

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-263/83-i4(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-263

License No. DPR-22

Licensee: Northern States Power Company  
414 Nicollet Mall  
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN

Inspection Conducted: June 2 through July 1, 1983

Inspector: C. H. Brown

*Roger S. Walker for*

7-15-83  
Date

Approved By: R. D. Walker, Chief  
Projects Section 2C

*Roger S. Walker*

7-15-83  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 2 through July 1, 1983 (Report No. 50-263/83-14(DPRP))

Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety verification; onsite review committee; Licensee Event Reports followup; and independent review which included 4160 volt and 480 volt breaker operability. The inspection involved a total of 36 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including six inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

\*W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager  
\*M. H. Clarity, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection  
H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager  
D. D. Antony, Superintendent of Operations  
W. E. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance  
\*R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering  
J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security and Services  
F. L. Fey, Superintendent, Radiation Protection  
W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering  
W. W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance  
R. A. Goranson, Acting Superintendent, Operating Engineering

The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.

\*Denotes those licensee representatives attending the exit interviews.

### 2. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of June. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

### 3. Onsite Review Committee

The inspector examined the onsite review functions conducted during the meetings held in June 1983, to verify conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. This review

included: review group membership and qualifications; review group meeting frequency and quorum; and activities reviewed including non-compliance items and corrective action, proposed facility and procedure changes and proposed tests and experiments conducted per 10 CFR 50.59, and others required by technical specifications.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

- a. (Closed) LER 263/83-14: High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) High Steam Flow Isolation Due to Injection Line Void. The injection line was walked down at the time of the event and no evidence of any water hammer was noted. The vendor stated that pumping into a void under these conditions may cause an over-steam demand.
- b. (Closed) LER 263/83-10: Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-86B Fast Closure. The fast closure was due to low oil level in the dashpot. The maintenance procedure has been revised to include a torque value for the needle valve locking nut.
- c. (Closed) LER 263/83-09: HPCI Woodward Governor EGR Ground Fault. This ground in the DC bus occurred again in June 1983 and the EGR was the fault location. The oil in HPCI lube oil sump was drained and the sump flushed and refilled with oil from a new batch. The EGR and a sample of the drained lube oil was sent to the manufacturer for analysis. Followup on this analysis will be handled as an Open Item (50-263/83-14-01). The batch of oil used in filling the HPCI lube oil sump during the 1982 outage and again in May 1983 was found to have the additives separating. The sampling to verify that it was good oil was just a top-of-barrel sample. The sampling procedure is now revised to include a sample from the bottom of the barrel. This also appears to be applicable to LER 263/83-06, HPCI EGR Coil Failure.
- d. (Closed) LER 263/83-07: Essential Motor Control Center 133A Feeder Breaker Trip. The breaker was reclosed in approximately 15 minutes. The breaker was replaced with a spare when no reason for the trip could be established. The breaker was later found to have one of the phase overcurrent trip devices to be set low. The out-of-adjustment trip point was considered to be from drift.
- e. (Closed) LER 263/83-06: HPCI EGR Coil Failure. See LER 263/83-09.

5. Electrical Breakers on Essential Buses

The inspector reviewed the operating history of the 4160-volt and 480 volt breakers associated with the plant essential buses. The review also included control power supplies, closing and tripping circuits, mechanical functions of the breakers, indications of breaker status, remote alarms and indication, maintenance schedules, and surveillance routines. No problem areas were noted.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 22, 1983, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.