

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 2055

JAN 0 3 1979

Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

> Mr. Byron Lee, Jr. Vice President Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. Lee:

SUBJECT: SECOND ROUND REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING LA SALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 & 2

As a result of our continuing review of the La Salle Final Safety Analysis Report, we find that we need additional information to continue our evaluation. The specific information required is listed in the Enclosure. These questions were discussed with your staff.

Please inform us after receipt of this letter of the date you can supply the requested information so that we may factor that date into our review schedule.

Please contact us if you desire any discussions or clarification of the information requested.

Sincerely,

Olan D. Parr, Chief

Olan D. Parr, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Project Management

Enclosure: As Stated

cc w/enclosure: Richard E. Powell, Esq. Isham, Lincoln & Beale One First National Plaza Suite 2400 Chicago, Illinois 60670

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## ENCLOSURE

## 030.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS BRANCH

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031.250(RSP) The responses to Questions 031.5 and 040.110 are incomplete and (Q031.5) (Q040.110) unacceptable. Therefore, the question of the qualification of Class 1E equipment remains an open issue in your application. Please provide a schedule for the completion of these responses.

031.251The response to Questions 031.134 and 031.222 Parts (2) and (3)(16.3.1)are incomplete. Please provide the following additional information(Q031.113)(Q031.134)(Q031.222)(1) Describe how the reactor parameters which are listed in the

revised response to Question 031.134 Part 1 are used by the operator to determine that the reactor has been shutdown with that margin which is specified by Technical Specification 3.1.1. This description shall include a discussion of how the operator correlates the observed readings with the plant conditions which existed prior to the scram.

(2) Define "fail safe" as used in the revised response to Question 031.134 Part 1.

(3) Describe how the reactor trip system is caused to fail safe should some external influence cause the scram solenoid valves

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to lock in their energized position. This description should address past reactor operating experiences which include non-fail safe failures and which resulted from such common causes as excessive coil voltages, contaminated air supplies and use of non-qualified solenoid valve piston seals.

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031.252(RSP) The revised response to Question 031.89 Part 3 do not resolve (0031.89) 10031.223 the staff's concern. Therefore:

- Provide a wiring diagram for penetrations x and y which show the circuits which are involved.
- (2) Describe how the plant process computer is qualified as an isolation device.
- (3) Describe the design criteria and methods which assure that non-divisional wiring (such as the plant process computer inputs) does not become a flammable common path between redundant, Class 1E, divisions.

031.253 The response to Question 031.158 is incomplete. Provide the (Q031.158) GE Qualification Specifications for our review.

031.254	The response to Questions 031.185, and the necessity for Technical
(Q031.46) (0031.185)	Specification 3.1.3.5.C, is not understood. Please clarify
(Q031.234)	the discrepancy between the response to Questions 031.18 and
	031 46 and the response to Ouestion 031.185.

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031.255 With regard to the response to Question 031.215 Part 1, please (15.1.2) (Q031.215) explain why continued, unchecked, feedwater controller failure

to maximum demand does not involve any safety consideration.

031.256 (F18.1.2-1) (F15.1.2-2) (F031.215-1) (0031.215)

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Please provide the following clarifications with regard to the response to Question 031.215 Part 2:

- (1) Justify your position that the simultaneous failure of the high water level turbine trip and the feed water pump trip with the postulated feedwater controller failure constitutes a multiple equipment failure event. This justification should include a discussion of how the feedwater turbine and main turbine trip signals are isolated at K624.
- (2) Explain the differences in assumptions and initial conditions
  (which were in addition to the assumed failure) that result
  in the striking differences between Figures 15.1.2-1,
  15.1.2-2 and Q31.2151.
- (3) Identify the power sources for K611, K612, K613 and describe the consequences of a loss of power to each of these units on their loads.
- (4) Describe the physical separation between K624A, K624B, and K624C.

031.257 Please provide the following clarifications with regard to the (Q031.124) (Q031.215) the responses to Question 031.215 Part 3:

> Identify the failure in the Class IE system which you believe to be a prerequisite to the failure of the non-Class IE of the high water level trip.

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031.257 (2) Identify the power sources for the pressure regulator and (Q031.124) (Q031.215) turbine bypass controls and describe the consequences of the failure of each source upon its loads.

031.258 State the temperature which was used in the accelerated aging (0031.156) (0031.217) process.

031.259The figures which are provided in FSAR Section 7.3 have been(6.2.4.2)updatec and modified since Question 031.235 was issued (after(Q031.160)Amendment 35). However, the corrections seem to be incomplete.Please clarify the discrepancy between FSAR Section 6.2.4.2.3 and

FSAR Figure 7.3-11 with regard to the normal position of the LPCI pump minimum flow values.

O31.260(RSP) The response to Question O31.237 is incomplete and, therefore, (QO31.237) unacceptable. For each Class IE circuit which must be disabled in order to conduct routine surveillance testing, please provide the following for our review:

(1) Identify the circuit

(2) Provide the design basis information which is required by Section 3 of IEEE Std 279-1971

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031.260(RSP)(3)Describe how the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971 for sections(Q031.237)listed below, are satisfied when due consideration is given to

Section 5 of IEEE 379-1972:

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123	6 33
101	M x 1 1.
1-1	1 12
101	4.10
121	1 17
(0)	M . 1/
10)	1 20
(2)	4.20

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(4) Describe no restoration of the circuit is verified

after testing has been completed.