

APPENDIX B

NOTICE OF DEVIATION

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna 1 and 2

License Nos. NPF-4
NPF-7

Based on the results of the NRC inspection conducted on April 14 - May 30, 1980, certain of your activities appear to deviate from your commitments to the Commission as indicated below.

- A. VEPCO letter Serial No. 1160 dated December 28, 1979, a supplement to Unit 1 LER 79-149, stated that station emergency procedures would be revised as necessary to assure continued ventilation flow from the safeguards buildings and the auxiliary building central area in the event of ductwork failure during a seismic event.

Contrary to the above, Units 1 and 2 abnormal Operating Procedure 1-AP-36, "Seismic Event," was revised March 5, 1980, but instructions were not provided for assuring continued ventilation of the safeguards buildings in the event of failure of exhaust ductwork.

- B. VEPCO letter Serial No. 123 of February 14, 1980, a final report per 10 CFR 50.55(e) on the non-seismically qualified control room air conditioning chiller control panels, stated that required Unit 2 modification would be completed prior to initial fuel loading.

Contrary to the above, electrical modifications per Engineering and Design Coordination Report P-2717-2 were not completed until April 28, 1980. Initial fuel loading began April 12, 1980.

- C. VEPCO's "Topical Report - Quality Assurance Program - Operations Phase" (VEP-3A), Section 17.2.27, as implemented by Paragraph 2.5.3.2 of the "Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual," requires that temporary personnel be indoctrinated in VEPCO's quality assurance procedures as related to their specific tasks to be performed.

Contrary to the above, the Babcock and Wilcox startup test engineer in charge of Unit 2 precritical test 2-SW-11 on the 4:00pm and midnight shift on May 1, 1980, had not received such indoctrination.

- D. VEPCO letter Serial No. 1179 dated December 12, 1979, concerning commitments to correct identified equipment problems, stated that any use of service water mode of containment cooling would have to be under strict administrative control and these controls for Unit 1 would be in place prior to startup from the first refueling outage.

Contrary to the above, no administrative controls were implemented until after May 16, 1980. Startup from the first refueling was in January 1980.