



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-321/82-20 and 50-366/82-20

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
 P.O. Box 4545
 Atlanta, GA 30302

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia and Licensee requested management meeting at NRC Region II Office, Atlanta, Georgia

Inspectors:	<u>Vergil H. Brownlee for</u>	<u>7/14/82</u>
	R. F. Rogers	Date Signed
	<u>Vergil H. Brownlee for</u>	<u>7/14/82</u>
	P. Holmes-Ray	Date Signed
Approved by:	<u>Vergil H. Brownlee</u>	<u>7/14/82</u>
	V. L. Brownlee, Section Chief, Division of Project and Resident Programs	Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on May 26 - June 21, 1982

Areas Inspected

This inspection involved 194 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, surveillance activities, previous enforcement items, and Licensee Event Reports.

Results

Of the 11 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in nine areas, two violations were identified in two areas (Failure to follow procedure - PSW valve locking, paragraph 5; Failure to follow Technical Specifications - RHR operability, paragraph 6).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *H. C. Nix, Plant Manager
- *T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager
- *C. T. Jones, Assistant Plant Manager
- *S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations
- *C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

*Attended site exit interviews

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 9 and 21, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. Violations

(Closed) (366/81-23-01) Failure to notify the NRC operations center within one hour. The corrective actions described in the licensee's response of November 24, 1981 have been completed. This item is closed.

(Closed) (366/81-34-03) Failure to notify the NRC regional office within 24 hours. The corrective measures discussed in the licensee's response dated March 2, 1982 have been completed. This item is closed.

(Closed) (321/81-28-01, 03, 06) Failure to review reports and documents in accordance with Technical Specifications requirements. The corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated April 22, 1982 have been implemented. These items are closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspector

also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts.

On June 18, 1982, during an inspection at the intake structure, the inspector noted that the cooling water isolation valve for 1D plant service water (PSW) pump was not locked open as required by HNP-1-1200, Plant Service Water. This valve was also required to be double verified in the proper position by the procedure. The required chain locking device was laying on the process pipe next to the valve. The inspector requested that the valve position be immediately verified by the licensee and it was found to be partially open. A similar situation was reported in IE report 50-321/82-12 issued on April 8, 1982 involving another cooling water valve. This failure to maintain the valve properly is a repeat violation (321/82-20-01).

6. Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operations (LCO's) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.

On April 19, 1982, on a control room tour, the inspector noted that the vertical section of panel 2H11-P601 over "A" loop Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was not energized as all instrumentation indicated zero. The inspector pointed out to the operator on shift that all flow indication had been lost on the RHR loop which was required to be operable during fuel loading. The operator was not aware that the panel had been de-energized. The system was then declared inoperable (LER 50-366/82-30 refers) and fuel loading stopped. Further investigation by the inspector indicated that this panel section which contains flow indication for both RHR and RHR service water had been de-energized for approximately 20 hours. The licensee's failure to enter the LCO and suspend refueling activities in a timely manner is a violation (366/82-20-01). The existence of this condition over three shifts without notice or comment by licensed operators is also of concern.

and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

8. Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

9. Review of Non-routine Events Reported by the Licensee (Unit 2)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and that the public health and safety were of utmost consideration. Asterisked reports were followed up in depth onsite.

LER No.	Date of Report	Description
50-366/81-92	10/27/81	Rod out permissive lost
50-366/81-94	10/20/81	2C D/G start failure*
50-366/81-99	10/22/81	Radiation monitor lost
50-366/81-100	11/12/81	2C D/G start failure*
50-366/81-105	12/01/81	L.P. alarms CRD hydraulic control units
50-366/81-106	12/04/81	SBGT Train 2T46-D001B failed to start*
50-366/81-107	12/01/81	Torus/RB vacuum bkr inoperable*
50-366/81-108	12/01/81	Rx pressure switch out of calibration*

50-366/81-109	12/01/81	RB/Torus vacuum bkr opened on high d/p
50-366/81-110	12/01/81	RHR 2C inop/valve 2E11-F004C inoperable
50-366/81-111	12/15/81	HPCI inoperable*
50-366/81-113	12/10/81	Test Procedure change not approved by plant management
50-366/81-114	12/17/81	LPCI injection valve failed*
50-366/81-117	12/17/81	LPCI inverter failed
50-366/81-118	12/15/81	DW temperature recorder inoperable
50-366/81-119	12/31/81	MS line rad instrument HI-HI trip OOC
50-366/81-122	12/29/81	Pressure Control Valve 2E11-F126A failed to operate
50-366/81-123	12/22/81	SBGT train inoperable
50-366/81-125	01/08/82	RCIC inoperable*
50-366/81-126	01/05/82	Hydrogen recombiner inoperable
50-366/81-128	12/31/81	Radwaste door 2RW21 found open
50-366/81-129	01/07/82	2C D/G inoperable due to engine failure*
50-366/81-130	01/07/82	L.P. alarms on CRD hydraulic units*
50-366/81-132	01/19/82	HPCI injection alarm inoperable
50-366/81-133	01/19/82	Rx water shroud level switch OOC
50-366/81-134	01/19/82	2C D/G tripped on attempt to sync to bus*