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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-113

DATE OF EVENT: September 14, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure to perform the required surveillance testing during inoperability of the Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2507 and Load (MWE) = 840.

Description of Occurrence: During the review of the Shift Foreman's log book on September 14, 1978, at 0030 hours, the Shift Foreman discovered that the required surveillance testing of Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 was not performed when Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 was inoperable.

Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 was declared inoperable on September 13, 1978, at 0952 hours for preventative maintenance. The surveillance testing required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 was not performed until September 14, 1978, at 0134 hours. Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 requires that when Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 is inoperable, the following surveillance requirements must be met:

1. Verification of correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability for each independent circuit between the offsite transmission network, and the onsite Class 1E distribution system (ST 5080.01).
2. Verify that the Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 starts from ambient conditions and accelerates to at least 900 RPM 10 seconds (ST 5081.01).

These surveillance requirements are to be performed within one hour of the inoperability of the Emergency Diesel Generator and at least once per eight hours thereafter.

Upon discovery of the omission of the surveillance testing, the Shift Foreman immediately arranged to perform the required testing. The surveillance testing was then repeated as required during the remainder of the inoperability of the Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the occurrence was personnel error. The Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 was declared inoperable on September 13, 1978 at 0952 hours. The surveillance requirements were not performed until after the discovery of the omission of the surveillance testing on September 14, 1978, at 0030 hours. The Shift Foreman failed to recognize that the surveillance testing was required.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. Had emergency power been required, Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 would have been able to start and supply electrical power to the essential busses as was verified by the surveillance testing performed on September 14, 1978.

Corrective Action: The Shift Foreman immediately arranged to perform the required surveillance testing by completing the appropriate sections of Surveillance Tests ST 5080.01 and ST 5081.01. This Licensee Event Report will be distributed to operations personnel as additional corrective action. The Diesel Generator Operating Procedure SP 1107.11 has been modified (T-3279) to emphasize the performance of this surveillance requirement.

Failure Data: Previous failures to perform surveillance requirements on the Emergency Diesel Generators occurred on November 30, 1977 as reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-77-101 and on August 15, 1978, as reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-97.

LER #78-096