

50.55(e) Report

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REGION V ICE

November 15, 1982

ANPP-22277-GHD/BSK

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
Creekside Oaks Office Park
1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California

Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1

Subject: Final Report - DFR 82-45
A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to
C. E./Borg-Warner Safety Injection System Valves
Installed With Motor Operators Not Qualified For
Inside Containment
File: 82-019-026
D.4.33.2

Reference: (A) Telephone Conversation between J. Eckhardt and
G. Duckworth on August 26, 1982
(B) ANPP-21836 dated September 15, 1982 (Interim Report)

Dear Sir:

Attached, is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency, under
10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President
Nuclear Projects Management
ANPP Project Director

EEVBJr/GHD:db

Enclosure

cc: See Attached Page 2

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief
Page 2

November 15, 1982
ANPP-22277-GHD/BSK

cc: Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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FINAL REPORT - DER 82-45
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2 & 3

I. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

A review of Combustion Engineering (CE) letter V-CE-6506 dated May 28, 1982, indicated motor operators for CE Tag Numbers SIC-UV-653 and SID-UV-654 were supplied by CE's valve vendor, Nuclear Valve Division of Borg Warner, with "outside-containment" motor operators instead of the qualified and specified "inside-containment operators". No documentation for this substitution was provided.

II. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATION

This condition is evaluated as reportable. As stated in the attached CE letter V-CE-17115, dated September 21, 1982, these valves normally provide the path for shutdown cooling suction flow of the reactor coolant from the hot legs to the pumps used during shutdown cooling. These valves would also provide this path after recovery from a small break LOCA and from a MSLB. The "outside-containment" motor operator meets all the requirements for "inside-containment" use except maximum temperature. "Outside-containment" motor operators were qualified to 250F for twenty-four (24) hours and 200F for sixteen (16) days. Post-accident service requires qualification at least to 350F for ten (10) minutes, then to 300F for approximately sixteen (16) hours, then decreasing to 200F over approximately the next twenty (20) days.

Since these operators were not fully qualified to the post-accident conditions inside containment, it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that they would have been capable of performing their safety function.

III. CORRECTIVE ACTION

Nonconformance Reports (NCR's) SM-1107, NC-861, and NC-862 will be dispositioned to replace the subject motor operators with the qualified "inside-containment" operators. Bechtel will request CE to initiate action to preclude recurrence by (1) notifying the vendor of this report, and (2) by reviewing the CE vendor surveillance program to assure adequate inspections are made prior to future shipments from this vendor.


In addition to reportability under 10CFR50.55(e), PVNGS Project considers the deficiency to be reportable under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21, by the supplier. Deficiency Evaluation Report 82-45 addresses the reporting requirements specified under 10CFR 21.21.(b) (3) with the exception of sub-part (vi) which requires the number and location (customers and/or facilities) of possible defective equipment. A copy of this report has been sent to CE for transmittal to Borg Warner, requesting their review for reporting under 10CFR Part 21, including number and location of all components supplied.

Since Bechtel has notified CE, and this 10CFR50.55(e) report is being submitted to the NRC by Arizona Public Service, Bechtel will not file a 10CFR Part 21 report with the NRC.

C-E Power Systems
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road
Windsor, Connecticut 06095

Tel 203/688-1911
Telex 99297

Attachment to DER 82-45



September 21, 1982
V-CE-17115

Mr. W. G. Bingham
Bechtel Power Corporation
12400 East Imperial Highway
Norwalk, CA 90650

Subject: Inside Containment Motor Operators, DER-82-45

Reference: Letter No. B/CE-E-41197, August 18, 1982


Dear Mr. Bingham:

At Bechtel's request, C-E has reviewed our previous recommendation concerning the reportability of the supply of incorrect valve operators on certain valves. C-E's valve vendor, Nuclear Valve division of Borg Warner, can not provide technical justification for supplying "outside" vs "inside" containment motor operators on valve tag nos SI-653 and -654. We have therefore concluded that our original recommendation of "not reportable" appears incorrect and that we would recommend this item be reported based on the following discussion.

These valves normally provide the path for shutdown cooling suction flow of the reactor coolant from the hot legs to the pumps used during shutdown cooling. These valves would also provide this path after recovery from a small break LOCA and from a MSLB. It is noted that the "outside" containment motor operator meets all the requirements for "inside" containment use except maximum temperature. "Outside" containment motor operators were qualified to 250F for 24 hours and to 200F for 16 days. Post-accident service requires qualification at least to 350F for 10 minutes, then to 300F for approximately 16 hours, then decreasing to 200F over approximately the next 20 days.

Since these operators were not fully qualified to the post-accident conditions inside containment, it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that they would have been capable of performing their safety function.

Very truly yours,


C. Ferguson
Project Manager

CF/GEW:kge
V-PPE-533/F41340
cc: Messrs:

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
G. C. Andognini
J. Vorees
W. H. Wilson
W. G. Bingham
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S. N. Mager
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JUL 10 1982
FILE NO. 104
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3	PL JHLS
2	API ALIEM
1	API MAJERIAN
	API ALIEM
	API ALIEM
	CONRAD 1
	CONRAD 2
	POE
	PR
	PR/WRD (LWD)
	PA 1 DA
	ARCH
	C/S
	CONTROLS
	ELECT
	MECH
	MR. CLEAR
	PLANT DESIGN
	STR & SUP
	CLIENT
	PO FILE
	cc VK
	cc WTS
	cc K. STWERNIK
	cc WELCHER