

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

November 3, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-25/03X-1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-25/03X-1.

Sincerely yours,

M. Jupilium

H. J. Midura General Manager -Salem Operations

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The Energy People

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Report Number:	82-25/03X-1
Report Date:	11-03-82
Occurrence Date:	04-02-82
Facility:	Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump - Overcurrent Trip.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-067.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1150 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 2, 1982 the Control Room Operator started No. 22 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump for an operability check. A few seconds after closing, the pump supply breaker opened due to phase A overcurrent. At 0105 hours No. 22 RHR Pump and the related ECCS subsystem were declared inoperable, and Action Statement 3.5.2.a was entered.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Mechanical and electrical inspections of the pump, motor, and breaker revealed no apparent cause for the breaker overcurrent trip.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of either of the independent ECCS subsystems, in conjunction with the accumulators, ensures that sufficient core cooling capability will be available to limit peak cladding temperatures to within acceptable limits in the event of a LOCA. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Throughout the occurrence the other ECCS subsystem and the accumulators were operable, and emergency core cooling capability was maintained. Therefore, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Technical Specification 3.5.2.a requires:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours, or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

Inoperability of No. 22 RHR Pump and the related ECCS subsystem, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting Condition for Operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

No. 22 RHR Pump was satisfactorily tested, and Surveillance Procedure SP4.0.5(P) was satisfactorily performed. The pump and ECCS subsystem were declared operable at 1525 hours, April 2, 1982, and Action Statement 3.5.2.a was terminated.

A program of increased surveillance was instituted for No. 22 RHR Pump which continued through the end of April, 1982. No cause for the breaker overcurrent trip was discovered and no further trips have occurred.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Heller

1. J. mpister

General Manager -Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-98B