

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK																			
LICENSEE NAME					LICENSE NUMBER					LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE					
01 OHIDBS11					000-NPFI-03					41111				03					
CATEGORY				REPORT REPORT SOURCE				DOCKET NUMBER				EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE			
01 CON1				L L				050-0346				080277				082677			

EVENT DESCRIPTION
 02 At 0945 hours on August 2, 1977, an operator attempted to cycle Pressurizer Sample Valve RC 240A, for the purpose of obtaining a water sample for the station Chemistry Lab, but it would not stroke. The valve was inoperative. (NP-33-77-40).
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SYSTEM CODE			CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				VIOLATION	
07 S D			B		V A L V O P				Z		Z Z Z Z				N	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION
 08 The cause of the occurrence is attributed to incorrect adjustment of the spring hanger for thermal expansion which caused the failure of the motor operator.
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FACILITY STATUS			POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION					
11 B			000			NA			A			NA					

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED			CONTENT OF RELEASE			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			LOCATION OF RELEASE					
12 Z			Z			NA			NA					

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES			DESCRIPTION		
13 000			Z NA		

PERSONNEL INJURIES			DESCRIPTION		
14 000			NA		

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES		
15 NA		

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY			DESCRIPTION		
16 Z			NA		

PUBLICITY		
17 NA		

ADDITIONAL FACTORS		
18 NA		

ADDITIONAL FACTORS		
19		

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-40

DATE OF EVENT: August 2, 1977

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Isolation Valve RC 240A was inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 0945 hours on August 2, 1977, an operator attempted to cycle Pressure Sample Valve RC 240A for the purpose of obtaining a water sample for the station Chemistry Laboratory, but it would not stroke. The valve was inoperable, placing the unit in Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. In compliance with this Action Statement, RC 240A was closed and power removed at 1245 hours on August 2, 1977.

On August 6, 1977 at 1018 hours, RC 240A was opened to enable station personnel to repair the valve. The second isolation valve for that penetration, RC 240B, was then closed and its power removed until work on RC 240A was completed, also in compliance with Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: There was an adjustment problem with a spring hanger installed for thermal expansion. This caused a strain on the motor operator which caused the torque switch of the valve operator to prevent operation.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. From 0945 hours to 1245 hours on August 2, 1977, the Safety Features Actuation System would have been able to close RC 240B and thus assure Containment integrity if it was needed. At 1245 hours, RC 240A was closed and power removed for further assurance of Containment integrity.

Corrective Action: The hanger was readjusted, valve stroked successfully, and RC 240A was returned to service on August 8, 1977, removing the unit from Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. An investigation of the hanger design was made by the architect/engineer, Bechtel Corporation, as per Facility Change Request 77-338. It was determined that the only change necessary was re-adjustment of the spring hanger.

Failure Data: A different Containment Isolation Valve, CV 5074, was inoperable on July 27, 1977 (see Licensee Event Report NP-33-77-38) due to personnel error.