

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
 7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58

CON'T
 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 9
 7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | (NP-33-83-35) On 5/24/83 at 0932 hours, a one half channel trip in SFRCS Channel 2
 0 3 | was received. The trip was due to a failed input buffer wich monitors low steam line
 0 4 | pressure. Since the low steam line pressure trip takes priority, this failure would
 0 5 | have prevented auxiliary feedwater flow to Steam Generator (SG) #2 had a trip occurred
 0 6 | from the loss of all reactor coolant pumps, low SG level, or high steam to feedwater
 0 7 | differential pressure been received in that channel during the failure. This placed
 0 8 | the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | I | E | 11 | CAUSE CODE | E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | G | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | I | N | S | T | R | U | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | X | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
 17 | LER RD REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | 8 | 3 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 2 | 6 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | REPORT TYPE | L | REVISION NO. | 0 |
 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 ACTION TAKEN | A | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NRPD-4 FORM 509 | Y | 24 | PRIME COMP SUPPLIER | Z | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26
 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause was a component failure on the input buffer circuit #1 which caused the
 1 1 | output relay to trip. On 5/24/83 at 1102 hours, the input buffer was replaced per
 1 2 | Maintenance Work Order 83-3318-00. The channel was declared operable at 1210 hours,
 1 3 | removing the unit from the action statement.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 9 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator observation | 32
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 44 45 46 80

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41
 7 8 9 10 11 12 80

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43
 7 8 9 10 80

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45
 7 8 9 10 80

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 PDR ADOCK 05000346
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NRC USE ONLY

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-35

DATE OF EVENT: May 24, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel 2 inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2506 and Load (Gross MWE) = 832.

Description of Occurrence: On May 24, 1983, at 0932 hours, Control Room operators received a one half channel trip in SFRCS Channel 2. This trip was due to a failed input buffer which monitors low pressure on steam line #2. Because the low steam line pressure trip takes priority over the over SFRCS trips, the low steam line pressure input buffer failure would have prevented the auxiliary feedwater feed to Steam Generator #2 from Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #2 had a trip from loss of all four reactor coolant pumps, low steam generator level, or a high differential pressure (steam to feedwater) been received in that channel during the failure. Therefore, this failure placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.2 since the minimum number of actuation channels required to be operable was not being met.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: A component failure on the input buffer circuit #1 caused the output relays to trip.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The other SFRCS actuation channel was operable and would have provided adequate feedwater to Steam Generator #1 to remove reactor decay heat in the event normal feedwater supply or electric power supply to essential auxiliaries had been lost.

Corrective Action: On May 24, 1983, at 1102 hours, the input buffer was replaced per Maintenance Work Order 83-3318-00. The channel was declared operable at 1210 hours, and the unit was removed from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.

Failure Data: A previous similar occurrence was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-007 (78-006).

LER #83-026



June 21, 1983

Log No. K83-907
File: RR2 (NP-33-83-35)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-026
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: May 24, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-026 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Terry D. Murray'.

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Tom Peebles
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

JUN 24 1983

Handwritten initials, possibly 'JED', written in the bottom right corner of the page.