equipment. It will increase the amount of protection against abnormal voltage and frequency.

M-4-1(2)-80-10

HPCI Backup Control Power Feed

Description

Cables 13926 and 23926 were rerouted to ensure the separation of cable criteria is met. Cables 13926 and 23926 provide redundant control power to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI Systems from 125 VDC distribution panels 1A and 2A.

Evaluation

The reliability of the HPCI-ADS system is increased and will operate as posutlated in the FSAR. Segregated backup power is provided for essential HPCI-ADS equipment.