

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report of Emergency Planning Inspection

IE Inspection Report No. 050-263/76-17

Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Monticello, Minnesota

License No. DPR-22
Category: C

Type of Licensee: PWR (GE) - 545 MWe

Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced

Date of Inspection: October 27, 1976

Principal Inspector: *M. J. Oestmann*
M. J. Oestmann

11/12/76
(Date)

Accompanying Inspectors: None

Other Accompanying Personnel: None

Reviewed By: *A. B. Januska*
J. A. Pagliaro, Chief
Environmental and Special
Projects Section

11/12/76
(Date)

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Summary

Announced emergency planning inspection conducted on October 27, (76-17): observation of emergency drill involving licensee's response organization, onsite personnel evacuation, personnel accountability, communications checks with offsite support agencies, fire drill, and emergency preparedness; discussions of critique of drill results and status of the letters of agreement with offsite support agencies as described in a previous inspection report.^{1/}

Enforcement Items

None.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

No previously identified enforcement items within the scope of this inspection.

Other Significant Items

A. Systems and Components

1. Evacuation of onsite personnel to the appropriate assembly point was delayed for a few minutes because of a faulty public address system. (Paragraph 3, Report Details)
2. Radio communication problems were encountered during contact between Control Room personnel and one of the radiation protection survey teams. (Paragraph 3, Report Details)
3. The licensee's emergency response teams found during the fire drill that one of the fire hoses was leaking and another discharged sand and dirt when flushed with Mississippi River water. (Paragraph 3, Report Details)

B. Facility Items (Plans and Procedures)

Responsibilities of the Emergency Director and Emergency Coordinator as delineated on pages 20-21 and 26-27 of the Monticello Emergency Plan (MEP) were found to need clarification. (Paragraph 4, Report Details)

^{1/} IE Inspection Report No. 050-263/76-06.

C. Managerial Items

None.

D. Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by Licensee

None.

E. Deviations

None.

F. Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items

None.

Management Interview

The following items were discussed in the management interview on October 27, 1976, with Mr. L. Eliason, Plant Manager, and members of his staff.

A. The inspector discussed the intent and scope of this inspection. (Paragraph 2, Report Details)

B. The inspector noted that the responsibilities to notify offsite agencies by the Emergency Director and Emergency Coordinator as delineated in the Emergency Plan need to be clarified. (Paragraph 4, Report Details)

C. The inspector discussed the results of the emergency drill critique, and in particular the problems encountered pertaining to the faulty public address system and to the leaking fire hose. (Paragraph 3, Report Details)

D. The licensee discussed the status of the letters of agreement with offsite support agencies. (Paragraph 5, Report Details)

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

L. Eliason, Plant Manager
G. Jacobson, Superintendent of Nuclear Projects, Corporate Headquarters
W. Sparrow, Operations Supervisor
R. Milke, Shift Supervisor
F. Fey, Radiation Protection Engineer
L. Nolan, Assistant Radiation Protection Engineer

2. General

The licensee is required to determine the adequacy of his Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan (MEP) and implementing procedures by observing and evaluating performance of the emergency organization during response to a test of the Emergency Plan. This inspection consisted of observations of the response by the licensee's organization during a scheduled drill conducted by the licensee to determine: (a) if the organization responds with approved procedures and plans; (b) if the response seems coordinated, orderly, and timely; (c) if the licensee is using designated persons to evaluate the organization's response; (d) if a critique is held shortly following the drill; (e) if the results of the drill and licensee's self evaluation are documented and reviewed by licensee management and supervision; and (f) if appropriate corrective actions are being initiated to correct identified deficiencies. The status of the letters of agreement with offsite support agencies as discussed in a previous inspection report^{2/} was reviewed.

3. Monticello Nuclear Generating Control Room

The licensee had available in the Control Room a designated corporate person who observed the drill and participated in the critique following the drill. The emergency drill conducted on October 27, 1976, involved a simulated explosion in the Recombiner Building resulting in a postulated ground release of radioactive gas and included a simulated fire in the Diesel Generator Day Tank Room. The drill was initiated by the Shift Supervisor to test evacuation of plant personnel, to check personnel accountability, to assemble and dispatch radiation protection survey teams and emergency response teams, to check communications with offsite support agencies and to determine the emergency category. The licensee implemented emergency procedure E2 "Emergency Procedures," including notification of offsite support agencies in accordance with technical specification requirements.

^{2/} Ibid.

The plant evacuation siren was sounded and the Emergency Director and his emergency response group gathered in the plant Control Room. The wind direction and speed were determined in the Control Room. The Emergency Director made a public address announcement regarding the location for assembling the evacuated personnel. However, the licensee found out that the public address system was not working properly. Within a few minutes the security guard called the Control Room to determine which assembly place was being used for evacuation. All persons were accounted for by the Emergency Coordinator at the substation assembly location in a timely manner, and the information telephoned to the Control Room.

A simulated explosion was established resulting in a postulated ground release of radioactive gases. The Emergency Director classified the emergency as a General Emergency as delineated in the licensee's emergency plan. Two radiation protection survey teams were dispatched by the Radiation Protection Engineer to monitor onsite and offsite areas downwind of the release point. The survey teams were in contact with the Control Room by radio; however, the second survey team could not transmit information to the Control Room. The licensee found that the radio used was in need of repair.

The Radiation Protection Engineer also called the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) to inform them of the drill. The MDH dispatched three survey teams from Minneapolis to the site and reported to the Control Room in a timely manner that the three teams had found no activity above background in the offsite areas surrounding the plant.

Under the advice of the Emergency Director, the Radiation Protection Engineer also called local, state and federal support agencies on the notification list in the emergency plan. All agencies responded in accordance with the emergency plan.

The Emergency Director dispatched two emergency response teams to the Diesel Generator Day Tank Room to put out a simulated fire. Based on the critique that followed the drill, the licensee found: (1) that one of the linen fire hoses had a hole in it because mice had eaten the linen; and (2) that one of the other hoses discharged silt and dirt when flushed with the low level Mississippi River water.

4. Critique Following Emergency Drill

Following the completion of the drill, the drill was reviewed and evaluated by the licensee. The inspector noted that in contrast to the planned scenario, the Radiation Protection Engineer under the direction of the Emergency Director rather than the Emergency Coordinator made the telephone calls to notify the offsite support agencies. The inspector discussed the need to clarify the responsibilities of the Emergency Director and Emergency Coordinator as described on pages 20-21 and 26-27 of the emergency plan. The licensee acknowledged the inconsistencies in the plan regarding which person has the responsibility to notify offsite support agencies. The licensee will take this matter up during the next revision of the emergency plan. This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection.

The licensee also found that the public address system was not working properly. The licensee plans to prepare a new plant operating procedure to periodically check the audibility of the public address system at locations inside and outside different plant buildings. This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection.

Difficulties in transmitting information by one of the radios was discussed. The radio used by the survey teams which was found to not transmit properly was sent to the repair shop. During a recent inventory check, the licensee had found it to be working properly. This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection.

The licensee plans to investigate the above mentioned problems with the fire hoses. In addition, because of the cold weather, the licensee found that gloves were needed during the fire drill. This item will be examined during a future inspection.

A summary and critique of the drill will be prepared by the licensee and will be examined by the inspector during a subsequent inspection. The drill demonstrated the adequacy as well as problems of the licensee's emergency plans and procedures.

5. Status of Letters of Agreement

The inspector discussed the status of renewing letters of agreement with offsite support agencies in reference to an open item described in a previous inspection report.^{3/} The licensee reported that eleven offsite support agencies had submitted letters of agreement to the licensee. One additional letter was pending. This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection.

3/ Ibid.