NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 LICENSEE CODE: I L D R S 2 ② LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ③ LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 ④ CAT ⑤

CON'T

01 REPORT SOURCE: L ⑥ DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 ⑦ EVENT DATE: 1 0 1 2 7 8 ⑧ REPORT DATE: 1 1 0 1 7 8 ⑨

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

02 While performing quarterly Surv. DIS 1600-3, Diff. Press. Sw. Isol. Valve for DPIS
03 2-1622A was found closed. DPIS 2-1622 A monitors press. between Torus and Rx. Bld. and
04 is calibrated to trip open at -12.5 +/- 1 in. H_2O increasing. Isolation valve may have
05 been left closed during previous surv. on 7/13/78. Safety significance minimal while
06 remaining vacuum sw. 2-1622B was operable to actuate redundant vacuum breaker. On
07 10/1/78, redundant vacuum breaker was inoperable for approx. 8 hrs. to replace
08 fuse F-16 on panel 902-3. No previous similar events.

09 SYSTEM CODE: S A ⑪ CAUSE CODE: A ⑫ CAUSE SUBCODE: C ⑬ COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U ⑭ COMP. SUBCODE: E ⑮ VALVE SUBCODE: Z ⑯

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR: 7 8 — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 5 6 / OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 REPORT TYPE: T — REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: G ⑱ FUTURE ACTION: Z ⑲ EFFECT ON PLANT: Z ⑳ SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z ㉑ HOURS ㉒: 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y ㉓ NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N ㉔ PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N ㉕ COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: B 0 8 0 ㉖

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

10 Cause unknown. Surv. DIS 1600-3 requires isolation valve to be opened slowly upon
11 completion of surv. DIS 1600-3 has been revised to require Inst. Mech. to sign
12 data sheet upon valving isol. valve back into service. For 90 days, IM supervisors
13 will visually examine "AS LEFT" position of all critical non-indicating safety
14 related valves, which are repositioned during surveillances.

15 FACILITY STATUS: E ㉘ % POWER: 0 9 7 ㉙ OTHER STATUS ㉚: NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B ㉛ DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ㉜: Surveillance Testing

16 ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z ㉝ CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z ㉞ AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉟: NA LOCATION OF RELEASE ㊱: NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17 NUMBER: 0 0 0 ㊲ TYPE: Z ㊳ DESCRIPTION ㊴: NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18 NUMBER: 0 0 0 ㊵ DESCRIPTION ㊶: NA

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LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸

19 TYPE: Z ㊷ DESCRIPTION: NA

50-237-S

PUBLICITY

20 ISSUED: N ㊹ DESCRIPTION ㊺: NA

NRC USE ONLY

Carl Lindberg

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-056/01T-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT -2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET # 050-237

While performing quarterly surveillance DIS 1600-3, the differential pressure switch isolation valve for DPIS 2-1622A was found closed. The Differential Pressure Switch is designed to monitor the ΔP between the Torus and Reactor Building and is calibrated to trip open at -12.5 +/- 1 inch H_2O vacuum increasing. Technical Specification 3.7.3.a limits the maximum negative ΔP referenced to Torus at -13.7 inches H_2O. At -12.5 +/- 1" H_2O increasing vacuum, either AO 2-1601-20A is opened by switch DPIS 2-1622A or AO 2-1601-20B opens in response to DPIS 2-1622B (both vacuum breaker valves arranged in parallel). This relieves the torus negative pressure from the reactor building.

All trip setpoints in the surveillance were found within the Dresden Tech Spec Limits. However, prior to the surveillance the isolation valve upstream of Differential Pressure Switch 2-1622-A, was found closed which caused the switch to be inoperable. It is assumed that the isolation valve was left closed after completion of the previous quarterly surveillance on 7/13/78. The safety consequence was minimal while the remaining Pressure Suppression to Rx Building Vacuum Switch 2-1622B and vacuum breaker AO2-1601-20B were operable. On 10/1/78, the AO-2-1601-20B valve was also rendered inoperable for approximately 8 hours, however, to replace Fuse F-16 on panel 902-3. During that period, vacuum protection was not available for the torus.

DIS 1600-3 had already correctly contained a step requiring the instrument isolation valve to be opened slowly upon completion of the surveillance. However, to provide better assurance that the step is completed, DIS 1600-3 has been additionally modified to require the Instrument Maintenance Mechanic assigned to the surveillance to sign the data sheet upon valving the switches back into service.

In addition for the next 90 days an Instrument Maintenance Supervisor will visually examine the "As Left" position of all critical non-indicating Safety-Related valves which are repositioned during instrument surveillances and similarly co-sign each associated surveillance upon its completion. The Pressure Suppression to Rx Building Vacuum Switches will continue to be tested quarterly to ascertain compliance with the Technical Specifications.