

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---|----|----|----------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--------------|----|----|----|----|-----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 01 | M | S | G | G | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 |
| LICENSEE CODE | | | | | LICENSE NUMBER | | | | | | | | | | LICENSE TYPE | | | | | 57 CAT 58 | | | | | | |

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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|------------|----|----|----|----|-------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 9 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 |
| REPORT SOURCE | | DOCKET NUMBER | | | | | | | | | | EVENT DATE | | | | | REPORT DATE | | | | | | | | | |

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On January 14, 1983, it was discovered that the heat detectors in the

03 control room standby fresh air system had not been functionally tested.

04 These detectors are required by T.S.3.3.7.9. This event had no affect on

05 the health and safety of the public and did not constitute a threat to

06 plant safety. This is a final report filed pursuant to T.S.6.9.1.12.b.

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|-------------|---|------------|----|---------------|----|----------------|----|----|----|----|---------------|----|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 09 | A | B | 11 | D | 12 | Z | 13 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 |
| SYSTEM CODE | | CAUSE CODE | | CAUSE SUBCODE | | COMPONENT CODE | | | | | COMP. SUBCODE | | VALVE SUBCODE | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|---|---------------|----|-----------------------|----|-----------------|-----------------|-------|-------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------|----|----------------------|----|------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|
| 17 | 8 | 3 | 21 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 0 | 1 | 28 | 29 | X | 30 | 1 | 31 | 32 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |
| LER RO REPORT NUMBER | | EVENT YEAR | | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | | | OCCURRENCE CODE | | REPORT TYPE | | REVISION NO. | | | | | | | | | | |
| ACTION TAKEN | | FUTURE ACTION | | EFFECT ON PLANT | | SHUTDOWN METHOD | | HOURS | | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | | | | | |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The reason for the missed testing was the lack of a proper procedure.

11 Upon discovery an LCO was initiated and an hourly firewatch was

12 established in accordance with T.S.3.3.7.9. Procedure 06-EL-SP65-SA1001

13 Revision 20 now includes the testing of filter train heat detectors and

14 has been placed on the surveillance schedule for performance.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|----|---------|----|----|--------------|----|----|---------------------|----|------------------------|----|-----------------------|--|
| 15 | 6 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | A | 31 | Incidental Observation | 32 | | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | | |
| FACILITY STATUS | | | % POWER | | | OTHER STATUS | | | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | | | | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|----|----|----|--------------------|----|----|----|---------------------|--|--|--|
| 16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36 | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | | | | |
| ACTIVITY CONTENT | | | | | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | | | | LOCATION OF RELEASE | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|------|----|----|----|-------------|----|
| 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | | | TYPE | | | | DESCRIPTION | |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|-------------|----|----|----|
| 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| PERSONNEL INJURIES | | | DESCRIPTION | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|----|----|------------------|-------------------|----|--------|
| 19 | Z | 42 | NA | 43 | 8309070310 830829 | 44 | 830829 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | | | | TYPE DESCRIPTION | | | |
| PUBLICITY ISSUED | | | | DESCRIPTION | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|----|----|-------|----|----|----|
| 20 | N | 44 | NA | 45 | 68 | 69 | 80 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| NAME OF PREPARER | | | | PHONE | | | |

8309070310 830829
PDR ADOCK 05000416
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

Ron Byrd

PHONE



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

83 SEP 2 1983
August 24 1983

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/L-835.0
Update Report - Heat Detectors
in the Control Room Standby
Fresh Air System Not
Functionally Tested
LER 83-002/01 X-1
AECM-83/0497

This letter submits an update to a previous report submitted on January 28, 1983. The event for which the report was submitted occurred on January 14, 1983, when it was discovered that the heat detectors in the Control Room Standby Fresh Air System had not been functionally tested. These detectors are required to be operable per Technical Specification 3.3.7.9. The event was reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.b.

The reason for the missed testing was lack of a proper procedure. A procedure now includes testing of filter train heat detectors and has been placed on the surveillance schedule for performance. Attached is LER 83-002/01 X-1 which is a final report.

Yours truly,

for L. F. Dale
Manager of Nuclear Services

EBS/SHH:sap
Attachment

cc: (See Next Page)

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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)
Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/c)
Mr. T. B. Conner (w/o)
Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o)

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (w/a)
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Document Control Desk (w/a)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
LER 83-002/01 X-1

Mississippi Power & Light Company
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416

Technical Specification Involved: 3.3.7.9
Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.b

Event Narrative:

This is an update to a previous report submitted on January 28, 1983. The event for which the report was submitted is described in the following paragraphs.

On January 14, 1983, it was discovered that the charcoal filter train heat detectors in the control room standby fresh air system had not been functionally tested since the preoperational test was performed. These heat detectors are required by Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 to be operable anytime the control room standby fresh air system is required to be operable. Technical Specification 3.7.2 requires this system be operable in all operational modes. A fire watch should have been established on October 1, 1982, when the 6 month surveillance requirement, plus the 25% extension, expired. Also a Special Report should have been filed by November 14, 1982. Neither of these took place.

This event had no affect on the health and safety of the public and did not constitute a threat to plant safety. However, the event was reportable in 24 hours with a 14 day followup pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.b.

The reason for the missed surveillance was the lack of a proper procedure. Upon discovery, an LCO was initiated and an hourly fire watch was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.7.9.

Procedure 06-EL-SP65-SA-1001, Revision 20, now includes the testing of charcoal filter trains and is scheduled for performance. This is submitted as a final report.