



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos.: 50-416/83-26

Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
 Jackson, MS 39205

Docket Nos.: 50-416

License Nos.: NPF-13

Facility Name: Grand Gulf

Inspection at Grand Gulf site near Port Gibson, Mississippi

Inspector: *W. H. Miller, Jr.* 7-22-83
 W. H. Miller, Jr. Date Signed

Approved by: *T. E. Conlon* 7-22-83
 T. E. Conlon, Section Chief Date Signed
 Engineering Inspection Branch
 Division of Engineering and Operational Programs

SUMMARY

Inspection on June 27 - July 1, 1983

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 35 inspector-hours on site in the areas of fire protection/prevention.

Results

Of the areas inspected, one apparent violation was found (Failure to conduct semi-annual weight and pressure verification of the PGCC Halon Fire Suppression Systems - paragraph 5.d(13)), and one apparent deviation was found (Failure to provide skid-mounted air compressor for breathing air application - paragraph 5.b(3)).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *C. K. McCoy, Plant Manager
- *L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
- *C. Hayes, Plant Quality Superintendent
- *S. M. Feith, Operations QA Supervisor
- *K. Black, Engineering Supervisor
- A. Hotham, Operations Training Superintendent
- P. Sudnack, Training Department (Consultant)
- *V. Holmberg, Fire Protection Coordinator
- *B. Bearden, Licensing
- *R. Byrd, Compliance
- W. Abrahams, Compliance
- *W. M. Garner, QA
- *J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator

Other Organization

- H. D. Castles, Risk Control Specialist/Middle South Services, Inc.
- *G. Oneto, Risk Control Specialist/Middle South Services, Inc.

NRC Resident Inspector

A. Wagner

- *Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 1, 1983, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the following inspection findings:

- a. Deviation Item (416/83-26-01), Failure to Provide Skid-Mounted Air Compressor for Breathing Air Application - paragraph 5.b(3).
- b. Violation Item (416/83-26-02), Failure to Conduct Semi-Annual Weight and Pressure Verification of the PGCC Halon Fire Suppression Systems - paragraph 5.d(13).

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

a. (Closed) Violation (416/82-69-01), Failure to Implement the Technical Specification Requirements for Fire Rated Assemblies and Barriers: The licensee's response of January 5, 1983, to this violation and the following corrective actions were reviewed and found to be acceptable:

- (1) An interim Special Report to document the incomplete fire protection provisions was submitted to the NRC on November 17, 1982. A final report will be issued when all work is completed.
- (2) A Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was declared due to the removal of the fire rated hatch cover in the fire barrier between the lower cable spreading room and the HVAC shaft of the control building. The LCO was removed when the cover was reinstalled on November 29, 1982.
- (3) The blocked open fire doors were immediately restored to their closed position. Signs were being placed on all fire doors which denote that the shift superintendent's permission is required if the doors are to be blocked open.

In addition to the above corrective actions, appropriate plant personnel have been made aware of the requirement to notify the shift superintendent and to establish a fire watch when fire rated assemblies and sealing devices are open.

b. (Closed) Violation (416/82-69-02), Failure to Establish and Implement Written Procedures of the Fire Protection Program: The licensee response of January 5, 1983, to this violation and the following corrective actions were reviewed and found to be satisfactory:

- (1) General Maintenance Instruction 07-S-12-108 has been issued establishing the activities which will control the inspection and testing of the emergency lighting systems. The 8-hour type batteries are inspected and functionally test weekly. A preventive maintenance inspection is to be performed semi-annually on all battery powered units.
- (2) Fire detector zones 2-15 and 2-18 have been included in Procedure 06-IC-SP65-1001. Future functional tests of these detectors will be scheduled within the time specified by the Technical Specifications.
- (3) Note 36 has been added to Drawing M-0800A (Revision 18) to require repairs and work on fire barrier penetrations to be conducted in accordance with the licensee's QA program.

- c. (Open) Unresolved Item (416/82-56-02), Inadequate Fire Protection Surveillance Inspection and Test Procedures: Corrective action has been completed on all of the identified discrepancies except the following:
- (1) Functional tests of the detection system for the charcoal filter trains had not yet been written.
 - (2) Fire barrier inspection procedures had been written but had not been reviewed, approved and issued.
- d. (Open) Unresolved Item (416/82-56-06), Temporary Structures Within Auxiliary Building Should be Removed or Equipped with Appropriate Fire Protection Features: Several temporary structures remain in the Auxiliary Building but are scheduled to be removed or provided with appropriate fire protection features prior to plant entering the criticality mode.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Fire Protection/Prevention Program Implementation (Modules 64703 and 64704)

a. Fire Protection Administrative Procedures

The licensee's fire protection administrative procedures comply with the NRC guidelines. Refer to Report Nos. 50-416/82-08, 50-416/82-34, and 50-416/82-56 for documentation on the review of these procedures.

b. Fire Brigade

(1) Organization

The fire brigade is composed of all operational personnel. A total of 51 people were on the qualified fire brigade roster of which a total of 18 were qualified brigade leaders. An adequate number of personnel are to be assigned to each shift to accomplish required plant operations and to meet the minimum of five qualified people for fire brigade duties. The inspector reviewed the following "revised shift schedule" and verified that the minimum shift crew composition met the provision of Technical Specifications Sections 6.2.2.a and 6.2.2.e for the dates indicated:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL SHIFT EMPLOYEES</u>	<u>FIRE BRIGADE MEMBERS</u>
Sept. 25, 1982	N (2330-0730)	9	6
	D (0730-1530)	9	9
	E (1530-2330)	8	8

Oct. 24, 1982	N	7	7
	D	7	7
	E	8	8
Dec. 25, 1982	N	8	6
	D	8	7
Mar. 16, 1983	N	9	7
	D	8	7
	E	8	8
May 27, 1983	N	8	7
	D	8	7
	E	8	7

(2) Training

The inspector reviewed the plant training records and noted that the training coordinator's training data sheet indicated that the brigade training was up-to-date. The training records for three brigade leaders and seven brigade members were reviewed. The records indicated that each member had attended the Mississippi State Fire Academy and received site specific training within the past 12 months, received a physical examination within the past 12 months, and participated in the required quarterly drills and classroom training for CY1983.

The drill records were reviewed and it was verified that for the fourth quarter of 1982, and the first and second quarter of 1983, each operational shift had participated in at least one drill per quarter, except the drills for Shifts B and D had not yet been conducted for the second quarter of 1983. These drills were scheduled to be conducted before the end of the quarter.

The annual drill with the local county public fire department was conducted on September 23, 1982. The licensee's evaluation report indicated that this drill was satisfactory.

(3) Fire Brigade Equipment

A sufficient quantity of turnout gear (coats, boots, helmets, gloves, etc.) was provided to equip 16 fire brigade members. This equipment was stored in four lockers on three elevation of the turbine building and on the 139' elevation of the auxiliary building and appeared to be adequately maintained.

A total of 18 self contained breathing apparatus was assigned to the fire brigade. Additional units were available from the health physics group. The licensee estimated that the total quantity of self contained air breathing equipment exceeded the minimum 6-hour supply required by the NRC. The maintenance of this equipment

appeared to be satisfactory. However, the licensee had not provided the portable skid-mounted air compressors approved for breathing air application as committed by response to NRC/FSAR Question 013.17. This is identified as Deviation Item (416/83-26-01), Failure to Provide Skid-Mounted Air Compressor for Breathing Air Application.

c. Plant Tour

A tour was made of the plant to review general housekeeping, control of flammable and combustible materials and general fire protection and prevention features. The general housekeeping was considered satisfactory for a plant undergoing the transition from the construction to the operational phase. Most of the temporary construction materials had been removed; however, several temporary structures remained in place. These are scheduled to be removed or provided with appropriate fire protection features prior to the plant entering the criticality mode. Refer to above paragraph 3.d. Six welding permits and four temporary combustible storage permits issued on June 28, 1983, were reviewed. These permits adhered to the requirements of Procedures 10-S-03-3, Control of Ignition Sources, and 10-S-03-4, Control of Combustible Materials.

The following fire protection systems were inspected and found to be in service: automatic sprinkler systems for diesel generator building, upper and lower cable spreading rooms, and auxiliary building elevations 93'-103', 119', and 139'; "Halon" system for computer room; carbon dioxide systems for penetration and switchgear rooms (System Nos. NIP64D 200A-D, 201A-D, and 217A-B); and, six interior fire protection control valves (Valve Nos. F134, F194, F195, F200, F206 and F291). Five fire hydrant equipment houses (Nos. 08, 09, 10, 23, and 25) were inspected and found to contain the required quantity of equipment. The equipment was satisfactorily maintained.

d. Surveillance Inspection and Tests of Fire Protection Systems

The inspector reviewed the following inspection and test documents for dates indicated to verify that the inspections and tests were accomplished within the time specified by the Technical Specifications (TS). Surveillance was considered satisfactory except as noted.

- (1) 06-OP-SP64-W-0001, Fire Pump Weekly Operability Test: October 30, 1982, thru June 16, 1983.
- (2) 06-OP-SP64-A-0004, Valve Stroke Test: June 15, 1982. Retest was due June 1983, but will not be late until after August 15, 1983.
- (3) 06-OP-SP64-A-0005, Fire Pump "A" Functional Test: June 15, 1982. This test is required each 18 months by the TS and annually by the licensee's procedure.

- (4) 06-OP-SP64-A-0006, Fire Pump "B" Functional Test: June 15, 1982. Also, refer to above item.
- (5) 06-OP-SP64-A-0007, Motor Driven Fire Pump Functional Test: June 15, 1983 and June 15, 1983. The 1983 pump test indicated that pump volume was slightly deficient (1400 gpm at 120 psi in lieu of 1500 gpm at 119 psi) from that required by the TS. Pump had been rebuilt, retested and once again failed the test. The licensee is to calibrate the flow meter and retest the pump. Presently, the licensee does not consider this pump to be functional; however, the remaining two pumps meet the TS fire pump operability requirements.
- (6) 06-OP-SP64-A-0010, Fire Suppression Water System Loop Flow Test: June 13, 1982.
- (7) 06-OP-SP64-M-0011, Valve Lineup Verification: October 2, 1982, through May 28, 1983.
- (8) 06-OP-SP64-A-0012, Annual Yard Fire Hydrant Flow Check: June 12, 1982. Retest due June 1983, but will not be late until August 12, 1983.
- (9) 06-OP-SP64-M-0013, Fire Hydrant Hose House Equipment Inventory: June 12, 1982, through May 12, 1983.
- (10) 06-OP-SP64-M-0015, Fire House Station Check: June 14, 1982, through May 15, 1983.
- (11) 06-OP-SP64-R-0019, Sprinkler System Functional Test: June 5, 1982. Retest due January 1984.
- (12) 06-ME-SP64-S-0001, Halon System Bottle Weight Check (Computer and Control Panel Room): May 29, 1982, through April 29, 1983.
- (13) 06-ME-SP64-SA-0002, PGCC Halon System Bottle Weight and Pressure Check: Weight and pressure inspection of the 21 PGCC Halon System cylinders were satisfactorily conducted on various dates during May and June 1983. Test records were not available to indicate if any previous inspections had been conducted. TS Section 4.7.6.4.b requires the weight and pressure of each Halon cylinder to be verified at least once per 6 months. The failure to verify the pressure and weight of these cylinders prior to licensing and 6 months prior to the most recent inspections is identified as Violation (416/83-26-02), Failure to Conduct Semi-annual Weight and Pressure Verification of the PGCC Halon Systems. The licensee in February 1983, issued Procedure 06-ME-SP64-SA-0002 for the inspection of the PGCC Halon systems. Current inspection and test scheduling procedures should assure that future inspections will be accomplished within the required time.

- (14) 06-CH-SP64-Q-0039, Diesel Fuel Oil Viscosity, water and sediment: June 4, 1982, through June 14, 1983.
- (15) 06-IC-SP64-A-1001, Halon System Automatic Functional Test: The preoperational test on this system was completed on April 9, 1982. However, the first operational test of this system scheduled for March 25, 1983, could not be completed due to a number of installation discrepancies. Incident Report No. 83-3-107, Limiting Condition of Operation No. 83-0206 and Material Nonconformance Report 00423-83 had been issued and modifications were being made to correct the discrepancies. The systems are to be retested and restored to service upon completion of the required modifications.
- (16) 06-EL-SP65-0-1001, Detectors and Supervisory Panels Functional Test: The first test for the detection systems was accomplished during the pre-operational testing program. This test was completed on March 9, 1982. The following zones and inspection test results were reviewed and no discrepancies were noted:

<u>ZONES NOS.</u>	<u>DATES</u>
1-4	October 28, 1982 and June 6, 1983
1-5	October 28, 1982 and June 6, 1983
1-10	October 27, 1982 and June 7, 1983
2-2	October 29, 1982 and June 6, 1983
2-4	October 29, 1982 and May 6, 1983
2-19	September 28, 1982 and May 4, 1983

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations other than those listed above were identified.

6. Inspector Followup Items

- a. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (416/82-69-03), Licensee to Evaluate Fire Protection QA Program Commitments and Revise FSAR as Needed: FSAR, Appendix 9A, Table 7A-1, Item C.2, Note 4 had been revised to include the fire protection systems in the safety-related areas under the operational QA program.
- b. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (416/82-56-04), List of Redundant Safety Shutdown Circuits Not Separated by at Least a 1-hour Fire Rated Barrier is not Provided Onsite: This data has been incorporated into Drawing E-0731.
- c. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (416/82-56-08), Licensee's Evaluation of the Location, Distribution and Adequacy of Portable Fire Extinguishers and Interior Fire Hose System: The evaluation had been completed. Bechtel had prepared drawings which show the location and type of each extinguisher or interior hose station actually installed within the plant. The licensee is also to provide drawings which will

indicate this data. These drawings were about 50% complete and are scheduled to be completed by August 1, 1983.

- d. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (416/82-56-09), Review of Licensee's Evaluation of Carbon Dioxide Actuation System: Licensee issued Technical Work Request 82-339 to evaluate the events concerning the July 13, 1982, actuation of the carbon dioxide system into the ESF switchgear room. This evaluation determined that the system was installed in conformance with the manufacturer's design and installation requirements. The manufacturer advised the licensee that this was the first such incident that had been reported. This problem appeared to be an isolated situation and no additional problems have been found since the actuation. The report on this event has been completed and is being forwarded to the licensee's engineering supervision for final review and approval. No changes are anticipated.

7. Licensee Identified Items - Special Reports (SR)

The inspector reviewed the following licensee identified items:

- a. (Closed) SR-83-001, Smoke Detectors in the LPCS Pump Room Covered to Perform Planned Maintenance. On March 16, 1983, the above detectors were covered in order to perform maintenance activities. An hourly fire watch patrol was established as required by the Technical Specifications and was maintained until June 15, 1983, at which time the detectors were restored to normal service.
- b. (Closed) SR-83-002, Smoke Detectors Covered to Perform Planned Maintenance Activity. Smoke detectors on 119' elevation of Auxiliary Building were covered on February 1, 1983, in order to perform planned maintenance activities within the area. An hourly fire watch was established in accordance with the Technical Specifications and maintained for 88 days until the maintenance activities were completed.
- c. (Closed) SR-83-003, Fire Door Alarmed and Would Not Reset. On February 8, 1983, fire door OC414 was found inoperative due to a malfunction of the latch bolt. Until door was repaired and restored to service, a limiting condition for operation (LCO), which included an hourly fire watch was in effect for 7 days and 16 hours.
- d. (Closed) SR-83-004, Fire Door Blocked Open to Allow Planned Welding. The LPCS Room fire door was blocked open on February 9, 1983, and kept open for 13 days and 15 hours for planned welding operations. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was initiated as required by the Technical Specifications. Fire door was returned to normal operation when welding operations were completed.
- e. (Closed) SR-83-005, Fire Doors Blocked Open During Welding Activities. Fire doors OC210, OC214, OC219, and OC220 were blocked in the open position on February 9, 1983, in order to perform welding operations. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch patrol was established and

was maintained for 13 days as required by the Technical Specifications. The fire doors were returned to normal operation when the welding operations were completed.

- f. (Open) SR-83-006, Fire Penetrations Opened. On February 10, 1983, penetrations AE-382C and AE-384C were opened to perform planned maintenance. An hourly fire watch was established and a LCO declared as required by the Technical Specifications. These penetrations remain open.
- g. (Closed) SR-83-007, Fire Penetration CE-359-G Opened to Perform Planned Maintenance. Penetration was opened on February 16, 1983, for maintenance and remained open for 21 days. A LCO was declared and a fire watch was initiated as required by the Technical Specifications. The penetration was restored upon completion of the maintenance work.
- h. (Closed) SR-83-008, Fire Door 1A315 Alarmed and Would Not Reset. Fire door alarmed due to a misaligned magnetic switch on March 25, 1983. Licensee verified that door was closed, alarm system was deactivated and a fire watch initiated as required by the Technical Specifications. The door was adjusted, functionally tested and returned to operation 21 days following discovery.
- i. (Closed) SR-83-009, Fire Zone 2-01 Alarmed and Would Not Reset. The fire detection system for the Standby Service Water Pump House went into an alarm condition on February 16, 1982. Investigation indicated that there was no smoke or fire within the area. The system was deactivated and the LCO requirements of the Technical Specifications were established and maintained for 15 days until maintenance personnel investigated, functionally tested and the system declared operable.
- j. (Closed) SR-83-010, Smoke Detectors Covered for Planned Maintenance Activities. The fire detectors in a number of plant areas were covered for planned maintenance activities on February 9, 1982. A LCO was declared and a fire watch patrol for these areas was established and maintained until June 15, 1983, at which time the detectors were restored to normal service.
- k. (Open) SR-83-011, Fire Penetrations Do Not Conform to Original Design Criteria. This item remains outstanding.
- l. (Open) SR-83-012, Fire Rated Seals Broken to Perform Planned Maintenance Activities. These penetrations have not been restored to service.
- m. (Closed) SR-83-013, Fire Doors Blocked Open for Planned Maintenance Activities. Fire doors 1A109, 0C709, 0C710 were blocked open to perform planned maintenance and tests on March 1 and March 3, 1983. A LCO was declared and hourly fire watch patrols were established as required by the Technical Specifications and maintained until April 5, 1983, at which time these doors were restored to service.

- n. (Open) SR-83-014, Fire Rated Penetration Opened. Penetration TE-14B was opened on March 1, 1983, to install a raceway. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch established as required by the Technical Specifications. This penetration had not been resealed.
- o. (Open) SR-83-015, Fire Rated Penetrations Found Open. Several penetrations in the control building were found open on March 11, 1983. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch patrol was established. These penetrations had not been resealed.
- p. (Closed) SR-83-016, Fire Door Blocked Open. Fire door 1A202 was blocked open on March 2, 1983, and remained open for 12 days to allow routing of supply hose used in the performance of a hydrostatic test on a portion of the RHR system. A LCO was issued and an hourly fire watch was established. The fire door was closed and returned to normal service following completion of the tests.
- q. (Closed) SR-83-017, Fire Door OC313 Inoperative. The latch mechanism to this fire door was found damaged on March 1, 1983, by an operator. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and maintained until May 6, 1983, at which time the door was restored to service.
- r. (Closed) SR-83-018, Fire Rated Doors Blocked Open to Support Planned Work. Fire doors OC202, OC105, and OC106 were blocked open on March 7, 1983, and kept open for 29 days to perform work under a design change package. A LCO was established and an hourly fire watch was initiated. The fire doors were restored to operability following completion of the required work.
- s. (Open) SR-83-019, Fire Barriers Opened to Support Planned Work. On March 17 and 19, 1983, several fire barrier penetrations were opened to perform scheduled work activities. A LCO was declared and hourly fire watch was established as required by the Technical Specifications. These penetrations had not been resealed.
- t. (Closed) SR-83-020, Supervisory Alarms for Fire Doors Alarmed and Would Not Reset. Alarms for doors 1A412 and OC103 were received on March 15 and 17, 1983, respectively but alarms could not be reset. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established for the 14 days that the doors were malfunctioning. The licensee found these alarms were due to damaged hinges on door 1A412 and a damaged limit switch actuator arms on door OC103. Doors were repaired and returned to service on March 30, 1983.
- u. (Closed) SR-83-021, Fire Barriers in Auxiliary Building Opened to Support Planned Maintenance Activities. Five fire doors were blocked in the open position on March 15 and 16, 1983, and kept in the open position for 30 days to allow performance of planned maintenance activities. Hourly fire watch were established and maintained until

the maintenance activities were completed. Upon completion, the doors were closed and restored to normal operation.

- v. (Open) SR-83-022, Fire Break in a Cable Tray Removed. A cable tray fire break at 177' elevation of Control Building was removed to accomplish a plant modification. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the Technical Specification. This item had not been corrected.
- w. (Closed) SR-83-023, Smoke Detectors Covered During Welding Activities. The smoke detectors in the Standby Gas Treatment filter train room were covered on March 12, 1983, to perform welding activities. One detector in the auxiliary building was also covered on March 15, 1983, to perform welding activities. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and maintained until May 9, 1983, at which time the work was completed and detectors were restored to service.
- x. (Closed) SR-83-024, Smoke Detectors in Control Room and Auxiliary Building Covered During Welding Activities. Several smoke detectors in the control room and auxiliary building were covered on March 19 and 30, 1983, to prevent actuation while welding activities were being performed in the area. A fire watch was established and maintained for the 14 days the detectors were not functional and until the detectors were restored to service.
- y. (Open) SR-83-025, Fire Rated Penetrations Opened to Implement Design Change Packages. A number of penetrations in the fire barriers were opened on March 22, 1983, to accomplish plant modifications. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch patrol was established. These penetrations had not been resealed.
- z. (Closed) SR-83-026, Fire Door 1A318 Blocked Open. The security access card reader to fire door 1A318 malfunctioned on March 27, 1983. This door was blocked open and an hourly fire watch was established and maintained for 9 days until the card reader was repaired and returned to service as required by the Technical Specification.
- a1. (Open) SR-83-028, Fire Rated Penetrations Opened to Implement Design Change Packages. On March 29, 1983, a number of fire barrier penetrations were opened to accomplish plant modifications. A LCO was established and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the Technical Specifications. These penetrations had not yet been resealed.
- a2. (Closed) SR-83-030, Smoke Detectors Covered During Welding Activities. A number of smoke detectors on the 139' elevation of the auxiliary building were covered on April 18, 1983, to prevent alarms from welding operations which were being performed within the area. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and maintained for 21 days until the welding operations were complete at which time the detectors were returned to service.

- a3. (Closed) SR-83-031, Fire Doors Blocked Open to Allow Routing of Air Hose. On April 15, 1983, fire doors OC502, OC503, OC708, and OC710 were blocked open to perform planned maintenance operations. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was initiated and maintained for 21 days until the maintenance work was completed at which time the fire doors were returned to service.
- a4. (Closed) SR-83-032, Smoke Detectors Covered During Welding Activities. On April 15, 1983, smoke detectors in a number of areas within the control building were covered to prevent alarm conditions while welding operations were being performed in the area. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and maintained for 14 days until the welding operations were completed and detectors restored to service.
- a5. (Open) SR-83-033, Fire Rated Penetrations Opened to Implement Design Change Packages. Beginning April 11, 1983, a number of fire barrier penetrations were opened to accomplish plant modifications. A LCO was declared for the penetrations and an hourly fire watch was established. These penetrations had not been resealed.
- a6. (Closed) SR-83-034, Fire Door 1A312 Alarmed and Would Not Reset. On April 13, 1983, fire door 1A312 alarmed and would not reset. Investigation revealed that the door was closed. Door alarm was deactivated. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established. Subsequent investigation found no problems. Alarm was retested and returned to service.
- a7. (Open) SR-83-035, Fire Door 1A401 Blocked Open. This fire door was blocked open on April 15, 1983, for personnel use and is to remain in the open position until the plant is changed from cold shutdown. An LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch had been established as required by the Technical Specifications.
- a8. (Closed) SR-83-036, Fire Rated Penetration DE-20A Opened to Route a Temporary Cable. This penetration was opened on April 18, 1983, to route a power cable to supply lighting transformer X113 during a planned electrical outage. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and maintained until the cable was removed and penetration was resealed on May 25, 1983.
- a9. (Closed) SR-83-037, Fire Doors 1A214 and 1A210 Opened to Allow Routing of Air Hoses. These fire doors were blocked open on April 21, 1983, to allow air hoses to be routed into adjacent motor control center switch-gear rooms for planned maintenance activities. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was provided as required by the Technical Specifications and maintained until May 4, 1983, at which time the hoses were removed and the doors were returned to normal service.

- a10. (Closed) SR-83-039, Fire Detection Zone 2-18 Alarmed and Would Not Reset. This alarm zone alarmed and would not reset on April 14, 1983. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the Technical Specifications. The detectors were cleaned, system retested and restored to operability on May 5, 1983.
- a11. (Open) SR-83-040, Fire Rated Penetrations Opened to Implement Design Change Packages. A number of penetrations were opened on April 24, 1983, to perform plant modifications. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and are to be maintained until the penetrations are resealed.
- a12. (Open) SR-83-041, Smoke Detectors Covered During Welding Activities. The smoke detectors in the upper and lower cable spreading rooms were covered and deactivated to prevent inadvertent actuation from welding activities being conducted within the area. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and is to be maintained until the detection systems are restored to service.
- a13. (Open) SR-83-042, Smoke Detectors Covered During Welding Activities. The smoke detectors in the corridor area at the 148' elevation of the Control Building were covered to prevent inadvertent actuation from welding operations being conducted within the area. A LCO was declared and an hourly fire watch was established and is to be maintained until the detection system is restored to service.
- a14. (Closed) SR-83-043, Smoke Detector N524E Alarmed and Would Not Reset. On May 3, 1983, this smoke detector went into continuous alarm after being bumped by a maintenance worker. This alarm zone was declared inoperative, a LCO declared and an hourly fire watch established and maintained as required by the Technical Specifications until the detectors were returned to service on May 22, 1983.