NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	LICENSEE CODE (2)	F L S L S 1
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 01	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 5
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 9 0 2 8 2
	REPORT DATE (9)	1 0 0 4 8 2

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 99% power, while testing a generator trip relay a brief short caused
03 the generator breakers to open and started a synchronizing inhibit timer
04 to start. When the reactor tripped the timer had cycled so transfer of
05 vital busses (4.16 KV) required OPERABLE by TS 3.8.2.1 to startup power
06 did not occur. Diesel generators started and loaded properly. Power was
07 restored to normal. Due to the transient, iodine buildup (spiking)
08 occurred. Similar bus loss was LER 79-28. Tenth Iodine spike, See LER 82-38.

09	SYSTEM CODE (11)	H A
	CAUSE CODE (12)	A
	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	C
	COMPONENT CODE (14)	X X X X X X
	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	Z
	VALVE SUBCODE (16)	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 2 — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 0 / OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 — REPORT TYPE L — REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
Z	Z	A	C	0 0 0 6	Y	N	Z	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 In testing the generator negative sequence relay, relay personnel short
11 circuited the relay, giving a signal to open the generator breakers. By
12 the time the reactor tripped the unit was out of synchronization with
13 the grid and the time delay (.17 sec) inhibited automatic bus transfer.
14 Generator protection design is being reviewed for possible changes.

15	FACILITY STATUS (28)	E	% POWER (29)	0 9 9	OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	A	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	Operator Observation		
16	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA				
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	0 0 0	TYPE (38)	Z	DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	0 0 0	DESCRIPTION (41)	NA		
19	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (42)	Z	DESCRIPTION (43)	NA		
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	Z	DESCRIPTION (45)	NA	NRC USE ONLY	

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EVENT DESCRIPTION (Cont)

At approximately 10:28 AM, during normal full power operation, a negative sequence generator trip relay was inadvertently actuated causing opening of the main generator oil circuit breakers (OCB's), a separation from the grid, and a turbine trip on over speed. The loss of load caused the turbine and reactor to trip, however since the OCB's had already opened and the unit was out of synchronization with the grid, the transfer to the startup switchgear for offsite power could not occur. The diesel generators automatically loaded to provide AC power to the plant vital loads. An Unusual Event was declared at approximately 10:35 AM. Offsite power and normal plant status was restored at approximately 10:46 AM. During the return to power the dose equivalent iodine (DEQ) exceeded T.S. 3.4.8.a limit of 1.0 uCi/gm DEQ I-131. The DEQ iodine was first measured above the limit at 1345 on 9-2-82 and remained above the limit for approximately 15.5 hours. The attached sheets contain information required by T.S. 3.4.8.d. The health and safety of the public was not affected by this event.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

During a determination of the minimum voltage required for the negative sequence relay to actuate, Systems Protection (Relay) personnel short circuited a resistor and relay in the negative sequence relay circuitry. The negative sequence relay was actuated for a short duration causing the main generator OCB's to open. The subsequent generator lockout caused by the turbine overspeed trip would normally provide a fast transfer of onsite electrical loads from the auxiliary transformers to the startup transformers. Since the OCB's were already open for greater than 170 milli seconds (design circuitry time delay for protection against electrical loading out of synchronization), the automatic transfer did not occur.

After an extended period of power operation with a nominal level of fuel leakage, a reactor scram from full power was a sufficient transient to cause iodine build-up (iodine spiking phenomenon). The DEQ I-131 level decreased to below 1.0 uCi/gm after 15.5 hours and to nominal levels thereafter.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REPORT
DOSE EQUIVALENT IODINE

1. Reactor power history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded.

Time	Average Reactor Power 8/31/82	Average Reactor Power 9/1/82	Average Reactor Power 9/2/82
0000	--	99.23	99.23
0100	--	99.18	99.15
0200	--	99.20	99.15
0300	--	99.23	99.15
0400	--	99.28	99.15
0500	--	99.26	99.18
0600	--	99.18	99.20
0700	--	99.23	99.18
0800	--	99.20	99.20
0900	--	99.20	99.26
1000	--	99.20	99.26
1100	--	99.18	--
1200	--	99.28	--
1300	99.30	99.30	--
1400	99.09	99.30	--
1500	99.20	99.30	--
1600	99.20	99.23	--
1700	99.18	99.20	--
1800	99.18	99.23	--
1900	99.18	99.23	--
2000	99.20	99.20	--
2100	99.23	99.23	--
2200	99.23	99.20	--
2300	99.28	99.20	--

2. Fuel Burnup by Core Region

See Attachment "A"

3. Cleanup Flow History starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded.

Time	Flow Rate (GPM) 8/31/82	Flow Rate (GPM) 9/1/82	Flow Rate (GPM) 9/2/82
0000	--	87	86
0100	--	87	86
0200	--	87	86
0300	--	87	86
0400	--	87	86
0500	--	86	86
0600	--	86	86

3. Continued

Time	Flow Rate (GPM) 8/31/82	Flow Rate (GPM) 9/1/82	Flow Rate (GPM) 8/2/82
0700	--	86	86
0800	--	87	86
0900	--	87	86
1000	--	87	86
1100	--	87	88 (Trip)
1200	--	87	88
1300	92	87	86
1400	44	87	--
1500	88	87	--
1600	86	87	--
1700	86	87	--
1800	90	87	--
1900	88	87	--
2000	87	87	--
2100	87	86	--
2200	87	87	--
2300	87	87	--

4. History of Degassing Operation, if any, starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded.

There were no degassing operations during the 48 hour period prior to exceeding the dose equivalent iodine limit.

5. The Time duration when the specific activity of the primary coolant exceeded 1.0 uCi/gm dose equivalent I-131.

Date	Time	DEQ I-131 (uCi/gm)
9/2/82	0600	1.14 E-01
9/2/82	1345	1.68 E 00
9/2/82	1730	1.75 E 00
9/2/82	2115	1.46 E 00
9/3/82	0115	1.24 E 00
9/3/82	0515	8.69 E-01

The dose equivalent I-131 exceeded the limit for a period of approximately 15.5 hours.

ATTACHMENT A

FUEL BURNUP BY CORE REGION

REGION	ENRICHMENT (W/O)	NUMBER OF ASSEMBLIES	EXPOSURE (MWD/MTU)
E	3.03	40	29546.9
E*	2.73	25	26133.3
F	3.65	40	20025.9
F*	3.03	48	23825.9
G	3.65	32	7239.8
G*	3.20	24	9276.4
G/	3.65	4	8076.2
GX	3.03	4	9708.7

Core Average: 19845.09 MWD/MTU