



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-269/82-11

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242

Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station

Docket No. 50-269

License No. DPR-38

Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina

Inspectors: D. P. Falconer 6/24/82
W. Orders Date Signed

Frank Gape 6/24/82
R. Fiedler Date Signed

Approved by: J. C. Bryant 6/25/82
J. C. Bryant, Section Chief, Division of Date Signed
Project and Resident Programs

SUMMARY

Inspection on March 23 - April 1, 1982

Areas Inspected

This special announced inspection involved 62 inspector-hours on site in the areas of operations and maintenance.

Results

Of the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in one area; one item of noncompliance was found in the other area (violation - failure to follow instrument calibration procedure which led to a breach of containment integrity - paragraph 5).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- J. Ed Smith, Station Manager
- *G. Vaughn, Assistant Plant Manager
- *T. Cribbe, Licensing & Project Engineer
- *W. Harris, Operations Engineer
- *R. Adams, I&E Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 30 - April 2, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The results of the inspection were discussed with licensee management who acknowledged their understanding of the violation. The licensee stated that steps had been taken to upgrade I&E procedures to include double verification of components returned to service. According to the licensee, in the interim, this will be accomplished by rubber stamping the verification requirement on applicable procedures, and the permanent corrective action will be accomplished by procedure revisions within the next two years.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved Items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Breach of Containment Integrity

On March 23, 1982, the resident inspector, during an inspection of the Oconee Unit 1 reactor building found a $\frac{1}{2}$ "-line in reactor building penetration WB-13 to be blowing air. The unit was in hot shutdown in preparation for going to power operation. The inspector brought this finding to the licensee's attention. Subsequent licensee investigation identified the $\frac{1}{2}$ "-line as the reactor building pressure sensing line for switch 1PS-22, one of three pressure switches which actuate Train A of reactor building spray.

The licensee's investigation disclosed that an instrument test connection cap had been left off the sensing line. The test connection to the sensing

line was a tee connection with a $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch line which was reduced to a $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch valve and tubing. The opening provided was approximately 0.195 inches. The result of this missing cap was twofold:

1. The missing cap breached reactor building integrity. There was a direct pathway between the reactor building atmosphere to the penetration room through the sensing line.
2. Initiation logic for Train A of the reactor building spray system was degraded in that IPS-22 could not function and the initiation instrumentation for the train had been reduced to a two-out-of-two logic from the normal two-out-of-three.

Licensee instrument technicians replaced the cap immediately upon discovery of the problem, restoring reactor building integrity and reactor building spray system initiation logic. Subsequently, the licensee and the resident inspector verified that similar instrumentation on all three Oconee units had the caps in place.

Review of the procedure (IP/O/A/310/5D) employed by the I&E technicians to calibrate IPS-22 revealed that step 10.2.10 requires that the test cap be replaced; however, replacing the cap is 1 of 4 specific actions detailed in the step, which had no signoff.

Subsequent licensee review of work performed by the technicians who calibrated IPS-22 revealed no further evidence which would indicate incompetence or negligence.

The last scheduled and/or recorded work performed on IPS-22 was on July 9, 1981. No evidence was obtained which would indicate the cap was not left off during the work performed that day. The instrument is not easily accessible and inspection is required only during refueling outages.

Reactor building integrity is required by Technical Specification 3.6.1 whenever reactor coolant system pressure is 300 psig or greater, reactor coolant temperature is 200°F or greater, and fuel is in the core. Unit 1 reactor building integrity was required on four occasions during the period July 9, 1981 through March 23, 1982 as follows:

December 21, 1981 through January 8, 1982	- 19 days
January 25, 1982 through February 10, 1982	- 17 days
February 23, 1982 through March 7, 1982	- 13 days
March 22, 1982 through March 23, 1982	- 2 days
	Total 51 days

All three reactor building pressure switches for both trains of the reactor building spray system are required by Technical Specification 3.5.1 to be

operable when the reactor is critical. The switches were required to be operable on three occasions during the period July 9, 1981 through March 23, 1982 as follows:

December 27, 1981 through January 6, 1982	- 11 days
January 30, 1982 through February 9, 1982	- 11 days
February 25, 1982 through March 6, 1982	- 10 days
Total	<u>32 days</u>

It should be noted that on two occasions, February 3 and March 4, 1982, Train B of reactor building spray was removed from service for approximately 2 hours in order to facilitate performance testing. Since Train A initiation was in a degraded mode, technical specification requirements for spray system operability were not fully met. However, assuming the two remaining pressure switches associated with the A train were operable, Train A would have initiated if called upon to do so.

In summary, on July 9, 1981 pressure switch 1PS-22 was calibrated employing procedure IP/O/A/310/50 which requires the replacement of the instrument cap. The cap apparently was not replaced, which is in violation of the procedural requirements and Technical Specification 6.4.1 which requires the plant be maintained in accordance with approved procedures.

The missing instrument test cap breached reactor building integrity which was required by Technical Specification 3.6.1 on four occasions during the period in question as detailed above.

Pressure switch 1PS-22 was rendered inoperable by the missing cap, which on three occasions during the period in question, resulted in the violation of technical specification 3.5.1 which requires all three channels of reactor building spray initiation instrumentation to be operable when the reactor is critical.

Technically, Train A of reactor building spray was inoperable during the period delineated above when both trains were required. On two occasions during the period in question, Train B of reactor building spray was also rendered inoperable in order to facilitate performance testing.

The above delineated event singularly and collectively violates regulatory requirements. This is a Violation (50-269/82-11-01).