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September 1, 1982

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached a final response to Significant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/82-02.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker

Hal B. Tucker

RWO/php
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. P. K. Van Doorn
NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

Report No: SD 413-414/82-02

Final Report Date: September 1, 1982

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

Identification of Deficiency: Some welds previously completed on miscellaneous steel structures were found not to meet the requirements of the design drawing or the inspection procedure, QAP M-21.

Initial Report:

On January 25, 1982, J Bryant of Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified of the deficiency by W O Henry and J H Lanier of Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, NC 28242. The 30-day report required by 10CFR50.55e was submitted on February 23, 1982.

Final Report:

This final report is submitted to provide additional details regarding the cause of the deficiency, corrective actions taken, results achieved, and additional corrective measures planned.

The cause of the deficiency has been determined to be poor workmanship followed by inadequate inspections in the past. In addition, some of the welds are suspected not to have received a final weld inspection. Documentation does not exist to verify that the welds received an inspection. A heightened awareness of the strict code and design requirements and the use of more sophisticated inspection tools has contributed to these findings.

Action Taken To Date is as Follows:

1. Sixty-four welds on structural platforms were reinspected after removal of paint. The results were presented to Design Engineering for evaluation. Although the welds were not in strict compliance with code and design requirements, Design Engineering was able to make the determination that the deficient welds were not of safety significance. In addition, Design Engineering concluded that similar weld defects occurring on other structural platforms would

result in minimal decrease in capacity and would not be of safety significance. No further inspections are planned on structural platforms.

2. One hundred and twenty-one welds on pipe rupture frames were reinspected (34 after removal of paint, 87 without removal of paint). The results were submitted to Design Engineering for evaluation. The design evaluation concluded that sufficient design margins did not exist to include all deficiencies noted. Based on the design evaluation, all field welds on pipe rupture frames will be reinspected without removal of paint.

3. One hundred and eighty-one welds on instrument tube supports were reinspected. The results reflect a high degree of quality, as only one weld defect was found. Quality Assurance concluded that the level of inspected quality was acceptable.

Additional Corrective Action Planned is as Follows:

1. Reinspect a sample of welds in each of the following generic areas to determine the level of quality.

Electrical Equipment Mountings
Electrical Cabinet/Panel Fabrication
Electrical Cable Tray Hangers
Electray Hangers
Equipment Supports
Tube Steel Cable Tray Grid
Blockwall Structural Steel

These reinspections will be performed without the removal of paint. Results will be evaluated by Design Engineering to determine the need for additional inspections. The reinspections and resulting evaluation will be completed prior to fuel loading.

2. Institute a program for verifying and documenting that welding inspections are performed on all QA Condition 1 and 4 welds. This program will be implemented by October 1, 1982.