

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | G | A | E | I | H | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 | With the unit at hot shutdown following a reactor scram, the Torus high
03 | water level alarm was activated. The highest indicator showed a water
04 | level of approximately 12 feet 7 inches. T.S.3.6.2.1.a requires a water
05 | level between 12 feet 2 inches and 12 feet 6 inches. As per action item
06 | a. of this Tech. Spec., the unit was at cold shutdown within 24 hours of
07 | the event. The health and safety of the public were not affected. This
08 | event is not repetitive.

09 | S | H | 11 | E | 12 | B | 13 | V | A | L | V | E | X | 14 | E | 15 | D | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 24 | 26 | 0 | 3 | 28 | 29 | L | 30 | 0 | 32
18 | X | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | A | 25 | R | 3 | 4 | 0 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 | The cause of this event was a reactor scram and group I isolation that
11 | occurred as a result of a MSIV failing and going closed. Steam relief
12 | valves opened to control reactor pressure discharged to the Torus. The
13 | Torus water level was returned to within TS limits before the unit was
14 | taken from cold shutdown. The MSIV was repaired and returned to service.

15 | G | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | A | 31 | Alarm | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

19 | Z | 42 | NA | 43
7 8 9 10 80

20 | N | 44 | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 80

8209300162 820921
PDR ADOCK 05000366
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

PHONE: (912) 367-7851

80 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00

LER No.: 50-366/1982-081
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report
for LER 50-366/1982-081

On August 25, 1982, with the unit at hot shutdown following a reactor scram, the suppression chamber (Torus) high water level alarm was received in the control room. One indicator showed a water level of approximately 12 feet, 7 inches. Tech. Specs. section 3.6.2.1.a. states that the suppression chamber (Torus) shall be operable with a water volume equivalent to a water level between 12 feet 2 inches and 12 feet 6 inches. The limiting condition for operation (LCO) of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.2.1., Action item a. was complied with since the unit was already at hot shutdown and was at cold shutdown within 24 hours of this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected. This event is non-repetitive.

The cause of this event was a reactor scram and group I isolation that occurred as a result of a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) failing and going closed. After the scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system started to help control reactor pressure and maintain reactor water level. Steam Relief Valves "A" and "D" (opened to relieve reactor pressure) discharged to the Torus and caused the Torus water level to rise above the Tech. Specs. limit.

The Torus water level was returned to Tech. Specs. limits before the unit was taken from cold shutdown. The MSIV whose failure initiated this event was repaired and returned to service.