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## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the matter of:

Gulf States Utilities Co., et al
(River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2)

Docket No50-458 50-459

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#### TAYLOE ASSOCIATES

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### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

#### BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING BOARD

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In the Matter of:

Gulf States Utilities Co., et. al : Docket Nos. 50-458 : 
(River Bend Station, Units : 50-459 : 
1 & 2) : : :

State District Court Building Appellate Courtroom 222 St. Louis Baton Rouge, LA.

Tuesday, June 14, 1983

The pre-hearing in the above-entitled matter convened, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m.

BEFORE:

B. PAUL COTTER, ESQ., Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

DR. RICHARD COLE, Member Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

GUSTAVE LINENBERGER, Member Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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#### APPEARANCES:

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On behalf of the Applicants:

TROY B. CONNER, JR., ESQ. MARK J. WETTERHAHN, ESQ. Conner & Wetterhahn, P.C. 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006

On behalf of the Petitioner, Louisianians for Safe Energy:

JAMES PIERCE, ESQ. 235 West State Baton Rouge, LA

On behalf of the Petitioner, Louisiana Consumers League:

STEPHEN IRVING, ESQ. DORIS FALKENHEIMER 355 Napoleon St. Baton Rouge, LA

On behalf of Gretchen Reinike Rothschild:

LINDA WATKINS 355 Napoleon St. Baton Rouge, LA

On behalf of the State of Louisiana:

IAN DOUGLAS LINDSEY, ESQ. Office of the Attorney General 7434 Perkins Baton Rouge, LA

On behalf of the Regulatory Staff:

DAVID REPKA , ESQ. EDMUND REIS , ESQ. Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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### PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE COTTER: Will the hearing please come to order.

This is the pre-hearing conference before an

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in an administrative proceeding entitled In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company and Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, NRC Docket Numbers 50-458 and 50-459.

The two utilities, Gulf States and Cajun Electric, will be referred to herein after as Applicants.

This proceeding concerns the application for a facility operating license which would authorize the Applicants to possess, use, and operate the River Bend Station Units 1 and 2, two boiling water nuclear reactors located some three miles southeast of St. Francisville on the Mississippi River and approximately 24 miles north-northwest of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Each of the reactors is designed to operate at a power level of 2,894 megawatts thermal with an equivalent net electrical output of approximately 936 megawatts.

March 25, 1977. Notice of the Applicant's request for a facility operating license was published on September 4, 1981 in the Federal Register and it was given general public distribution. It provides that any person whose interest might be affected could request a hearing and file a petition for leave to intervene in accordance with the Commission's

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Rules of Practice. Those Rules of Practice are as set out in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.

Petitions were received from the Louisiana Consumers League, Inc., Louisianians for Safe Energy, Inc., and Gretchen Reinike Rothschild, individually. These two corporate and single individual petitioners will be referred to as Joint Petitioners.

The State of Louisiana also petitioned to participate both as a party to the proceeding, and as an interested state under our rules.

All of these Petitioners have been found to have standing and will be admitted as parties to the proceeding upon a finding by this Board that they have filed an admissible contention.

The three Administrative Judges comprising this Board consist of Gustave Linenberger, a physicist, who is seated to my right; and Dr. Richard F. Cole, an environmental scientist and engineer, who is seated to my left. I am B. Paul Cotter, Junior. I am trained in law and administrative proceedings and serve as Chairman of this Board.

The purpose of this proceeding is to consider the contentions filed by the Petitioners. This Board will issue an Order some 30 to 35 days hence, ruling on the admissibility of some or all of the 20 contentions offered today, and thus whether Petitioners may be admitted to the

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proceeding as a party. If they are admitted as a party, then notice of hearing will issue.

We will also consider today some preliminary procedural matters, should one or more Petitioners be admitted.

With that preliminary statement, would the representatives of the parties please enter their appearance for the record.

MR. CONNER: If the Board please, my name is Troy B. Conner, Junior. With me is Mark James Wetterhahn, from our firm of Conner & Wetterhahn, Washington, D.C.. We have filed appearances of record.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you.

MR. REPKA: My name is David Repka, with the NRC Staff. With me is Edmund Reis, also of the Staff.

MR. IRVING: My name is Steve Irving of Baton Rouge and with me is Doris Falkenheimer. We're counsel for the Louisiana Consumers League, Incorporated.

MR. PIERCE: My name is James Pierce of Baton Rouge. I represent Louisianians for Safe Energy, Incorporated.

MS. WATKINS: My name is Linda Watkins and I represent Gretchen Reinike Rothschild.

MR. LINDSEY: I am from the Department of Justice, State of Louisiana.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Let me take up a couple of preliminary matters.

As a matter of personal practice, I have a habit, whenever it looks like we're getting into a debate that's going to take some time of going off the record until the parties sort out their position on the matter and then going back on the record so it can be stated simply as possible, and thus cut down all of our reading time and make every word a pearl.

A second preliminary matter is the concern that

Judge Linenberger has as to whether or not he needs to change
his name. Judge Linenberger was placed on this Board six
to nine months ago, and his name was changed on the service
list but some of the parties, or petitioners, have not yet
changed or recognized that Judge Linenberger replaced Judge
Remick. So, if you would please, on your service list, put
Linenberger in place of Forrest Remick.

MI IRVING: Mr. Examiner, we have met and reached a stipulation as to a number of contentions that I think might expedite the proceeding if we can read it into the record.

JUDGE COTTER: You may be jumping the gun a little bit on me but I would like to hear that eventually. I have a little laundry list here I want to run through.

MR. IRVING: Okay.

JUDGE COTTER: Could the Petitioners clarify their status as to -- I referred to you as Joint Petitioners but I am not clear on precisely what the relationship among you is

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and whether one is going to speak for all or whether you have worked on that yet.

MR. IRVING: We're all in the same office, and I am referring to myself, Ms. Watkins, and Ms. Falkenheimer, and we have worked together on the case. We probably will speak with a spokesman, not necessarily the same spokesman, as to the various contentions, pursuant to the organized contentions.

JUDGE COTTER: So what you will do is rotate responsibility for specific contentions, but one person will address them?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you.

MR. COLE: Excuse me, Mr. Irving. You mentioned that Ms. Watkins and Ms. Falkenheimer, what about Mr. Pierce?

Is he part of the Joint Intervenors also?

MR. PIERCE: Yes, I am. I do represent a different client. The four of us actually, collectively, represent three clients, but we have classified ourselves as Joint Intervenors. We are, however, distinct of course from the State of Louisiana.

JUDGE COTTER: Yes. Maybe it would be appropriate at this point for you to address that stipulation. We have a question of the late filed contentions by the Joint Intervenors.

MR. IRVING: This would dispose of one of those questions.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I will make any corrections that

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we deem necessary.

MR. IRVING: We have agreed, and would stipulate on behalf of all the Joint Intervenors, to withdraw our Contentions Number 2, 3 -- and I'm referring to the amended contention list when I refer to these numbers --

JUDGE COTTER: Which amended contention list, the one dated March 31 -- I'm sorry, May 31?

MR. IRVING: Yes. We would stipulate and agree to withdraw numbers 2, 3, 5, 6, and 10, and in return the Applicant would agree to withdraw any objection to the timeliness and any objection to Contention Number 12, which deals with the Asiatic clams. We would further stipulate and agree that in the event the State of Louisiana, at some point in the future, withdraws that contention, if it is admitted, that we would agree to withdraw the contention at that point in time also.

JUDGE COTTER: Is that a correct statement, Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes. One point of emphasis, though, with regard to the timeliness of the other two late-filed contentions. The stipulation does not affect our position as far as the timeliness.

JUDGE COTTER: What is the number of those two contentions?

MR. IRVING: 13 and 14 would be the other two.

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MR. WETTERHAHN: Let me identify them by title, Fossil Plant Thermal Discharges is 13, and 14 is Synergistic Effects. We contemplated that those would be argued, both in terms of timeliness and substance, at this pre-hearing conference.

MR. IRVING: We'd also had a discussion as to the evacuation plan contention and I think we have reached an agreement as follows: we will argue today the contention dealing with prisons for the evacuation plan. And the reason for that is that --

JUDGE COTTER: Go a little slower, we're making notes.

MR. IRVING: The contention dealing with prisons, regarding the evacuation plan. We will concede that the prison is beyond the ten mile circle from the plant, and we will argue the question today as to why we think the evacuation of the prison should be considered. As to other evacuation plan contentions arising out of the off-site evactuation plan, which has not yet been filed, all parties would stipulate and agree that we have a 60 day period from the service on us of the off-site evacuation plan to raise contentions arising out of that document. And that there would be no need for making a special showing in order to have those contentions admitted. Correct?

> MR. WETTERHAHN: I think that's a fair representation. MR. IRVING: Thank you.

JUDGE COLE: You mean a special showing for late filing?

MR. IRVING: Yes, a special showing for a late filing.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Maybe this is premature, but for the consideration of the Board, we would like to stipulate that the prison is about 18 miles from the facility, air miles.

MR. IRVING: We would also stipulate to that.

JUDGE COTTER: Do you have these stipulations in a document, or are you going to proceed on the basis of the transcript?

MR. WETTERHAHN: These were reached not more than ten minutes ago, so I think we can proceed on the basis of the transcript.

JUDGE COTTER: You think we have no choice other than to proceed on the basis of the transcript?

(Laughter.)

MR. IRVING: In order for clarity's sake, if you desire to prepare a document we can, over the lunch hour, prepare it and perhaps get it signed and submitted.

JUDGE COTTER: I would appreciate if you did that.

I think there might be -- we'd avoid any possibility of questions about whether it was properly stated. It would suffice if you were to prepare that document and submit it to us, oh, within a week or ten days.

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MR. WETTERHAHN: Either way, perhaps if we can work it out over the lunch hour that would be better to show. there are any problems in its written form, we'd like to bring that to the attention of the Board this afternoon rather than to let it leave with the impression that we've reached agreement when we have not.

JUDGE COTTER: Very good.

MR. REPKA: For the information of the Board, the Staff has no objection to the substance of those stipulations.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you.

Then, that takes me to the question of the timeliness of what remains -- what remains of the question of the timeliness of the contentions filed by the Joint Petitioners dated May 31, and as I understand, that question applies only now to Contentions 13 and 14.

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir.

MR. WETTERHAHN: That is correct.

JUDGE COTTER: In reviewing the filing, the Board's first reaction was that a date certainly was specified for the filing of contentions, and that there was no showing of special circumstance or other reason why these contentions came in only a few days ago. And our preliminary inclination at this point would be to simply find them out of time and strike those contentions. Do you wish to address that?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. We will address that.

We filed a memorandum setting out in more detail our response to the question of the timeliness of the contentions. By way of background, our original contentions were submitted timely under the original schedule, which means in December. Thereafter, the State of Louisiana made a request for an extended period of time, which was granted. Under the rules, it's very clear that we have a right to amend our contentions up to 15 days prior to the special pre-hearing conference. The order that the Board issued, pursuant to the request of the State of Louisiana, made no reference whatsoever to the amendment provision in the regulations and it is our position therefore that under the regulations we have a 15 day amendment period. And, in fact, exercised our rights under it.

JUDGE COTTER: You mean again 15 days prior to the pre-hearing conference?

MR. IRVING: Yes, and the amendments were filed timely pursuant to the regulatory provisions. In addition to that, there was not -- never has been -- any special showing, as is required by the regulations, to suspend that 15 day period. There was a request by the State of Louisiana for an extended period of time, due to circumstances that they had, to file contentions. We did not find it necessary to take advantage of that period of time because we were under the belief that we had the right to review our contentions and

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amend them, based upon the responses to them, as is specifically provided under the regulations. And as the Board's order fixing the schedule for this hearing said absolutely nothing about the 15 day amendment provision provided in the regulations, we relied upon it.

And I further might point out that there is nothing prejudicial whatsoever in our amended contentions. One of them, which is the Clam Contention, was previously raised by the State of Louisiana.

Thank you.

JUDGE COTTER: Do you recall what section of the regulations you're referring to?

MR. IRVING: 2.714(b), and it's cited in our brief, too, in CFR 2.714(b). I think you'll find it also referenced in the response to the NRC Staff.

JUDGE COTTER: I take it you've served copies of this on the other parties?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. They were hand delivered previously.

MR. JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It is the Applicant's position that these two remaining contentions are not timely filed. Section 2.714(b) must be read in the context of the remainder of that regulation. That is, that regulation contemplates that a prehearing conference will be held within, I believe, 60 days of

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the Notice of Opportunity for Hearing -- 90 days after the Notice of Opportunity for Hearing and 60 days after its expiration. Therefore, the 15 days must be read in the context of the 90 days. The Commission has said it is reasonable to allow up to 15 days, prior to the pre-hearing conference, for Intervenors or Petitioners to submit petitions when the prehearing conference is held that short period of time -- relatively short period of time -- after the Notice of Opportunity for Hearing. That is, they would have approximately 45 days in which to prepare and file contentions after the Notice of Opportunity for Hearing has expired.

However, in this case the time situation is much different and the Board has changed the provisions of 2.714 and has adjusted them in accordance with its inherent powers under 2.718. The Board has the power to regulate the course of hearing, shorten times, and lengthen times. When approximately 18 months have passed since the Notice of Opportunity for Hearing the time given by this Licensing Board was entirely satisfactory and complete. Therefore, the Board's order and reasonable time set for the filing of the contentions supercedes the specific time periods in the regulations.

And for that reason, these contentions, which easily could have been filed within the relevant time period set by the Board, should be denied. There is nothing in these contentions that could not have been raised earlier, in a timely manner.

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JUDGE COTTER: Do I understand, Mr. Wetterhahn, that your argument is fundamentally based on an interpretation of the rules as distinguised from some finding of prejudice to the Applicant?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Anytime that the rules and the orders of the Board are not met, we believe the Applicants are prejudiced and therefore, there is no specific prejudice.

But, as the Commission has stated, in its Statement of Policy, Licensing Boards are required to enforce the regulations such as to assure a speedy application -- processing of the application and consideration of the matters before it.

We believe that the time set by the Board, in its various orders, are entirely reasonable and therefore this should not be permitted -- the late contentions should not be permitted.

JUDGE COTTER: In essence, the prejudice to the Applicants would lie in time.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, sir.

JUDGE COTTER: As it affects this proceeding.

MR. WETTERHAHN: That is correct, sir.

JUDGE COTTER: I have difficulty with that one because this notice of hearing, I believe, was originally issued in 1981 and, if I understand correctly, the estimated fuel load date is April 1985. So it's difficult to see a time prejudice operates.

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MR. WETTERHAHN: We are not claiming specific prejudice. However, the Notice of Opportunity for Hearing was issued in a time frame consistent with the construction of the facility. I think the Commission changed its rules back in 1972, or 1973, to allow an early hearing rather than being 30 days before the plant was ready, in order to allow develop, ment of the record. And I believe that this requirement is in furtherance of that. That the contentions be specified at an early time.

And as far as my experience is concerned, the Notice of Hearing was issued at a time consistent with other plants, as far as construction is concerned, so there is nothing out of the ordinary for this facility as compared to other facilities the Commission had noticed. The Commission, I believe, contemplated that in saying the 90 time period and this Board has seen fit to extend it for a period of almost 18 months.

JUDGE COTTER: Let me ask on another score, with respect to the two contentions themselves, it appears to me that the question of synergistic effects has already been raised by the State of Louisiana in their amended petition, which was filed approximately March 15. And so that the only new contention, that I see in here, is the fossil plant thermal question. It's Contention 3.

JUDGE COLE: Of the 3/15/83 filing, page 6.

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that runs over to the top of that page, the last sentence, which begins on the fourth line. For the purposes of the record, let me read it. "Applicant has failed to adequately consider the effect of an accidental plant release of radioactive materials on the health and welfare of those persons wherein the Mississippi River is the sole source of potable water, and has additionally failed to adequately consider the synergetic"

-- and I assume they mean synergistic -- "effect of such radioactive material combined with the industrial effluent discharged into the river."

MR. WETTERHAHN: Looking at page five, the actual contention, I did not read any synergism, or an attempt to introduce the effect of synergism into this contention. I read that, and I belive the Staff did too, as a challenge, in effect, to the Commission's rules with regard to the discharge of radioactivity into the surface and drinking water supplies. A single sentence basis should not be taken as adding to the substance of the contention, which we believe is stated in one sentence on page five. Therefore, we have not read any attempt to raise the concerns for the item raised by the Intervenors, by the State.

JUDGE COTTER: So it's your position that Contention
14, the new Contention 14, of the Joint Petitioners on synergistic effects is not comprehended within Contention 3 of the

State.

MR. WETTERHAHN: In any event, I don't think it makes a difference. I believe we must look at each Intervenor separately, or each Petitioner separately, and judge the merits of those contentions. I don't think it should enter into the Board's judgment whether another similar contention was filed. The Applicant does have rights with regard to each Intervenor or Petitioner. I would ask that the Board consider each of these independently, as far as their disability. If the Board decides to admit them at a later point in time that's a different story, but just because the State has filed something does mean that lateness should be excused on behalf of the Intervenors.

JUDGE COTTER: I think I understand your position.

Does the Staff wish to address this question?

MR. WETTERHAHN: We are not, at this point, addressing the substance and specificity. I think that's understood.

JUDGE COTTER: Yes.

MR. REPKA: We want to state only that, as we stated in our response to the amended and supplemented contentions, that we believe that the contentions are untimely as stated in our brief. The specific provision that Mr. Irving relies on, asking for 15 days before the pre-hearing conference, would not apply given the certain schedule set here by the Board.

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On the synergistic effects, we did note, in our original response, that the State had called it out in the liquid patchway contention, but as the Applicant has stated this is a different Intervenor, a different Petitioner, and the contentions must be treated separately.

In addition, I would also point out that the current proposed contention of the Joint Intervenors is broader in the sense that it raises the synergistic effects in air as well as water.

MR. IRVING: If I might respond very briefly. First of all, what is the purpose of the 15 day provision in the regulations. Obviously, it's to allow Intervenors, or the State, or whoever, to help clean up problems that they may have. You get an opportunity to review the objections, if there have been any raised by the other parties, and you may want to move your contention around. You may want to abandon the contention. You may suggest another contention or you may want to change the language of your contention. That's the reason that 15 day provision exists. It has nothing to do with the problem the Board was addressing when it granted the extension.

Furthermore, I might point out that since this hearing was originally commenced I think the fuel loading date for the plant has been moved backward another two years. So that certainly, no time prejudice whatsoever is brought

about by the length of this hearing.

Finally, I'd like to draw your attention to Section 2.711, which is entitled Extension and Reduction of Timeliness, which is the one that counsel for Applicant is referring to when he says that the Board has authority to change the time periods or set a schedule. Section A of that provision specifically requires a showing of good cause in order to change the time schedule. There was none and has never been a showing of good cause for eliminating the 15 day period to amend prior to the special pre-hearing conference. And I suggest to the Board that you never intended to do any such thing when you granted the extension to the State of Louisiana. It certainly did not intend to limit the rights of the other Intervenors in this case.

Thank you.

JUDGE COTTER: I think we have the positions of the parties.

Before we reach the question of the contentions themselves and their admissibility, it might be beneficial if we were to answer the first two questions in the Board's pre-hearing conference order of April 5.

The first question was directed to the Staff and I will ask them to state, as precisely as possible, the dates when the Safety Evaluation Report and it's first supplement in the environmental -- Final Environmental Statement will issue.

MR. REPKA: The answer to that question, the Staff SER has been out now --it came out two weeks ago. The final SER -- the first SER will be issued December of '83. The first supplement is scheduled to be issued in May of '84. The draft environmental statement is scheduled to be issued January of '84 and the final environmental statement in June of '84.

JUDGE COTTER: Let me back up. The first supplement is May of '84?

MR. REPKA: That's correct.

JUDGE COTTER: That is simply a planning date, consistent with the FEMA Report date?

MR. REPKA: That would be correct. That would assume open items in the SER schedule, and that some of those could presumably be closed out at that point.

JUDGE COTTER: And the Draft FES would be January

MR. REPKA: Yes.

JUDGE COTTER: And the final is still scheduled for June of '84?

MR. REPKA: Yes. The Draft SER has just been completed. It is 70% complete and the Final SER that's published in December would include 100% of the sections in the SER. It is anticipated that there will be a considerable number of open items. I believe there are 147 open items in the Draft SER right now. Some of those may be closed out between now and December but, in any case, there will be a fairly large number of open items.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Repka, was it the intent of the Staff to serve the Board a copy of that Draft SER?

MR. REPKA: We will do that. I don't believe you're on the technical service list right now, but we will do that if that is the Board's wish.

JUDGE COTTER: Would that be beneficial if there is 147 open items?

JUDGE LINENBERGER: I won't speak to that. It would be beneficial to this Board member to have a copy of that draft.

MR. REPKA: Okay. We will send at least a Draft.

JUDGE COLE: Send one to me, too.

MR. REPKA: Okay.

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the open items.

JUDGE COTTER: Of those 147 open items, can you estimate how much of them, or how many of them, relate to the contentions which have been filed in this proceeding to date?

MR. REPKA: Excluding off-site emergency planning,

I see very little, if any, overlap between the contentions and

JUDGE COTTER: So that the Draft SER, as it stands now, would be relatively complete as to the subject matter of the contentions?

MR. REPKA: That's correct. I think there would be a few minor areas in the liquid pathway, but other than that I can't think of any offhand.

JUDGE COTTER: Has the draft report been circulated to the other parties?

MR. REPKA: The other parties did receive a copy.

JUDGE COTTER: And your best estimate is June 1, approximately two weeks ago?

MR. REPKA: June 1st.

JUDGE COTTER: With respect to the Draft FES, can you estimate at this time how complete it will be when it issues in January of '84?

MR. REPKA: That draft will be complete.

JUDGE COTTER: There will be no open items in it?

MR. REPKA: That's right.

JUDGE COTTER: If it wasn't clear before, I would

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like a copy of the Draft SER, too.

MR. REPKA: Okay.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Repka.

The second question was addressed to the Applicants and related to the status of Unit 2 and its relationship to this proceeding.

MR. WETTERHAHN: The position, with regard to the construction of Unit 2, remains unchanged in that stated on page 39 of Applicant's answer to the contentions filed by the Joint Petitioners and the State of Louisiana. And that was filed on April 15, 1983. That states that Unit 2 is currently not scheduled and construction on that unit has been halted. Applicants will make no decision with regard to Unit 2 until late 1985.

JUDGE COTTER: Do you have an estimated percentage of completion for Unit 2?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe it's less than one percent complete.

JUDGE COTTER: And how about for Unit 1? MR. WETTERHAHN: Unit 1 is approximately 71% complete as of May of this year.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Wetterhahn, the Chairman mentioned earlier our understanding of an extension in the anticipated Unit 1 fuel loading date from October '83 to April '85. Are those numbers still current?

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MR. WETTERHAHN: That is correct. The fuel loading date for Unit 1 is April 1985.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Thank you.

JUDGE COTTER: You said that the utility does not expect to make a decision on Unit 2 until when in '85? MR. WETTERHAHN: Late 1985.

JUDGE COTTER: Late 1985. Is that to say that that is simply the present current scheduling date or is there a relationship that the utility will not make a decision on Unit 2 until after Unit 1 has been complete?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe that date is relatively independent of the fuel loading date for Unit 1 for other reasons. It will make a decision in late 1985.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE COTTER: That makes the ultimate question is this a hearing on Unit 1 or is this a hearing on Unit 1 and 22

MR. WETTERHAHN: We believe that -- well, Unit 1 and Unit 2 are duplicate plants. Any consideration of Unit 1 would have direct applicability to Unit 2. Any of the Staff review and any of the contentions which are ultimately heard by this Licensing Board would be applicable to both Units. They are, again, identical in design and construction at this point in time. Therefore, we see no reason not to consider the operation of both units at this point in time.

JUDGE COLE: So regardless of what the eventual plan might be, you're applying for license to operate Units 1 and 2.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, definitely.

nominal situation -- I won't speak for anybody but myself at this point -- but if the decision to proceed on Unit 2 is made beyond the fuel loading date and perhaps low power testing, or pre-operational testing of Unit 1, it's hard to see how consideration such as construction impact cross-talk between the two units can be either dealt with or disregarded by this Board when you make the statement that you are, in essence, applying for an operating permit on both units.

Can you enlighten us a bit here?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Well, there is significant precedence, as far as consideration by Licensing Boards, of the operation of two units. When one construction of the second unit, or even the third unit, will follow that of the first by some period of time, this is normal practice, in Commission consideration. If you examine our response to the particular contention raised -- I have the old number -- Joint Petitioner's Contention 13 -- I believe it's 12 now -- we do say that there are some issues which are premature at this point in time.

We do not see any sense in anticipating the decision by considering questions of the interaction of Units 1 and 2

during the construction of Unit 2 at this point in time. There are too many unknowns to do that in any manner at this point in time. We don't know how many construction will be there at any given point, or how the construction will be scheduled, however, as to all other issues, not related to this interaction between the two units, while Unit 2 is under construction, we believe they can be considered by the Board jointly at this point in time.

JUDGE COLE: Mr. Wetterhahn, if Unit 2 is now only one percent complete, and you're not going to make a decision as to whether to go forward with it until December or late 1985 when Unit 1 will be complete and capable of operation, you say you have no way to make estimates of what the work force might be. It will be quite similar to what you did with Unit 1 wouldn't it, with respect to numbers if you're going to make some estimates of construction workers?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It could be done as a general estimate, certainly, but we see no reason at this time to make specific plans as far as evacuation of construction workers or to security, etc., until a decision is made on Unit 2.

Certainly, if the Board believes it desirable, we could go ahead on a hypothetical case and present realistic assumptions.

As far as the construction of Unit 2, I believe that the experience gained in the construction of Unit 1 would

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allow a relatively fast paced construction, if that course was desired.

JUDGE COLE: Are you suggesting we hold off on the contention of that type and then litigate it when you make that decision?

MR. WETTERHAHN: We believe that is the best course. However, we would be open to doing it any way the Board considers it most expeditious.

JUDGE COTTER: Along that same line, the consideration that strikes me is that if, even allowing for some economies in the construction of Unit 2, the length of time for completing it runs more than five to seven years. That's essentially ten years from today. It may involve a certain amount of crystal ball gazing as to whether or not that plant is indeed identical to Unit 1.

MR. WETTERHAHN: At this point in time, I have no reason to believe that it will not be other than identical. Let me do say one thing about construction. The foundation work, new extensive excavation, and backfill work that was made necessary to lengthen the period of construction for Unit 1 has to be done. So, when I say construction I mean actual physical laying of concrete and rebar. No additional excavation work need be done for the second unit. Therefore, it is likely to be better than the general experience of the industry as far as construction is concerned if that is the

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course chosen by the Applicants.

JUDGE COLE: What does your one percent completion mean, then? Certainly if what you said has been done has, in fact, been done then Unit 2 is further along than one percent.

MR. WETTERHAHN: In the terms that the industry uses, and as the Applicant uses, in judging the completness of construction, it is less than one percent. But yes, there are actions taken with regard to Unit 1, the construction of Unit 1, which will enable probably faster construction of Unit 2. But it is still less than one percent complete as judged by this Applicant.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Wetterhahn, forgive our ignorance here. The Board does not have a copy of the Applicant's FSAR, so I should like to ask you does Applicant's FSAR address combined simultaneous operation of two units in terms of its impact on all sorts of things?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, it does.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: And let me ask the Staff, does the Staff anticipate that it's -- or does the Staff SER and will the Staff FES address combined simultaneous operation of both plants?

MR. REPKA: That will be addressed in the SER and the FES.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Thank you.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE COTTER: In connection with Judge Linenberger's question, the Board would appreciate a copy of the FSAR.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Certainly. We will send you an updated copy as soon as we can.

JUDGE COLE: I think just one updated copy, which we could use. And if you could make the inserts before you send it, it would be appreciated.

(Laughter.)

And later on, we'll get another copy.

with respect to the question of the contentions which have been filed themselves. It seems to me that the contentions, as they stand now, are divided fairly evenly, approximately seven or eight address safety issues, approximately seven or so address environmental issues. I believe there are only two which address emergency planning, and two which fall into some other category.

We had, prior to which here and reviewing the record to date, considered was any of alternatives in trying to deal with the contentions as filed. Largely because it appeared that, with respect to the record which might ultimately be built for a contention which had been admitted, that a substantial portion of the information is not yet available. We note the Staff's consistent position alleging prematurity

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with respect to many of the contentions.

I might also add a personal note of my own which is intended, I suppose, to benefit the Joint Petitioners but it may not sound that way. I was concerned that many of those contentions were too general. They were so general that it was difficult to get a focus on the real issues that you ultimately thought lay in the application. With respect to any future contentions which may be filed as a result of newly discovered information, we would greatly appreciate a more expanded statement to the extent it's possible. It seems to me with all the documentation that's being built, more specific references to particular sections of both the Applicant's documents and the Staff's review of those documents and the significance of the contents of those particular sections.

With that said, I guess we would appreciate the parties' views on how best to proceed here. Off the top of my head, it seems to me that there are only two or three contentions which might be ready to roll on. I think my colleagues think there might be more, but that leaves a substantial portion of them which may, in fact, be premature because of the emergency plan not being available and that sort of thing.

Maybe we should start, since they are the Petitioners contentions, to hear the position was, first, the manner in

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which you think it would be most beneficial to proceed on these.

MR. IRVING: I think one of the things is, pursuant to the Board's order, we've attempted to identify contentions which are perhaps subject to consolidation between ourselves and the State of Louisiana, and you might want to address those first.

JUDGE COTTER: Could you quickly give us a list of those?

MR. IRVING: Our old river control structure contention raises the same issue as the State has raised in its Contention Number 4. Of course, the Clams Contention we previously addressed and they are identical. Our synergism contention raises an issue that is also in the State's Contention Number 3. Our liquid pathway contention also raises an issue that's in the State's Contention Number 3 and what is left of our emergency evacuation plan contention that we're going to, by stipultion, take up today which is the question of the Angola Penitentiary will also be addressed in the State's emergency plan in Contention Number 2.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Irving, is it your position that these are items for potential consolidation with the State or is it your position that these are items that Petitioners are currently, let me say, negotiating with the State?

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MR. IRVING: It has been discussed in the State and my understanding is the State would have no problem with effecting a consolidation of those matters.

JUDGE COTTER: Would the State like to address that?

MR. LINDSEY: To the extent that those contentions

are similar, the State has no objection to consolidation on

certain items in similar contentions. For instance, emergency

planning that are not similar, of course, there could be no

consolidation.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE COTTER: You understand, all of you, with respect to consolidation of issues that what the Board would contemplate would be a lead Intervenor and one set of witnesses addressing that particular issue?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. That's understood.

MR. LINDSEY: I would assume that the State would reserve its right, as an interested state, to participate independently.

JUDGE COTTER: Yes. We'd appreciate -- yes, sir.

MR. WETTERHAHN: We'd like to be heard on that

JUDGE COLE: Has Mr. Lindsey finished?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I'm sorry. I can't see Mr. Lindsey.

Is he finished?

point.

JUDGE COTTER: Proceed, Mr. Wetterhahn.

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MR. WETTERHAHN: It is the Applicant's position that, as established by the Gulf States Utilities Case, ALAB 444, the state may come in either under Section 2.714 or Section 2.715. If the participation is different, as to those issues which it sought to have contentions introduced, we believe it has elected to proceed along that basis. So, as to contentions it has submitted, I believe it is precluded from pursuing this particular contentions also under 2.715.

JUDGE COTTER: Have you discussed, with the State, what their intention is?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe their pleading is fairly clear, that they've submitted contentions which is indicative of filing under 2.714. If they were to be consolidated, which we have no objection to, it should be understood they are participating as to the particular contention under that Section of the regulations. They would not have an independent opportunity to participate under 2.715.

With that understanding we have no objections to the consolidation of the parties.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Lindsey?

MR. LINDSEY: That's not my appreciation of it. I am under the impression that the State, under 2.715, can participate even if the State has no contentions and participates basically as a party with contentions that any Intervenor raises.

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(Board conferring.)

JUDGE COTTER: It seems like we're going to have to do a little homework, but I don't know if that's an issue that we need to reach at this point.

MR. LINDSEY: It's my appreciation that an interested state has additional rights that are not afforded to Intervenors.

JUDGE COTTER: That's correct, but I think what

Mr. Wetterhahn is saying is that if you elect to act as a party

with respect to a particular contention then his argument that

you are precluding from acting also as an interested state

with respect to that contention.

MR. WETTERHAHN: It is our position.

MR. LINDSEY: I would respectfully disagree.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. I think we will defer the issue, at least on the surface, so that we know it may be an issue but it doesn't require ruling on at this point.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE COTTER: Judge Linenberger makes a good point.

I think it might be well if Mr. Wetterhahn and Mr. Lindsey

consulted on the question, and you may find that there is not

a problem. Of course, we won't know until we see what

contentions, if any, are admitted to the proceeding.

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Mr. Irving, did you wish to say anything further? You noted that you had intention to consolidate five of the issues which have been filed. If you have a position as to how you would like to see the Board proceed with respect to all of the contentions at this point.

MR. IRVING: What I was suggesting is that since they involved more people, and perhaps we will get to the heart of some of the issues, that we might want to take up the ones that are subject to consolidation that we have suggested first.

JUDGE COTTER: Let me expand a little bit on what

I was saying or perhaps repeat it. We were considering

deferring any of those contentions which may depend upon or

be impacted by documents which have not issued, be that updates

of the FSAR, or the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, or the

Final Environmental Statement. So that is a preliminary

consideration. Is it your position that you want those

issues addressed or does the prospect of deferral appeal to

you or none of the above?

MR. IRVING: I think the -- I think deferral of those issues would probably work in everyone's best interest, particularly if it afforded us some opportunity, when the documents are filed, to amend and update our contention in accordance with the documentation we receive.

JUDGE COTTER: That prospect is always there if

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there is new information. Otherwise, you operate under the late filed contention.

MR. IRVING: It would be our understanding that we would not be subject to the late file under those documents that --

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Only if there's new information that's involved.

MR. WETTERHAHN: The Applicants would strenuously object to the approach, as we have heard it, as reflected in Applicant's answer and as I am prepared to discuss today. We believe that as far as the contentions are filed they have been specifically addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report, or the Environmental Report Operating License --JUDGE COTTER: With the exception of emergency planning.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, I think we've stipulated as to the emergency plan. And let me state a schedule right now. It is scheduled to be submitted again, like this here, around the first of December.

But aside from those, all other issues --JUDGE COTTER: I'm sorry. I wasn't clear on that. The Applicant will submit the emergency plan around --MR. WETTERHAHN: Section 50.47 contemplates that

the off-site plans of the State involving parishes will be submitted on the record. And this is the filing which I

have been discussing. It is a copy of the State plans involved in the plume EPZ and ingestion EPZ. They will be submitted on the record and delivered to the Intervenors and the Board such that the filing of contentions could begin at that point in time.

But as to --

JUDGE COTTER: And that date would be approximately the end of December?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Late this year. December, before the end of the year. But I think the parties contemplate that the time for filing would commence with actual delivery but that will be reflected in our stipulation.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you.

MR. WETTERHAHN: But aside from that, and aside from the Unit 1/Unit 2 question, which we also believe to be premature at this point in time, the others are ripe for decision as far as whether they constitute adequate contentions under the Commissions's rules. We believe, as to the others, they are lacking specificity. When judged against information available in the Final Safety Analysis Report, the ER-OL, and the remainder of the application as filed. Therefore, we believe that the Board should and can rule on the other contentions at this point in time. We see absolutely no reason to defer them.

JUDGE COTTER: Does the Staff have a position on

that?

MR. REPKA: We would agree with the Applicant that the great majority of these contentions could be ruled on at this time. I think the emergency planning contentions on the effects of Unit 2 construction are premature. However, all the other contentions, giving them a cursory overview, look like they can be judged at this point on the standards of 2.714 and their admissibility determined now. And that would be consistent with -- if there's new information or documents that have not been available, which later give rise to new concerns, those contentions can be raised at that point. However, no contention should be admitted conditionally at this time, or even held in abeyance.

JUDGE COLE: Except the emergency planning contentions:

MR. REPKA: That's correct.

JUDGE COTTER: Let's take what's possible here.

Do I understand that it is agreed, among the parties, that

neither the emergency planning contentions or the impact of

Unit 2 construction on Unit 1 are ripe for consideration or

ruling at this time?

MR. WETTERHAHN: With the exception of the one issue the prison and its location, 18 miles from the facility, and the legal question of whether that should be included in the plume EPZ.

JUDGE COTTER: What's the point of arguing about

that?

MR. WETTERHAHN: If we are able to obtain a ruling from the Board and the Board ruled favorably to the Petitioners we would proceed to plan, or ask the State since of course the Applicants do not control off-site plans. We believe that this legal issue can be decided right now and it would give the parties an opportunity to plan, depending on what the Board's ruling was.

MR. IRVING: My understanding of the Applicant and Staff's position on the prison is that even if the State did attempt to include that in the evacuation plan, that since it goes beyond the ten miles, they could not legally do so.

MR. WETTERHAHN: No, that is not our position at all. Our position is that the NRC would not have to, and should not, consider that aspect of the emergency planning of the State since it went beyond what is required by the Commission, by the Federal Regulations, as far as the plume --

JUDGE COTTER: As distinguished from the State?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, we are not precluding the State from doing anything it wants to and thinks it needs to protect its own citizens. What we are talking about is the jurisdiction of this Board under the NRC regulations to consider such State requirements, which we believe are outside the scope of NRC requirements.

MR. IRVING: I understood that the second step

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was there, but perhaps it's not.

MR. IRVING: Yes?

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Let's leave aside now the issues that I think have been relatively well identified, as to their prematurity, and talk about the ones for which Applicants and Staff take the position that there is adequate information available from which to frame a contention or contentions sufficiently well to permit this Board to make a decision about their admissibility.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Well, Mr. Irving?

You, on the other hand, have indicated earlier that Intervenors would prefer deferral. Now, that leaves a polarization between you and Applicants and Staff on this matter. How say you?

JUDGE COTTER: Perhaps it would be best for him to -- maybe we ought to consult for a moment. If you'll excuse us.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE COTTER: I think, before we get into what might be a somewhat extended process, we'll take a ten minute recess.

(Recess.)

JUDGE COTTER: We're back on the record.

Let me suggest, as a preliminary matter, that with respect to emergency plan completeness and Petitioners for

Intervenors' questions with respect to the adequacy of the emergency plan, that this forum is an awkward one for resolving those kinds of questions. And so, the Board asks or directs that the Applicant and the Joint Petitioners get together over the course of the next six months for the purpose of resolving any questions or difficulties that anyone may find with the emergency plan. And that after the plan is filed -- we understand that it is currently scheduled for filing at the end of this year -- that 45 days after that plan is filed that the parties, whatever parties there are in this proceeding, file with the Board a report of their discussions and negotiations concerning any questions they may have with the plan.

And it seems to us that that approach to it may effect resolution of any questions that are raised in connection with it in a more efficient manner than if we go the conventional contention and subsequent litigation route.

Does anyone wish to comment on that?

MR. WETTERHAHN: That arrangement is generally acceptable. However, on two sub-items I do -- I don't believe that, speaking for the Applicant which is not really responsible for submitting the plans, we would hope that the cognizant State agency, the Department of Natural Resources, Office of Environmental Affairs of the Nuclear Energy Division, we would hope to involve them in our discussion. However, I'm

not sure we can reach resolution with regard to the question of Angola.

JUDGE COTTER: What's Angola?

MR. WETTERHAHN: That's the state prison.

JUDGE COTTER: I'm reserving that issue.

MR. WETTERHAHN: The other issue, which is related to emergency plan, is the question of the administration of potassium iodide. And I believe that we have a legal position, which is a discrete legal issue, which we believe can be ruled upon, and I see no hope of resolving that issue by discussion. So I see no reason not to consider that.

JUDGE COTTER: We see no problem with that.

MR. WETTERHAHN: With those two provisos, we have no objection to meeting with Intervenors and reporting 45 days after the submission of the emergency plan. Perhaps the Board could set a date, or wishes to reserve that right, at which time to file a contention, maybe 30 days after the 45 days have expired.

JUDGE COTTER: I'm seeing so much reasonableness in this room that there's some hope that it may not be necessary to file a contention.

Mr. Irving?

MR. IRVING: We previously stipulated to 60 days after the emergency plan was filed. But if he wants to give us an additional 15 days we would certainly not --

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things. The Board is not addressing the question of your stipulation and mutual agreement to file contentions 60 days after the plan is filed. What the Board is asking you all to do is to consult on the plan so that it may be possible that you can negotiate resolution of any questions that you have, and it would then not be necessary for you to exercise your agreed upon right to file contentions after 60 days.

JUDGE COLE: It might very well be that making your views at as early a stage as possible might result in the satisfaction of your concerns by consideration in the plan itself.

MR. IRVING: We would agree. I might point out that in the last proceeding that we intervened in, in the Waterford case, we did in fact settle our intervention. They redesigned part of the plan and we pulled out.

JUDGE COTTER: I think that's a more sensible approach.

Mr. Lindsey, do you have any comment on that approach?

MR. LINDSEY: That's fine with me.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. I'm not going to attempt to spell out timeframes on that, but the Board certainly would urge you to communicate early and often.

All right. Let's address the question of the prisons. Now, as I understand the question that's being placed before us, it is that, as a matter of law, the prison

which is located approximately 18 miles outside of the emergency planning zone is not a facility for which the Applicant or the State is required, by either the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rules or Regulations nor FEMA Rules or Regulations, to address in the context of emergency evacuation. Is that a correct statement of the issue?

MR. IRVING: As framed by the Applicant, I think that is correct.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. You will have a full opportunity to frame it yourself.

(Laughter.)

How do you want to proceed? Who goes first, Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe that the Petitioner bears the burden of proof, as far as the admissibility of contentions and I believe it's appropriate for the Intervenor to proceed.

JUDGE COTTER: It appears that the Intervenor agrees. Mr. Irving, proceed.

MR. IRVING: One of the reasons you have a hearing like this or an opportunity for a hearing like this, rather than a simple computer program where you plug in all the variables and they spit out what the plan is supposed to look like, is to take into consideration individual variables which are distinct and different for different sites.

In this case, there is a penitentiary, and let

me give you something of the geological or geographical outlay

of the penitentiary. First of all, let me tell you that this

is a plantation farm type penitentiary of the type that perhaps

you do not have in the northern part of the country. This is

a penal system that developed particularly in the South, and is

I think, generally accepted to be antiquated. However, it

There are some 4,000 plus inmates at this penitentiary and they are inmates of the most incorrigible variety.

Those who are lesser offenders and even felons who are first offenders are sent to other parts of the state in other facilities. You are dealing with people that you would not feel comfortable with meeting on the street and you would not want these people a) mad at you or b) loose. Most of them, or a good number of them, are there for long times. Several of them have been there before and with the exception of, you know, one or two local officials who wind up there periodically -- things do happen --

(Laughter.)

still exists and it's all we have.

-- you're really dealing with the really hard core part of society.

The prison is located at a bend in the Mississippi River. It has one entrance and exit road.

JUDGE COTTER: Is it on the Mississippi?

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MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. It is on the Mississippi River. It's actually surrounded, more or less, on three sides by the Mississippi River. It was put there for a reason and that is, for a long time, period of time no one ever successfully escaped from it. Because on three sides you have the Mississippi and on the fourth side you have a very dense and impenetrable swamp.

JUDGE COTTER: Where is it in relation to the facility?

MR. IRVING: North and slightly west of the facility. You just follow the meander of the Mississippi up and if you look at a map of the state of Louisiana, Angola would be the bottom of the tongue of the shoe, just for comparison purposes.

JUDGE COTTER: Could you give me miles?

MR. IRVING: It's approximately 18 air miles from the facility and, as I say, if you were to look at a map of the state, it would be where the tongue connects to the shoe.

Now, our concerns with regard to the penitentiary are two-fold. First, of course, there are inmates there, 4,000 people there, who would be very, very difficult to evacuate in the event that there was an accident.

MR. IRVING: I'm not for certain the size of the staff. I can tell you that it is consistently understaffed because it's not considered a desirable place to work. If

JUDGE COTTER: How big a staff is there?

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you ever need a job, I guarantee you there will be one here in Louisiana working at the penitentiary.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you.

MR. IRVING: At any rate, it is the ingress and egress to this site -- it is very difficult if one did have to evacuate it, it would be very difficult.

But a second point, and I think the most important point to the people who are outside -- because members of the Consumers League are not in the penitentiary by and large, some of them may have family members there but they're not specifically our clients -- is the possiblity of even an accident or even a rumored accident at the plant inducing a situation at the penitentiary where the inmates decided to act en masse to escape. I can assure you that if 4,000 people at Angola State Penitentiary decided they want to get out, they would succeed. And if that were to happen, it would present a danger to the persons on the outside who live in the area including Baton Rouge, St. Francisville, and the other surrounding communities.

That is a particular problem with this site. is specifically addressable by this Board and I think there are mechanisms, which we'll propose at a later date, to deal with it.

Certainly one is going to be able to provide additional security for the penitentiary and one is going to have

to be able to guarantee the inmates of the penitentiary that if there is an accident at River Bend, mechanisms will be provided for them to get out so that they don't try to do it on their own.

What we're asking the Board to do is consider the unusual situation of this plant and its unusual location and particularly a penitentiary of this type, which you don't have in other parts of the country, and to take it into consideration. We have framed the contention to put the issue before the Board as best that we could.

Thank you.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Irving, as you know, this Board is a creature of statute and we are wrapped in regulations. What is our authority? I can understand the situation which you so graphically present, but under what authority would we be acting if we were to find that the emergency plan should encompass a facility which is outside the ten mile emergency planning zone?

MR. IRVING: Hang on a second, counsel is underlining a provision of the regulation. We can brief that point, but I think the key thing is that, if it is not addressed here, where else can it be addressed?

JUDGE COTTER: Well, obviously the State can address it.

MR. IRVING: The State can address it in the

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evacuation plan to the extent of the issues which it may lawfully consider in an evacuation plan. But you've still got to deal not just with evacuation but providing security, and that is the important issue. That's not -- the evacuation aspect of it is only one of the many facets of seeing to it that the penitentiary is secure in the event of an accident or even the rumor of an accident.

JUDGE COTTER: If I understand it, the core of your argument is the potential threat of panic and mass escape from this facility could jeopardize the smooth operation of other portions of the evacuation plan?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Counsel also points out that you could have events such as 4,000 inmates escaping and a likely target is they might want to take the plant. You know these things do happen. This is a dangerous group of people you're talking about and if they were to succeed in escaping, they would be heavily armed.

JUDGE COTTER: That would be stupid, though, wouldn't it?

(Laughter.)

MR. IRVING: It is a matter of opinion. One would certainly assume when one violates the law sufficiently so as to get caught and sent to jail that at least your level of intelligence about how to violate the law isn't as good as

some other people's.

JUDGE COLE: Mr. Irving, if the event that triggered the evacuation was something that happened at the plant is it likely that they would proceed in that direction? That seems to me to be remote.

MR. IRVING: Remember that you're dealing with a situation where the rumor of an event at the plant even could do it. Unless these people get outside -- I think certainly the possibility of coming and taking the plant over may not be such a likely event but I promise you that if 4,000 people from the penitentiary are running around it will thwart the efforts of the other parts of the evacuation plan by complicating matters.

JUDGE COTTER: Why is it if we were willing to accept the theoretical possibility that 4,000 people would attempt to escape en masse because of an event occuring at the plant, why wouldn't it be a more logical conclusion that the direction of their escape would be away from the plant and away from the ten mile EPZ?

MR. IRVING: We can postulate as to which way they're going to go once they get out. The fact of the matter is that most of these people are from Louisiana and the only way away from the plant that doesn't -- the only way away from the plant goes to Mississippi and beyond. You're going into the hills of north Mississippi or going into urban Baton

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Rouge and you're talking about urban criminals. We're not suggesting an enlargement of the ten mile area, but rather to take into consideration this particular situation and, among other things, the impacts that it would have on people inside the ten mile area.

JUDGE COTTER: Is there anything about the geography of the land surrounding this facility that would cause people to move south rather than east, west, or north?

MR. IRVING: Well, if you look at the penitentiary itself, there's only one way out of the penitentiary which moves in the direction of the highway which passes the plant.

Okay? Now once you get to that point, you are to the main highway. Now from there you can go two directions. You cannot cross the river at that point. You can go east or you can go south past the plant. If you go east, you're going to proceed through Jackson, Louisiana, you're going to proceed through Clinton and generally into a very rural kind of an area. If you are a prisoner and you want to escape detection, I would suggest that you're going to move in the direction of the biggest metropolis that you can find, where you can become lost in crowds. And that means go to Baton Rouge or New Orleans, and that means head south.

I might add that you're dealing with an area of the state where the highway development is not that good anyway. This is four lane -- four lane roads don't exist in that area. There are going to be some in the near fluture. It will be the road heading out to the plant. You're dealing with narrow two lane blacktop roads running through the hills of northern Louisiana.

JUDGE COTTER: Did you have a citation to the Statute of Regulations you're relying on?

MR. IRVING: We haven't found it but the fact that there are impacts within the ten mile area easily possible from the event is alone sufficient to have it considered by the Board.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you, Mr. Irving.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Excuse me if I argue from a seated position. I have some references. I don't think I have ever heard something as remote and speculative based upon fear, or fear of fear, as I did in the last five or ten minutes. The issue that real y faces the Licensing Board is its jurisdiction, or the consideration of emergency planning as far as evacuation for those within a designated area in the plume emergency planning zone.

Certainly the State has the jurisdiction to plan for contingencies with regard to evacuation. I would be shocked if the State -- by that I mean any part of the State --

didn't have plans for any contingency at Angola. To say that 4,000 prisoners would run rampant is just speculative and there's just no basis given for it.

I'm certain as counsel for the Intervenors has stated this is near the Mississsippi River. I'm certain that since the levees are approaching their top, there are contingency plans for such eventuality. Perhaps the prisoners were threatened more by the flooding than they would be ever by the nuclear plant, but there was no rioting.

In any event, the question before this Board is its jurisdiction to consider evacuation. The Commission has found that approximately a ten mile radius is appropriate for planning evacuation, or other protective actions, from the effect of a plume from an accident in the EPZ. It has set this on the basis of various studies set forth in NUREG-0396. It has set this by rulemaking and it applies generically to all plants.

As we read the regulations, and as those regulations have been interpreted by other Licensing Boards, there is some slight margin for flexibility, but that flexibility in setting the bounds of the plume EPZ certainly doesn't allow this Licensing Board to change and increase the area to about 18 or more miles from the facility.

In the San Onofre case, that's Southern California Edison, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3,

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LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, which was decided in 1982,

the Licensing Board stated, "Rather these boundaries" -- speaking about the boundaries of the plume EPZ -- "are to be established in the first instance at about ten miles, subject to their possible adjustment inward or outward based upon the judgment of local emergency planning officials. Such judgments will be made with reference to the factors enumerated in the rule that applies to the particular case."

We note first the language stating that the plume EPZ shall consist of an area about ten miles in radius. This is mandatory language. It would clearly allow leeway for a mile or two in either direction, based on local factors, but as the Board said in that case, it clearly precludes a plume EPZ radius of say twenty or more miles. We believe 18 is the same order of magnitude as 20 miles and the Licensing Board is precluded, by the regulation which is 50.47(c)(2), from considering evacuation of the inmates at Angola, at the location of 18 miles. An excess just a little bit off the mark, though, because the language talks in terms of an enlarged radius. In here it is being argued that it's a single facility that might impact the plant.

I don't think there's any rational basis for saying that these prisoners would be affected and therefore the Commission has meant to restrict any consideration beyond that point. I believe that is most evident in another portion

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of the Commission's regulations. Our guidance, which is specifically referenced is 50.47, and that is NUREG-0654, Rev. 1 entitled Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Preparedness and Support of Nuclear Power Plants. At page 63 of that document, speaking in terms of relocation of individuals within the plume EPZ, it states that relocation centers in host areas which are at least five wiles and it says preferably ten miles beyond the boundaries of the plume exposure emergency planning zone, are sufficient. Therefore, it would allow the -- the Commission's guidance would allow relocation of individuals evacuated from the plume EPZ at a location closer in than the 18 mile location of the prison. And if people can be relocated from their homes within the plume EPZ to a distance of 15 to 20 miles, certainly there is no requirement that individuals or groups of individuals located within that band of the facility need be relocated or considered in the Commission's Emergency Planning Regulations.

I won't repeat it. If you can relocate people to within 15 miles of the facility, which is closer than 18 miles, it certainly indicates to me the Commission's intention not to have to consider institutions or individuals located 18 miles away. We're talking about people who are physically being relocated from the vicinity of the plant. I don't think -- in addition, I don't think any specificity has been given, other than sheer speculation, as to how these individuals could

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affect the planning process for evacuation in this facility.

JUDGE COTTER: If all the buses that were to be used in the evacuation at River Bend were located in a facility 16 miles outside or away from River Bend, should the location of the buses be considered in the emergency plan?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Certainly.

JUDGE COTTER: Why? Is it not because they would have a major impact on the implementation of the plan?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It would have an impact on the evacuation of the individuals within the plume emergency planning zone, as set by the Commission, which is approximately ten miles.

JUDGE COTTER: But, if I understand the argument, before you get to its plausibility or its likelihood they're simply saying that there exists a situation 18 miles away which could have a major impact on the implementation of the evacuation plans.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe that it's -- what he is asking for -- that is, a requirement that the Commission impose evacuation planning and require that of the prison is beyond what can be required by this Licensing Board. And I think that's the remedy which is being requested by the Petitioners in this case and we believe that that is beyond what can be required by the Licensing Board.

Again, that's in addition to the argument about the

plausibility or lack of it as far as the prison and its effect upon the emergency planning evacuation.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. Mr. Lindsey, did you want to address this subject?

MR. LINDSEY: No, I didn't because the State is working on the evacuation plans at the present time so we choose not to raise the issue against ourselves, so to speak.

JUDGE COTTER: As a master of background information, does the State have any plans with respect to evacuating the prison, wholly aside from the question of nuclear power plants? It was suggested possibly in connection with a flood, for example.

MR. LINDSEY: Yes. As a matter of fact, there was a pretty strong likelihood that the State would have to evacuate because of the high water we had very recently, and it would have required a fair amount of assets and frankly, I don't know of the details of the plan. Most of the details were kept confidential.

JUDGE COTTER: But the plan has, in fact, been written and is in existence?

MR. LINDSEY: I can't even answer that.

JUDGE COLE: Is it that you don't know?

MR. LINDSEY: That's correct.

JUDGE COLE: Okay.

JUDGE COTTER: Can you find out and answer that?

MR. LINDSEY: Yes, I can.

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JUDGE COTTER: We would appreciate that if you'd do that. Does it sound feasible to do it within a week's time? MR. LINDSEY: Yes.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you. Does the Staff wish to address this subject?

MR. REPKA: We can only add a very brief comment.

I think that Petitioners are setting forth two hypotheses. First, the difficulty to evacuate the prison, and on that point, the Staff does take a position that the regulation is very clear. It sets the ten mile EPZ as the outer limits of the Commission's regulations. And therefore, the prison would not -- evacuation would not be required by the prison. If the State chose to do so, that's something the Commission could look upon with favor.

The second hypothesis would be the rebellion that could potentially affect evacuation within the EPZ. It seems very speculative, and very much lacking in basis, and from that standpoint it would not be a very helpful contention to litigate. Furthermore, this again would be a situation where it's clearly within the State's police power -- their powers to protect the public health and safety from a possible rebellion at the prison. They should be encouraged to take some sort of action for a plan to such a contingency.

However, it is outside the Commission's regulations

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again to require something which is possibly unforeseeable and very speculative.

JUDGE COLE: So, you're saying it might not be a bad idea to do it but it's not required by NRC regulations? MR. REPKA: That's correct.

JUDGE COTTER: Assuming it were plausible, do you see it as a -- when I say it I mean the fact of a mass escape -do you see that as a second scep to mean that it could somehow significantly impact the EPZ evacuation?

MR. REPKA: I suppose anything is possible. I mean, it's speculation at this point. It's not a radiological threat and therefore it's not something within, really, the Commission's jurisdiction.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you. Mr. Irving?

MR. IRVING: I might point out that security during the flood was a major issue that was of concern and was addressed in connection with the evacuation of the penitentiary.

I might also add that a period of months praceded the period of high water when it was a known fact that it was going to occur. There was an opportunity to plan for and get ready for the event. The Mississippi River's crest has been known since February that it was going to be very, very high, at near record levels. So there is a good bit of difference there and what you might have with a nuclear event where you would have less time ahead of time to get ready.

authority for the Commission to consider the issue and we believe it is encompassed in 50.47(c)(2). In particular, the right to address the exact size and configuration of the zone as well as the zone shall be particularly determined in relation to local emergency response needs. And the capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, and access roads, which I think would specifically encompass the issue that we're raising.

JUDGE COLE: Isn't there some Commission precedent that sort of establishes guidelines for departure from the ten mile zone?

MR. IRVING: There are Commission precedents but there are none that have ever addressed an issue of this type because this particular problem is unique to this plant. There are no other plants, that I am aware of, that have a penal farm type institution within such close proximity, with this many inmates.

JUDGE COTTER: I'm not sure that is the case.

Does that ring a bell with you gentlemen?

MR. WETTERHAHN: There are other facilities, nuclear facilities, which have maximum security and farm type prisons close to the plume -- edge of the plume EPZ, so this plant is not unique.

MR. IRVING: There is a difference between a maximum security prison building and a prison farm type environment, as is provided at Angola. The prison farm type environment relies much more on the geography around it to ensure that the prisoners do not escape. Certainly there are fences and armed guards and this kind of thing, but in particular this site was selected because of its inaccessibility, to help keep the prisoners in. And also the number of inmates that you have is probably greater than you would find at a prison type merely housed in a building.

JUDGE COLE: What is going to change and make it easier for them to get out, then?

MR. IRVING: I would doubt seriously that without an expenditure of many millions of dollars you could make it any easier to get out, if you mean in terms of access roads. In terms of getting out, the possibility of escape is a continuing problem. People escape from Angola on a reasonably frequent basis. What's different is that you

don't normally have all the prisoners at the penitentiary trying to escape at once, which is what you might have if you had an event of this type, and I don't think that is speculative, I think that is a very real possibility. If you were locked up in an area where you were afraid that something like this might be happening, that you might be exposed to radiation, you might well want to get out and you could probably get a lot of people to go with you.

And also, remember that you are not dealing with people who have a high education level and understand the security and safeguards that are provided for them. You are dealing with people that are very emotional or they wouldn't be there in the first place.

MR. WETTERHAHN: May I address two items? This is getting to be very close to what the Supreme Court decided in the TMI case. This is fear of fear, the risk of risk, and I know while it's in a slightly different context, environmental vs. safety, I think we are getting very remote from what the Commission intended as far as the necessity for evacuation.

I think, as the Petitioner has indicated, this prison is located such to impede the egress of prisoners.

We are talking about evacuation times in a plume EPZ on the order of several, maybe four to five, hours. By the time that plume EPZ were evacuated, perhaps then the prisoners

would be escaping, but we have not seen how this facility and these prisoners escaping 18 miles away would indeed impede evacuation. It is entirely remote and speculative.

I believe again it is a matter of state planning, and as the Petitioners admitted, the State has already planned for contingencies such as flooding. There is no reason to believe that they would not and are not planning for other contingencies. But, again, the question is, what can this Licensing Board impose? And we believe the precedents are clear, the Licensing Board cannot impose requirements as far as evacuation from Angola, and that nothing has been shown which requires you to consider the effect of such prison on the evacuation of the designated plume EPZ.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. I think we have a feel for the position of the parties.

I would propose at this point that, as a matter of convenience, holding aside the fact that we have not ruled on the admissibility of the Joint Petitioners' latest filing, that we proceed through those contentions within that filing and get the positions of the parties with respect to them for the purpose of ruling on the contentions.

I would ask -- I don't think there is any need to repeat what you have already said in your respective

1 pleadings. It should be more an exercise in whether or not 2 you have something additional to add to it. 3 Do I understand that the financial and technical qualifications contention has not been withdrawn? MR. IRVING: That is correct. 5 6 JUDGE COTTER: And, of course, I assume you are 7 aware of the regulations on the subject? 8 MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. JUDGE COTTER: Is there any need to address the 10 financial aspect of that contention? 11 MR. IRVING: We filed an affidavit from myself 12 in connection with the amended contentions which I think 13 sets forth the details of why we are trying to meet the 14 showing that is required to support this contention, and I 15 think we have pretty well covered the waterfront in terms 16 of our position on the financial qualifications of the 17 Applicant. 18 JUDGE COTTER: Is there anything the State 19 would like to say? 20 (No response.) 21 JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Wetterhahn, is there anything 22 to add to your position? 23 MR. WETTERHAHN: Not really. With all due 24

respect to learned counsel, his affidavit, which is an affidavit of counsel, adds absolutely nothing to making a

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prima facie case under 2.758.

I would only add that looking at the four examples given on page 2 of the pleading, that the note of purported cost-cutting measures -- I don't see there has been any demonstration, there's been any compromise in safety, that there are other than isolated noncompliances, particularly with regard to the fourth one.

GSU, the lead applicant, proposed openly to the Commission an alternative way of meeting the regulations. This was more cost-effective. I'm sure that Petitioners would be quite excited if, in other proceedings -particularly rate proceedings -- if the Applicants did not pursue cost-cutting measures which were in compliance with the NRC regulations.

This was done openly. The Applicant sought Staff approval, they had meetings, and the Staff approved it. There is nothing to show that there was any compromise of safety.

We believe that the showing under 2.758 has not been made.

JUDGE COLE: Mr. Irving, I have got some concerns about the nexus of those four examples to the Applicant's financial ability. Would you care to elaborate on that, sir?

MR. IRVING: Our concern is that due to the

very strapped state of the Applicant's financial condition, which I might add there's been some suggestion we might have contributed to, the record will reflect over the years we have intervened in their rate cases. We have always supported them receiving a fair rate of return, and have in fact on occasion, if not with them, with other utilities, gone to court to see to it they got a rate increase greater than that awarded by the Public Service Commission because what was awarded was less than what they were entitled to.

So our concern specifically is that the financial condition of the Applicant is not such as they can actually complete this plant. We have that on a number of bases.

We know for a fact, and we believe the Public Service Commission's consultants would concur, that at a price greater than \$2-1/2 to \$3 billion, this Applicant cannot raise the money to complete this plant.

It is our belief that the current completion cost will be in excess of \$4 billion. We have postulated 4.2.

I might add that we have a very good track record in estimating the cost of nuclear plants.

In fact, we arrived at the Applicant's current projected cost several years prior to the Applicant arriving at those figures, as was also the case with Waterford 3 in New Orleans.

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Our concern specifically is that they don't have the money to do it. They can't get the money to do it, and so they must, to complete it at some point, cut corners, and we believe the incidents that we have cited are evidence that they are in fact already cutting corners.

JUDGE COLE: A couple of points, Mr. Irving:

You indicated that it is the position of your clients that they have always supported a fair and reasonable rate of return, and I assume that based on your view that they have received a fair and reasonable rate of return?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir, they have.

JUDGE COLE: Then how come they're in such bad financial condition if they have received a fair and reasonable rate of return?

MR. IRVING: I'm glad you asked that question. It is a combination of several things:

For one thing, the company has a history of mismanagement that dates really from the early 19 -- really dates prior to that. They did not have a significant problem, because running a natural gas generator is something that really doesn't require a lot of talent, and before this utility got into the nuclear industry, they really didn't have to have it, and they did a good job.

When they got into the nuclear business, they did

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not have the onboard technical support, and I might add that I'm not raising this question. During the construction permit stage, this Board or the Board that was here then raised the question. This is not a new idea.

They did not have the onboard technical support necessary to make the decisions that they had to make in construction of this plant, number one.

Number two, the plant is being constructed under what amounts to a cost-plus contract, and what technical support they did have was provided by the architectengineer, who was on the cost-plus contract.

In essence, what you are asking for is for the wolf to watch the chickens.

Number three, the architect-engineer, Stone & Webster, in fact owned a holding company which owned this utility until 1935. In the 1930-35 timeframe. And in fact there were Stone & Webster people in the management of Gulf State Utilities up until the time these decisions were made.

So you have again the wolves watching the chickens.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Irving, excuse me, but I would like to understand how you intend the Board to receive the remarks that you are just now making. Let me explain my question.

testifying or else there is a possibility that the remarks you are providing us constitute a further amendment to your already amended statement of contention, and in whichever case it is, it is not clear to me that you have established a basis for proceeding in either direction.

MR. IRVING: I wasn't trying to do either. I was just trying to answer his question.

JUDGE COLE: It's my fault.

Go ahead.

MR. IRVING: My knowledge on the subject comes from having for a number of years, since 1976, participated as an intervenor in the utility rate proceedings. I have designed utility rates which were in fact implemented by the Commission for this utility, and I'm probably more familiar than most anybody else, outside the utility itself, on the financial aspects of it.

I am also a holder of some modest amount of stock in the company, so I am aware of what they do.

I believe that while they have been allowed a fair rate of return, their management, in terms of what they did with that fair rate of return, is extremely suspect.

I am not, by that, criticizing the present
management whom I am very pleased with, and I think is very

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competent at doing the best with what they have got.

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JUDGE COTTER: That seems inconsistent with what you were saying before.

MR. IRVING: The management has improved, but they are in a very unenviable position because of what has gone on before.

JUDGE COLE: The title of the contention,

Financial and Technical Qualifications -- it seems to me

that the thrust of this contention is almost exclusively

with the financial. What aspect of it considers technical,

or is it a financial qualification contention?

MR. IRVING: We were attempting to address the impact of the financing on the technical qualifications and on the construction. We were intending to get at specifically the impact of financing on this company and, as I say, we believe that that impact is very, very detrimental to the completion of the construction of this facility because of what we believe is going to be the actual completion cost.

JUDGE COLE: You are not proposing to relitigate the contention on the technical qualifications of the Applicant?

MR. IRVING: No, I think the technical qualifications at the construction stage were very suspect, and I think everyone recognized that. At this point in time there have been many new people brought in by the Applicant,

particularly relatively recently, and we are not challenging their technical qualifications at this point in time, with the current people that they have onboard.

JUDGE COTTER: Well, why are you asking us to do what the Commission has specifically told us not to do?

MR. IRVING: Because in this case you have-you've got to look at specifically the problem in this
case, and that is that this company can't raise the money
to do what it is here asking this Board to do. I mean, it
is not possible.

JUDGE COTTER: The Commission has said that is simply not a matter for Poards to consider. That's a matter for the state ratemakers or the decision on the need for power.

MR. IRVING: We raised the contention. Our understanding is that if we make a showing that it is specifically applicable to the matter under consideration by the Board, that the Board can consider it, and that is why we filed the affidavit, in an attempt to do so. It is a particular problem.

To begin with, you, I am sure, are familiar with the capitalization of this utility and you know that at best, even with the current projected cost of it, you are dealing with a company attempting to build something that is going to cost more than its current capitalization, and that

in itself should make it -- should certainly warrant further financial inquiry about the company. And then when you add these other matters to it, I think that in this case there is a particular need to consider the financing of the company as an issue of safety in this case.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. I understand your position.

I want to make it clear to you that you understand where we are coming from, that we can only do what we are properly authorized to do under the regulations.

MR. IRVING: We understand that this is a very controversial contention. We feel like we are right in raising it. We understand that there is jurisprudence which is not advantageous to our position, but I think there also are considerations that are.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you, Mr. Irving.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Just let me say that I don't wish my silence to be considered as agreement with Mr.

Irving's remarks about the position of the company. I do not wish to respond further. I believe our position is clear, but a lot has been said, most of which is not relevant to this Licensing Board's consideration, and I think this Licensing Board would consider it in that respect.

JUDGE COTTER: All right, Mr. Wetterhahn.

The second contention in the latest filing is

entitled Environmental Qualifications, and has been withdrawn.

MR. IRVING: That is correct.

JUDGE COTTER: As has the third, entitled Prematurity of Application.

JUDGE COLE: You have also withdrawn No. 3 of your old filing, the seismic activity; is that correct?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir.

JUDGE COTTER: Which brings us to Contention No. 4, the liquid pathway study.

MR. IRVING: Here we have raised the question of the impact on the discharge of the plant on drinking water in the Baton Rouge regional aquifer, as well as the Mississippi River. The Mississippi River is the source of drinking water for virtually everyone downstream of Donaldsonville, as you look at the map, and for most of Ascension Parish, as well.

We were attempting to make a similar contention to those raised in the Waterford case in New Orleans, where some of these matters, I think, are being considered.

I think the liquid pathway has also in it an element of the synergism question, that being the impact of the discharges on the effect on the pollutants that are already in the river.

As you may or may not be aware, the City of New

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Orleans has the opportunity to drink some of the most polluted drinking water available in the country to such a large number of people, and that is due to the fact that the Mississippi River is used as a source of industrial discharge, and the people of the State of Louisiana are by no means innocent in polluting New Orleans' drinking water. It is kind of a joint effort.

At any rate, there are a number of persons who are members of the Louisiana Consumers League who drink the water which would be impacted by these discharges, and for that reason we have expressed concern, and we believe that those issues -- and we were specifically concerned about synergism, though we didn't do a very good job of expressing it -- those issues should be addressed by this Board.

JUDGE COTTER: Let me understand. You characterize this both in terms of water quality and synergism, but there is no reference to synergism in 4.

MR. IRVING: That is the reason we provided the amended contention on synergism.

JUDGE COLE: So, really, you are considering 14 as a part of your Contention 4?

MR. IRVING: Yes, that is correct, amended Contention 4.

JUDGE COTTER: It sounds like you just amended the amended contention. What we have got in front of us is 4,

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and it doesn't mention synergism. So we should keep things reasonably clean and save 14 for last.

MR. IRVING: I was merely explaining that that was the reason that we came in with 14, is because we had not made that point clear in our estimation in the original Contention No. 4.

JUDGE COTTER: Is there anything more to add? JUDGE COLE: What sort of synergistic effects are you talking about, sir?

> JUDGE COTTER: Why don't we save that until 14? MR. IRVING: Okay.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe our response is abundantly clear, as to the analyses and the specificity with regard to liquid discharges, which is contained in the application as filed. Therefore, we believe this contention is nonspecific, does not assert any sort of basis. It is the type of contention that should not be considered by the Licensing Board, and I will stand on that.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you.

I'm afraid I jumped past the State. Do you wish to address this?

MR. LINDSEY: I have a couple of other questions I'd like to ask the Board to clarify, Mr. Cotter.

We are going down the contentions right now as proposed by the Joint Intervenors' amended petition, and I'd

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like to know if you intend for the State to address similar contentions at the time the Joint Intervenors do.

JUDGE COTTER: If you would, I think that would be most efficient. Then when we have finished with those, if there is anything that has to be considered in your contentions, we'll turn to them. But if we can treat the two together wherever they appear reasonably close, and if there is no objection from either the Applicant or the Staff, I will do so.

MR. LINDSEY: I would also like to clarify an earlier question you had about joining the contentions of the State and the Joint Intervenors, because that's when we discussed the State's interest under 2.715 as an interested state. I would like to clarify a comment I made earlier and say that even though obviously the State's concerns are very similar to the Joint Intervenors' concerns in a number of areas -- emergency planning, liquid pathway studies and several other of our similar contentions -- the State's interest in these would be somewhat different because of a broader constituency, and assuming the contentions are admitted, and the State and the Joint Intervenors are admitted as parties, the State would like to participate in its own right at any further hearings, rather than having, as I believe you referred to, one lead counsel.

JUDGE COTTER: I'm inclined to defer that guestion

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because I think we could get into a can of worms there as to specifically what you would want to do outside of your posture as a joint party, were you admitted as such, and I think it would probably be more efficient to defer that question until we bump up against the specific instance.

MR. LINDSEY: That's fine with me. I just wanted to go on record as clarifying --

JUDGE COTTER: I understand you want to preserve your right as a party and as an interested state.

MR. LINDSEY: Correct.

JUDGE COTTER: With respect to everything you can possibly preserve your right to.

MR. LINDSEY: Yes, with a party's interest somewhat different from the Joint Intervenors, even though the contentions may be very similar.

Now, with specific respect to the Joint Intervenors' so-called liquid pathways contention, that is basically the State's Contention No. 3, and I have little further to add to that, except to point out, Mr. Cotter, as you yourself pointed out earlier, that this is basically a combination of liquid pathways and of synergism issue as well.

There was some question as to how you were treating the liquid pathways contention by the Joint Intervenors, because they have a separate synergism contention which the State does not.

I believe counsel for the Applicant has suggested that the synergism question was not raised within the body of the contention, but was raised as a basis, and I take the position that the contention and the basis is basically just one document, with two subparts to it.

I have nothing further.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you, Mr. Lindsey.

JUDGE COLE: One of the criticisms of this contention is that it lacks specificity. It's general. And I believe in one of the filings they indicate that the Applicant has addressed the liquid pathway in the FSAR, and it states that no criticisms have been directed against that specifically.

Would you like to comment on that? Is there something wrong with the way the Applicant has analyzed the potential contamination of liquid pathways and what is wrong with it?

MR. IRVING: They have a dye study that is referenced. However, it is -- I believe that that dye study does not take into consideration the characteristics of the radionuclide effluents that might be -- as you know, a dye doesn't necessarily behave the same way, and for that reason we had some problems with it, and it appeared there had been no work done other than that.

JUDGE COTTER: Do you have a reference to the FSAR

for that?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir, we do. The reference would be 2.4-40.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: We are at a point beyond an amendment of an amended set of contentions, where only now Intervenor begins to say there is something in the application which is no good because. There is no basis given for it. This information is late and there is absolutely no basis given for why a dye study is not appropriate for the purpose to which it was put. That is a dilution ratio, if you will, from some point in the Mississippi where effluents would be released, to some other point. He says it's no good. Why?

In any event, that presentation, that basis, that specificity should have been presented weeks, if not months, ago. We believe that this contention as stated is completely lacking in specificity and should be denied.

JUDGE COTTER: Does the Staff wish to comment?

MR. REPKA: We agree with the Applicant, that it is without basis or specificity. We would point out that in the Draft SER, dated June 1st, the Staff's review to date of the liquid pathway analysis, is documented. The section numbers are 2.4.7 and 15.5.

Absent any specific showings by the Joint Intervenors

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in special circumstances that the liquid pathway analyses performed are not sufficient, this contention should not be admitted.

JUDGE COLE: Mr. Repka, in the Draft SER, the Staff has conducted its own evaluation of the liquid pathway and as the Staff sees it, are the results of the Staff's evaluation complete in the Draft, or do you anticipate any revision in the Final?

MR. REPKA: The Draft SER states that the independent analysis of radionuclide transport is complete and that the plant meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100.

JUDGE COTTER: Has that study -- I believe you stated earlier that the Draft SER had been furnished to the Joint Petitioners.

MR. REPKA: That has been furnished.

JUDGE COTTER: Does that include the studies?

MR. REPKA: No, I don't believe we provided a copy of the study. We just provided our write-up in the SER.

MR. IRVING: We did not have the benefit of that information, even when the amended contention was drafted, since that was the day after they were submitted.

MR. REPKA: I'm not asserting that -- I'm just asserting that as an example, that this review is based on the Staff's independent analysis, but also the information in the FSAR, and there was no specific deficiency called out

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in the original contention.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Excuse me, but I think we are having a bit of trouble hearing you, Mr. Repka. You are speaking awfully softly, and I believe maybe even the reporter is, and it's extremely important that the transcript reflect your comments.

JUDGE COTTER: If you would use a microphone in the future, that would be helpful.

MR. IRVING: We could certainly draft a lot more specific contentions if we had the report, or the results of the dye study telling us how it was done and when it was which is, I think, a matter of major concern to us.

JUDGE COLE: Is that your principal concern, the dye study, or are there other concerns associated with the liquid pathway?

MR. IRVING: There are concerns beyond that, but our appreciation of what the Applicant has done right now is the dye study, and we suspect that the dye study is several years old, and as the river continues to change, is not necessarily very applicable to current conditions. At this instant in time the dilution factor might be very good because the river is so high, but what about low flow conditions that we might expect in the future, and as the course of the river changes?

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As you know, dilution factors can be influenced greatly just by bottom configuration changes.

JUDGE COLE: What would you expect to be litigated here? Would the Applicant come forward with a demonstration that the dye study does in fact predict what the flow paths would be, and the dilutions?

MR. IRVING: That would be fine with me. I had another case where I went after the dilution study -- it's not a nuclear plant -- but I went after the diffuser study and they wound up having to reduce some of it, and that's exactly what I'd like to do.

JUDGE COTTER: Is there any problem with the Staff providing the Joint Petitioners with a copy of the study?

MR. REPKA: We are unaware of any problem at this point, but we'll check into it. We just don't know.

JUDGE COTTER: It may be that that would satisfy them.

Yes, Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAMN: I'm not going to drag this out, but I understand that this dilution study which right now became a problem, or the Intervenors say it's a problem, was only designed to look at localized dilution in the vicinity of the discharge. It does not reflect the calculations as far as doses at some distance away from the plant.

JUDGE COTTER: I don't think we need to get into
the details. I may be a cockeyed optimist, but I do believe
that frequently simply the exchange of information sometimes
resolves matters without having to go through a formal

I believe that completes addressing Contention 4.

Contentions 5, Generic Safety Issues, and 6,

Tracking of Materials, have been withdrawn under the

stipulation, and that brings us to Contention 7, which is

the old river control structure. I believe that is also the

State's Contention 4?

MR. LINDSEY: Correct.

process like this.

MR. IRVING: I guess in order to give the Board a feeling for what we are talking about, some time during the 19th Century -- and I think it was during the Civil War -- a channel was cut between the Mississippi River and Atchafalaya River which lie very close together, and that channel has allowed water from the Mississippi River to flow down the Atchafalaya Channel since that period of time.

JUDGE COTTER: Is that east or west of the Mississippi?

MR. IRVING: The channel is cut -- if you look at a map of the State of Louisiana and Mississippi together, the channel will be near Fort Adams, Mississippi, which is

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north of the River Bend Plant a number of miles. It is cut across into the Atchafalaya Channel.

Now, what happened later on was that the Mississippi River, which has always been known to change course, attempted to change course, and in fact capture the Atchafalaya River or the Atchafalaya River would capture the Mississippi River.

At any rate, the channel of the Mississippi River would be at or near Morgan City, Louisiana, rather than at New Orleans where it is now, if not prevented.

JUDGE COTTER: Where is Morgan City in relation to this?

MR. IRVING: Morgan City, Louisiana is west of New Orleans and if you have a -- you know, I thought somebody would have a full color map of Louisiana, but I guess not. You do have a small map, and you will note an area referred to as the Atchafalaya Basin.

JUDGE COLE: I don't know whether this map is going to provide that kind of detail.

MR. IRVING: Has anybody got a highway map? JUDGE COTTER: We'll go off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

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JUDGE COTTER: Why don't we just proceed verbally and not use exhibits or aids.

MR. IRVING: The net result of all that I am talking about is that the Mississippi River is going to move west, and it's going to move west about at the level of Highway 190, about 40 miles. And Highway 190 is the federal highway that goes across the state a little bit north of Interstate 10.

Now, the question is, if this event should occur, what happens to that below what is called the old river control structure? The old river control structure is an effort that the Army Corps of Engineers has made to keep the Mississippi River in its current channel and keep it from moving.

The old river control structure has for years required continuous maintenance; every time we have a high water condition, it is a top priority item for the Army Corps of Engineers, and it is very, very difficult to keep the Mississippi River from moving.

There are reports suggesting that the movement of the Mississippi River to the Atchafalaya Channel is an inevitable event, and they suggest that the event is likely to occur during the time period that this plant will be in operation during the next 30 years.

Now the question is --

JUDGE COTTER: Who says that?

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MR. IRVING: A report authored by a professor at LSU, a Mr. Kazmann, and his associate, Mr. Johnson, and that was a study of the economic impact of what would happen if the river did move.

If the river moves, the flow characteristics past this plant will be very different because the plant, instead of being located on a flowing freshwater river, will be on what amounts to a salt water estuary.

The water characteristics past the plant will be different.

Now the Applicant has addressed this by referring to what amounts to the record low flow of the Mississippi River at this point in time which is some 100 cfs -- I'm sorry, 100,000 cfs -- the day is getting long and I'm getting hungry, I guess. The 100,000 cfs is a completely different ballpark from the situation that would exist if the river moves, and we think it is when the river moves.

And the obvious impact upon the plant can come in a number of ways:

We think there will be a change in the salinity characteristics of what is now the Mississippi River Channel because the water will be different. The water will probably be saltier, and if the event is as likely as we believe that it is, as a very likely event during the

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existence of this plant, then the Board should take it into consideration.

Thank you.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Why?

MR. IRVING: It makes no sense to build a plant when you know a very high probability incident is going to occur within the lifespan of the plant that is going to greatly change the design for the plant that you need, and the economics of it.

JUDGE COTTER: Why does it change the design?

MR. IRVING: There are aspects of the plant that

are not designed to handle salt water that probably will be

handling salt water if the Mississippi River changes course.

JUDGE COTTER: Which aspects?

MR. IRVING: The water intakes. You know, we certainly agree that the water within the reactor is going to be provided from wells, and we understand that, but there is still going to be intakes of Mississippi River water which are going to be used within the plant, they are going to be used in piping that is not designed to handle salt water.

Now you are not talking about creating an immediate emergency at the plant, but you are talking about an event that could be very significantly -- could very significantly impact the economics of the plant, and also

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could very significantly impact the lifespan of the plant.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Irving, I am just curious about your reference several times to salt water which would cause me to think there must have been some hydrological studies of some sort that would indicate that tidal intrusion might come up as far as River Bend, if there was such a shift. Are you referring to anything explicit?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. Our understanding is that the Corps of Engineers already has studies where salt water intrusion has been identified as high up as Vicksburg. This is under the current flow regime of the river which would be vastly different if the river moved. We think the chances of the water being salty at this point are very great if the river should move down a different channel.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Thank you.

JUDGE COLE: So, Mr. Irving, I guess you agree that this is not really a safety issue, it's an economic issue?

MR. IRVING: It's not a safety issue in the sense that this event is going to immediately trigger a Class 9 accident at the plant. That is obviously not the case. But it is an impact on the operation of this plant. If the plant is not properly designed at this point in time, it is very likely to shorten its lifespan by many years, and it is also very, very possible that you could create

an undesirable operating condition at the plant because, you know, you really get down to splitting hairs. Once the water gets salty, how long can we operate this plant before we have got a problem?

JUDGE COLE: I understand.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Lindsey, do you want to add to that?

MR. LINDSEY: I have little to add to it, except I'd like to point out that the reason why the State raised the issue is apparently nobody else had raised this issue.

It received virtually no treatment in the FSAR, and the State wanted the Board to know that this structure did exist, that there was a strong possibility that the Mississippi River would divert its course, and that is a potentially significant event, and it was apparently not addressed by the Applicants or their contractors in preparing the FSAR.

JUDGE COTTER: If I understand the allegation, the earliest timeframe for expecting such a shift might be 20 years?

MR. LINDSEY: No, no. I think that is incorrect.

I think that as stated, there is a 50-50 chance that the old river control structure could fail within 20 to 40 years.

JUDGE COTTER: But that is the operative event

that would shift the river?

MR. LINDSEY: Correct.

JUDGE COTTER: That makes it a 50-50 chance that the old river control structure would not fail within 40 years.

MR. LINDSEY: That's correct, but my point is this was not discussed at all by the Applicant. I think it is significant enough in light of many of the items which are in the FSAR that the question needs to be addressed.

There may be no safety issues related to it, but I don't think the question has been looked into, and I think it needs to be looked into.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Well, let me understand what both of you are saying here in the following respect:

Are you both saying that you consider Applicant is making a wrong business judgment with respect to locating the plant where he is locating it, since you are not concerned about safety? You think that such a catastrophe might shorten the life of the plant; therefore, you must be -- it seems to me you must be questioning the business judgment of the Applicant. Is that the thrust, Mr. Lindsey?

MR. LINDSEY: I would style my reason for raising the issue as safety-related.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: You do consider it safety-related?

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MR. LINDSEY: Safety-related as opposed to safety.

I think there appears to be a distinction between those two types of issues.

JUDGE COTTER: What distinction do you make between safety-related and safety?

MR. LINDSEY: Well, I personally don't have enough expertise to answer that question. If I had some documentation in front of me, I might be able to answer that a little bit better.

There appears to be an awful lot of documents drawing a distinction between safety issues and safety-related issues.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: All right, now, you have seen some documents that made that distinction, but I'm asking what it is that the State is concerned about. You are here speaking for the State, and you say you don't really know how to make that distinction, so what is the State's concern here?

MR. LINDSEY: The State's concern is simply to put the issue before this Board and apparently this Board would not even know of the existence of the structure and the possibility of failure to assess it on its own, unless the State or the Joint Intervenors brought it to your attention, which is what we are seeking to do.

JUDGE COTTER: Have you-all communicated outside

this proceeding that information to the Staff?

MR. LINDSEY: Excuse me?

JUDGE COTTER: Have any of you communicated that information outside of this proceeding to the Staff? Has there been any discussion of it, or has it solely arisen through this proceeding?

MR. LINDSEY: That is the extent of my communication with the Staff, was in my amended petition.

JUDGE COLE: This figure you mentioned of a 50 percent chance of failure in the next 20 or 40 years, the basis for that is if nothing is done, that's what the probability is?

MR. LINDSEY: Well, something is always being done. The Corps of Engineers, it is my understanding, is dumping truckloads of rocks into the scour holes almost daily and are constantly maintaining the old river control structure. It's an ongoing process. They don't just make the structure and then do nothing. It's constant monitoring and constant maintenance.

JUDGE COLE: I want to try to get a better feel for the number. There are some numbers that come up when people try to get funds to do something, and say if we don't do something, there is a 50 percent chance of failure within 20 to 40 years. You told me the Corps of Engineers is working continuously on this. Is their

estimate of failure, or whoever is the author of the

estimate -- does it take into account the continued work

of the Corps of Engineers, and is it in fact the estimate

that if we don't do something drastic, there is a 50

percent chance of failure within the next 20 to 40 years?

Or was that generated for some other purpose?

MR. LINDSEY: I don't have the information. The sense is that it's somewhere between those two positions; that it's not quite if we don't do something drastic there is a 50 percent chance.

JUDGE COTTER: Do you know if the Corps has an estimate?

MR. LINDSEY: I do not know.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Wetterhahn.

MR. WETTERHAHN: If there is any question in the Board's mind, I want to separate the question of safety from the other questions. This facility can be safely shut down and maintained in safe shutdown condition without reliance on Mississippi River water. There is sufficient water in the emergency cooling water basin, plus makeup from wells, such that there is no reliance for safe shutdown as far as this facility is concerned.

I don't think this could possibly be an issue of safety.

With regard to the probability or lack of it, I

don't think anything that has been said changes the fact that such an occurrence as the loss of the old river control structure is other than remote and speculative.

We have the Corps of Engineers, as admitted by the Petitioners -- it is their number one or highest priority. There is no estimate in the record that it is other than of low probability.

It is up to the Joint Petitioners or the State to bring before this Licensing Board the basis of their contention. I don't think there is anything in the record to show that this is speculative.

By way of comparison, by way of background, this control structure is not only important for the River Bend Station; it is so important to the livelihood of the entire Baton Rouge-New Orleans area, that the Corps will give it the proper treatment.

I understand that there would be no drinking water, as an example, for the City of New Orleans, if this were allowed to fail, just to give the Board some perspective as to why the Corps will continue to keep the structure up, and why we believe that this event of a failure is remote and speculative.

MR. IRVING: I might point out that is the reason the City of New Orleans and the State has under consideration several eventualities of providing another source

of drinking water to the City of New Orleans.

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JUDGE COTTER: Does the Staff have a comment?

Second, to the extent they are safety, I think

There is adequate evidence in the FSAR that a

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MR. REPKA: Just a couple of comments.

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First, to the extent that the concerns are

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economic, they are clearly outside the Commission's

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jurisdiction.

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again they have to draw the distinction between safe

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shutdown vs. continued safe operation after a failure of

failure would not prevent safe shutdown. If there are

time. It is not necessarily appropriate to go forward

now, speculating as to what might happen and what safety

as a vague concern, and a feeling that maybe nobody was

for a contention to vaguely set out a vague concern with

the hope of more specific problems being turned up later.

Commission precedent for the position that it is insufficient

looking at this. There is ample case law and ample

problems of continued operation after such an event, this

is something the Commission would want to look at, at that

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the old river control structure.

concerns there might be in that event.

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JUDGE COTTER: Is there any more to be added to

Mr. Lindsey states that he brought the contention

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Contention 7?

It is now 12:30. Why don't we take a luncheon recess until a quarter of 2:00, if that is agreeable with everyone.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m., this same day.)

## AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:45 p.m.)

JUDGE COTTER: We'll go on the record.

For the purposes of the record, a short moment ago the Joint Petitioners provided the Board with a copy of a map of Louisiana which pointed out the location of the Atchafalaya River and the old river control structure and the penitentiary at Angola.

Mr. Irving, you said you had another housekeeping matter?

MR. IRVING: We caucused over the lunch hour and reviewed some material that we received from New Orleans this morning and also the legal arguments presented by the Applicant, and we have concluded that his legal arguments are probably correct as to the potassium iodide contention, which would be the next one up, which is No. 9, and therefore we would withdraw that contention. We would like to see the potassium iodide contained in the state evacuation plan, but after review, I think we are satisfied that the state has the option to do or not do, and it is their option.

The other matter is Contention No. 13, and as unlucky 13 would be, we are satisfied we have a technical error in our Contention No. 13, that being the reference to the emergency service water, that there are in fact wells on the site for emergency service water, and for that

reason -- I wish it were otherwise, because I think there is some merit to Contention No. \_3, but that is not the problem, so I would also withdraw Contention No. 13.

JUDGE COTTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Irving.

Now it is my understanding that you-all have agreed upon language for a stipulation during the luncheon hour, and that is now available to be read into the record.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I will do it on behalf of the parties, the Joint Petitioners, the Staff and the Applicants.

The stipulation is as follows:

"Joint Petitioners will withdraw and not seek to again raise in this proceeding the matters encompassed by their Contentions Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 10, as identified in 'The First Amended and Supplemented Contentions by Joint Intervenors Louisiana Consumers League, Inc., Louisianians for Safe Energy, Inc., and Gretchen Reineke Rothschild,' which pleading is dated May 31, 1983.

Applicants and Staff agree not to object to the admissibility or timeliness of Joint Petitioners' Contention 12 related to the effect of the asiatic clam on the River Bend Station. If the State of Louisiana withdraws its Contention 6, which is contained in the Supplemental Petition of the State of Louisiana, dated March 15, 1983, the Joint Petitioners will at that time

withdraw their Contention 12."

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And that is the end of the stipulation.

JUDGE COTTER: Is there any operative event that governs the State of Louisiana's decision to withdraw its contention which would then affect Joint Petitioners' action on Contention 12?

MR. LINDSEY: No, there is no specific event that would trigger it.

JUDGE COTTER: Do we wait until the bitter end to find out what happens to it? I'm not sure I understand.

MR. IRVING: The Applicant's concern was that they might satisfy the State of Louisiana with the contention and they would withdraw it, and if we were left as Intervenors, then we would not be satisfied and would pursue it, and we have assured the Applicant that we have for some period of time been working with the State of Louisiana, and that as a practical matter the State of Louisiana is not going to withdraw the contention if we don't also agree to it, and so this provision, in essence, is merely a recognition of what already exists.

JUDGE COTTER: All right.

JUDGE COLE: So you didn't really need that added to that?

MR. IRVING: No, sir, we didn't need that added to it, but the Applicant felt that layer of safety would

be provided, so we let them. It's like wearing a belt and suspenders.

(Laughter.)

JUDGE COTTER: Are there any other preliminary matters before we proceed?

All right, then, we completed Contention 7 before lunch, which brings us to Contention 8, and it is my understanding, with the exception of the question about the prison, that Contention 8 will be deferred pending issuance of the emergency plan at the end of this year.

MR. WETTERHAHN: That is correct.

JUDGE COTTER: Is that your understanding, Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes.

JUDGE COTTER: Staff concurs in that, I take it?

MR. REPKA: That is correct.

JUDGE COTTER: And the State of Louisiana concurs in that?

(Mr. Lindsey nodding.)

JUDGE COTTER: All right, then, pursuant to the statement by Mr. Irving a moment ago, Contentions 9 and 10 have been withdrawn.

That brings us to Contention 11, Construction of River Bend Unit 2, and I believe that it was earlier agreed that that, too, is to be deferred. What is the status of

that?

MR. IRVING: I don't think an agreement was ever reached on that contention. We are prepared to argue it.

JUDGE COTTER: All right, if you will proceed.

MR. IRVING: At this point in time, I would say that our position with regard to this contention was probably much better stated this morning by the Board than I could state it at this point in time.

I note that a number of questions were raised about how exactly this was going to be accomplished, and we suggest that is completely unreasonable to assume at this point in time that Unit 2 will have no effect on the operation of Unit 1. Things might be different if the Applicant were not asking for a construction permit for that unit -- I'm sorry, for an operating license for that unit at this point in time, with it less than 1 percent complete.

Since they are, the matter is germane and I think has to be considered.

Furthermore, I would like to point out, if I understand the Applicant's position this morning, in answer to the questions from the Board, the decision to go or stop River Bend Unit 2 is independent of the decision of finishing River Bend Unit 1; right? That was my understanding in response to the question, and I am having a lot of trouble

squaring that position with the financial documents that have been submitted by the Applicant to the Securities & Exchange Commission where their position is that a decision regarding construction of River Bend 2, a 940 megawatt boiling water nuclear reactor, has been deferred at least until the completion of River Bend Unit 1. I have to interpret this language as saying that the decision to go or no-go with River Bend Unit 2 is in fact not independent of completion of Unit 2, but rather a subsequent event to the completion of Unit 1, according to these documents.

JUDGE COTTER: Of course, there is another possible interpretation of this; they could be using the completion of Unit 1 as a benchmark to relate to.

MR. IRVING: There is another possible interpretation which I think is most likely, and that is upon the completion of Unit 1, if they can, that will be an incident that will be looked upon favorably by the financial regulators, and they will take that opportunity to announce the cancellation of Unit 2, which is likely not to be looked upon with great favor.

But, in any case, as long as we are seeking in this proceeding an operating license for Unit 2, then I think the impact of that plant and the people that are going to be onsite as a result of construction of that

plant, has to be taken into consideration in the operation of Unit 1.

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Thank you.

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JUDGE COLE: I'd like to hear what the Applicants say about that, and then I have a question.

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JUDGE COTTER: Does the State have any comment

MR. LINDSEY: That is State's Contention 5. No,

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on Contention 11?

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no lengthy comment, except as I read 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(vii)

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it requires the Applicant to consider the effect of

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construction of Unit 2 on the safe operation of Unit 1.

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It's mandatory language.

JUDGE COTTER: Anything else, Mr. Lindsey?

MR. WETTERHAHN: The Applicants do not disagree

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MR. LINDSEY: No, that's it.

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JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Wetterhahn?

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that the effect of Unit 2 on Unit 1, and Unit 1 on Unit 2 during its construction, do have to be considered. What we are talking about here is merely the timing of such considerations. No doubt this matter must be considered before Unit 2 construction resumes.

However, we do not see any need to go ahead with it in the hypothetical. It will proceed. We think the economy of time and judicial economy and everyone's time is best served by waiting until the decision is made, and

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at that time considering the effect of Unit 2 if the decision is made to proceed. That is our only contention. We don't see why we have to consider it in the hypothetical now. It has to be considered before construction goes forward, but there is no reason why it can't be considered at that time. This is a discrete issue which can be considered in this manner, and we believe as a matter of discretion the Board should defer this matter until the decision is made.

JUDGE COTTER: Procedurally speaking, you are suggesting that this proceeding be held open indefinitely until the decision is made?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I think there are various procedural ways of doing it, but that is one way. At the appropriate time, if the Board were able to make all the findings for Unit 1, certainly it could sever that, make its findings and lose jurisdiction. It could retain jurisdiction for Unit 2 and specifically condition the operation of Unit 2 on this matter. There are a number of procedural ways it could be handled. We wouldn't object to any reasonable way of doing it.

JUDGE COLE: Like holding up the operating license for Unit 2 until such time as that issue was resolved?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Until such -- at least the

Joint Petitioners were given an opportunity to set forth

contentions after the information required by the regulations was submitted. I don't think it need be open to begin, but certainly I don't see how we could object to these Joint Petitioners here being given the opportunity to review the technical information required by the regulations, and only in passing would I note that the decision on Unit 2 is a complicated one, involving cash flow, of course, but also involving need for power. And you really would have to see whether you needed the plant in 1985 for its future completion date before you could make that decision. So it is not all dependent on completion of Unit 1. There are various factors. I could not put any comparative weight, but it is a complicated decision, and I can only say that won't be made until the end of 1985.

JUDGE COLE: It would seem to me to be less than desirable to litigate a contention like that now. It would also seem to me that it would not be reasonable to address that contention in some way and give an operating license to Unit 2.

MR. WETTERHAHN: We recognize that, too, and we believe there are various procedural avenues which will allow the Joint Petitioners in this case and the State -- I don't want to leave the State out -- their procedural rights under the regulations. There are a number of ways that could be fashioned. Perhaps when the time comes for the

issuance of an initial decision on Unit 1 and Unit 2, the parties could be asked either to agree or to propose various mechanisms for doing so.

JUDGE COLE: Maybe you could stipulate something.
MR. WETTERHAHN: Perhaps.

MR. IRVING: I think it is the general consensus among us that, you know, certainly the litigation of the issues involving Unit 2 can be postponed until the point where that happens. It just looks to us like under the currently existing regulatory framework, if we don't raise it right now, we lose it, and the problem that you are mentioning will in fact happen to us and we don't want to give up our rights to raise very significant issues as to Unit 2 by not speaking up and saying our piece right now.

JUDGE COLE: We are only speaking about one issue with respect to Unit 2 right now. The plan is now to litigate all these contentions with respect to both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

MR. IRVING: Right. I understand. But I think we recognize that the construction aspects of Unit 2 may be irrelevant if Unit 2 is cancelled, as you gather we suspect is going to happen.

JUDGE COTTER: I take it then there is no objection to simply deferring ruling on this contention and perhaps even going the additional step and making

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provision in whatever order is issued as a result of this proceeding, that that issue is reserved for consideration at a later date.

MR. IRVING: As long as our rights are fully protected to litigate it at that point.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. That sounds like a very reasonable resolution.

(Pause.)

JUDGE COTTER: The next contention is contention 12, Asiatic clams. And I understand that has been stipulated, and the new Petitioners have hereby become parties to it being an admissible contention. Is that right?

MR. IRVING: Right.

JUDGE COTTER: There is no objection on the part of the Applicant on the Staff to the admission of contention 12?

MR. WETTERHAHN: There is none. I would hope perhaps the Board could order further specificity with regard -- either now or shortly after the prehearing conference -- with regard to the exact concerns of both the State and joint Petitioners.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. We'll keep it in mind.

JUDGE COLE: Why don't you try to work out a stipu-

MR. IRVING: We have not had ready access to the FSAR at this point, because its location is very inconvenient to where we are, because of the traffic problem around LSU. My understanding is that we're going to be provided with a copy. We've been provided with the amendments, but when we get the copy, I think we can get a little more into addressing the adequacy of the proposed mechanism that the Company has for dealing with the Asiatic clam, which is kind of a novel problem

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to the industry generally.

JUDGE COTTER: Do you have any sense of how soon you would get an FSAR to them?

MR. WETTERHAHN: In the next week.

JUDGE COTTER: All right, after they have gotten the FSAR, I would appreciate it if both parties would make an effort to work out a stipulated contention on the clam question.

MR. IRVING: It would be greatly expedited if the amendments were also inserted.

(Laughter.)

MR. WETTERHAHN: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE COTTER: The next contention is contention 13, which is, according to Mr. Irving's representation, withdrawn. And that leaves contention 14 of the joint Petitioners, the contention on synergistic effects.

JUDGE COLE: Isn't this really part of your contention 4, Mr. Irving?

MR. IRVING: Yes. The liquid part of it certainly is. You know, as I mentioned previously, we intended -- what we intended to do when we put these two together was to raise the issue that was admitted in the Waterford case on the synergistic effects. And when we discovered that we hadn't put the words "synergistic effects" in the liquid pathway

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contention, we came back and put it in No. 14 to cover the waterfront. And then on the second part of it, section B dealing with ionizing radiation released into the air, that particular contention was suggested by some advertising that some of the utilities have been given, suggesting that the radiation emissions from coal plants, in fact, exceed those from nuclear plants.

And, of course, if this is the case, then you're going to get a synergistic effect, to some degree, between the radiation emissions from the coal plants which are across the river, and the radiation emissions from the river bed plant on the east side of the river.

JUDGE COLE: I don't understand what you mean by synergistic in that context.

MR. IRVING: A reinforcing. The sum of the whole is greater than the parts. This particular area has got the highest cancer rates in the country. The death rate from cancer is very high, and in parts of this area the death rates are very high from cancers; for instance, pancreatic cancer, which has been linked both to radiation and water pollution.

And we suggest to you that the effects, the longterm effects of low levels of exposure to radiation are not
well understood and are a matter of continuing study. And when
you're dealing with a population that already has a higherthan-normal incidence of cancer, that is not a matter to be

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looked over when you already have a problem and may, in fact, be contributing to the problem. You may, in fact, be inducing an incident which in itself will aggravate the already-existing condition.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: If I understand you correctly, you seem to have indicated you have a basis for believing that the effects are not just additive, but more severe than additive.

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir. They are more severe than additive.

Right now, of course, there is a lot of medical controversy about what is and what is not synergistic. But I have tried lawsuits involving synergism issues, and have gotten courts, in connection with industrial pollutants, to find a synergistic effect between smoking and exposure to industrial pollutants. So we're not dealing with an abstract thing. This is at the forefront of medical science, but is coming into litigation also.

JUDGE COLE: Well, what are you going to litigate here? It's fairly general chemical effluents.

MR. IRVING: The chemical constituents of the Mississippi River -- some of them are reasonably well known. The river contains thousands of chemical compounds in small amounts, but some of them are known carcinogens which have appeared in the drinking water in New Orleans and also some

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places downstream of Baton Rouge that use that water for drinking purposes.

What we're suggesting is to have the Board consider the cumulative impact and the synergistic impact from the emissions from the plant and the chemicals which are already in the water, which we believe there are a number of studies that suggest induced cancers in the people that drink it.

JUDGE COLE: Well, I don't know what we'd litigate here. If the Applicant complies with the discharge standards and stays within the limits of 10 CFR 20 and the regulations of the Commission, what are to do here?

How would we consider it -- under a cost/benefit consideration or what?

MR. IRVING: It would certainly have to be considered in terms of the benefits of the plant, and certainly in terms of the safety of the plant. Again, this is something that has to be considered in some framework, and it really isn't anywhere else.

You can wind up in a situation where you don't create enough pigeon holes to get everything in, and I don't think that's what is envisoned by the regulations.

Thank you.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Lindsey, I believe you have taken that as a part of your contention 3.

MR. LINDSEY: Correct.

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JUDGE COTTER: Do you have anything to add to it?

MR. LINDSEY: I have nothing to add.

JUDGE COLE: You're not concerned with any chemical discharges from the plant, only the ionizing radiation aspects of it. For example, chlorine or something like that. You don't mention any of that.

MR. IRVING: We don't mention the chemical discharges from the plant. And the reason we did that was, we didn't teel like we had the technical expertise readily available to handle that problem.

You know, the ionizing radiation is at least being studied. The synergistic impact of all these different chemicals in water is even behind that.

JUDGE COLE: Okay. Thank you.

MR. IRVING: I wouldn't drink New Orleans water, and if you knew what was in there, you probably wouldn't drink it either. But the thing is, I can't sit down and show you a study that, in fact, proves conclusively that this is what's causing it. It's merely the statistics suggest that there is a problem.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Wetterhahn.

MR. WETTERHAHN: First of all, this contention is late. I emphasize that again. There is no basis given for why this could not have been submitted on time.

I understand the joint Petitioners consider it part

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of another contention. Certainly the words don't say that.

And if it were part of another contention, I don't see why
they would have seen the need to submit a specific contention
which should be rejected on a timeliness basis by itself.

In any event, this is so general and lacking in basis, I wouldn't know what evidence we would have to present or what we would need. This is lacking in the specificity required for admissible contentions, and it should be denied.

With regard to, I guess the cumulative effects of radiation from this facility, with a coal-fired plant nearby, I don't see any basis for saying it's other -- that it could possibly be synergistic. Maybe additive, but not synergistic.

In any event, the Commission's regulations regarding the emissions control would lead us to say there's no issue here to litigate.

MR. REPKA: The Staff also objected to the admissibility of this contention on the grounds of basis and specificity. We think Mr. Irving's comments this morning just underscored that lack of basis and specificity in the written contention. The written contention said nothing about cumulative effects of coal-firing plants, and that's a new concern we heard for the first time this morning.

The fact that the contention is that vague, that the parties are being asked to litigate a moving target, just makes it that much more difficult to litigate, and therefore

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is good reason to not admit the contention.

MR. IRVING: First, we previously set our pace on the timeliness of the contention. Our belief at the time this amendment was made was we were completely timely, because of the 50-day requirement in the regulation. With regard to hitting to a moving target, you know, we're doing the best we could to frame these things, and we didn't have ready access to the FSAR. We're going to have it now, and we would be happy to try to amend the contention again to make it sufficiently specific to satisfy them.

But I think the point that we were trying to raise is here, and I think given the location of this plant, as we explained it this morning, the reason for it is clear.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Repka, I did not really understand your moving target comment. If indeed there is a target, and the target is fair game to addressed in a proceeding such as this, then the mere fact that it's a moving target -- I guess I missed your point.

MR. REPKA: The point is that the requirement for basis and specificity is intended to put the parties on notice as to what the issues are for litigation. We have the contention, which is a very vague and general one, and a suggestion that there may be synergistic, cumulative effects out there. The parties are not on notice as to what those effects might be. Therefore, you have a moving target for litigation.

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Today, the effect may be the cumulative effects of radiation, and tomorrow it may be radiation plus chemical effluents. That presents a very difficult problem for litigation where the testimony will be unfocused, and therefore won't address the issues and the concerns at the time.

That's why you have basis and specificity requirements for admissibility for contentions.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Thank you.

JUDGE COTTER: Is there anything further to add on contention 14?

JUDGE COLE: Mr. Irving, do you have anything to add to this, to demonstrate as to why this is a problem? What is your real basis for raising this issue? That it's a problem that has to be addressed here.

MR. IRVING: Well, we did not include in the contention the data about the cancer rates and the different kinds of cancers in this area. But that is the concern. And I might add that this is not the first time that I've had to stand before a regulatory body and raise that concern; that has been raised by numerous groups that I represent in a variety of licensing and industrial proceedings. It is a major concern of people in this area about the long-term low-level effect of the things that they're being exposed to in the environment.

Probably if you had to pick a No. 1 environmental issue on the minds of the people today in this area, and maybe

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in the country, it is what are the long-term low-level effects of the things that we're being exposed to every day in our environment.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Are you saying thereby that you kind of wish you had written the contention differently?

MR. IRVING: Yes, sir, I do. I wish that we had put more of the data in about the cancer studies, some of which we didn't have at the point where the contention was written, and we have now.

The FSAR, we haven't had real good access to, because of the logistics of getting to it. If we put those two together, I think we could do a much better job of priming the contention. We did not intend to create a moving target for somebody to shoot at.

What we intended to do was to raise the identical issue that had been raised in the other proceeding, which is the Waterford case in this state.

JUDGE COTTER: One of the reactions I guess I have on the way you've phrased this most immediate statement -- yes, it sounds a little bit like what you had in mind -- was litigating the question of long-term effects of low level ionizing radiation. And if that's the case, that troubles me substantially, because this kind of forum does not lend itself to resolution of that kind of an unresolved question.

MR. IRVING: Well, I recognize the generic nature

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radiation.

My point is that there is a specific problem with this area because of the cancer rate that we already have and the industrial concentration that we have, and just the fact that there's a coal plant right across the river, and the attendant emissions from the coal plant, and all the petrochemical industries that we have here. We have a unique situation.

of a consideration of the long-term effects of ionizing

There is only one other place in the country that has a concentration of petrochemical industries like we've got here -- maybe two other places -- over in the Lake Charles area and the Houston area. We have a unique situation as part of our geography, and I think it's a matter that has to be considered.

We're not trying to open the waterfront up to a complete litigation of the long-term low-level effects of ionizing radiation, though in the proper forum that might not be a bad idea. We recognize this isn't the place for that.

JUDGE COLE: I think a valid criticism is lack of specificity, and I just wonder what would the Applicant come forward with? What kind of information would you expect him to come forward with to satisfy this contention?

If you had specific chemicals, you could measure concentrations, and if you had information on the effects of

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combinations of that chemical and radiation, that's something to go on. But this is something that's very difficult to get a handle on. How would you litigate it?

MR. IRVING: I think you'd have to look at what the data is on the low-level, long-term effects of ionizing radiation, and that's changing every day.

JUDGE COTTER: That's the part that bothers me.

I understand your concern with the industrial concentration here, and your representation concerning the level of cancer deaths and so forth, but it seems to me there would be no way of addressing this issue without getting into the generic issue of the long-term effects of low-level ionizing radiation for which, as I understand it, there are substantial studies going on now, but there is no conclusive data on the subject.

MR. IRVING: But when you have a particular problem already in an area, and you may have a synergistic impact with a new activity that you're undertaking, it would seem to me reasonable to have a look at that, to see if you're going to make your existing problem worse.

JUDGE COLE: But the Applicant's radioactive discharges -- if they're below the level that are specified in part 20, and are considerably below that, what are we going to do with that kind of information? If it meets the requirements, do we change the requirements?

MR. IRVING: You may have to change the discharges.

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It may be that you can do it with monitoring. It may be that the level of contaminants in the river is going to have to be monitored, and at certain times the plant not operated. There

I don't know. But it's something you've got to address.

JUDGE COLE: You've alleged that there are synergistic effects. What is your basis for making the statement that there are synergistic effects between these chemicals and ionizing radiation?

MR. IRVING: There are a number of studies, and what I have here -- the same question was asked in answer to interrogatories in the Waterford case. I have their response to it here, where they reference a number of studies.

Rather than going through all this, it might be better if I reduced it to writing and sent a copy of it out to everyone. There are studies coming out every day.

(The Board conferring.)

are a lot of things that could be done.

JUDGE COTTER: Well, obviously, we're having difficulty with this one. I think perhaps one way, one possible way to deal with it, is the issue as it was litigated in the Waterford proceeding as a matter of public record. And I suppose we could take notice of what was in that proceeding.

And, absent some kind of a significant objection,

I guess what we would propose to do would be that this contention -- rule on this contention, having taken notice of whatever

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was in the Waterford proceeding.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I guess I'm going to have to object.

Having only skimmed that proceeding, all I recall from it

is the Board authorized the issuance of an operating license

where the issue of synergistic effects was considered. But I

really cannot say that the conditions are the same.

JUDGE COTTER: We're certainly not asking you to, but we would have to, presumably.

JUDGE COLE: If they were the same, we wouldn't have to litigate it, would we?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I don't know, and I think I'm going to have -- that record is not part of this proceeding, nor until three seconds ago was it mentioned by the Petitioners and I don't think it should form part of the basis for ruling.

The contention as submitted, with basis or lack thereof, is what the Board must find as far as specificity is concerned.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. I think the position is clear.

MR. REPKA: The Staff would note that if the Board considers the record of Waterford when judging the admissibility of this contention, that they shall so consider the conclusions of the Waterford Board. We ask that the Board make sure that they consider the conclusions of the Waterford Board in considering the record of the Waterford case in judging the admissibility

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of this contention.

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JUDGE COTTER: If we go the route taking official notice of the record, we certainly can't do it selectively.

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MR. REPKA: I understand.

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JUDGE COTTER: I believe that concludes all of the joint Intervenors' petitions -- contentions, I'm sorry.

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And that leaves us to ensure that we have given full consider-

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ation to the State of Louisiana's contentions as set forth

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in the March 15 file. And I suppose the first question that

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arises is that I cannot recall for sure whether contention 1,

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which basically, I think, raises the Table S-3 question, has

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been withdrawn, or is that still being advanced?

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MR. LINDSEY: The State of Louisiana is withdrawing

I'd like to state for the record in this proceeding

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contention 1 at this time. That's the Table S-3 contention.

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that the State continues to be very interested in the un-

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resolved and highly controversial issue of the long-term

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storage and/or disposal of high-level radioactive waste.

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decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric versus National Resources

However, in light of last week's Supreme Court

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Defense.Council, the State of Louisiana recognizes that this is

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the wrong forum to advance its concerns and will continue to

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JUDGE COTTER: Thank you, Mr. Lindsey.

express its concerns in other forums.

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For the record, the Supreme Court decision referred

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to is entitled Baltimore Gas & Electric Company et al. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., docket no. 82-524, Supreme Court of the United States, argued April 18, 1983 and decided June 6, 1983.

Does that result -- are there any contentions unresolved?

MR. LINDSEY: There are no additional contentions that have been proposed by the State which were not addressed at the time the joint Intervenors' contentions were addressed

JUDGE COTTER: All right. Is there anything else that you'd like to add at this time, Mr. Lindsey?

MR. LINDSEY: Nothing at this time.

JUDGE COTTER: All right. Thank you very much.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Mr. Wetterhahn, while there is a lull here, let me comment that I think we may have unintentionally short-changed ourselves this morning when we requested one copy for the Board of the FSAR. At this point, I think we would also like the environmental report and the OL phase.

MR. WETTERHAHN: We will send you, and intended to send you, a complete copy of the application for the operating license.

JUDGE LINENBERGER: Fine, thank you.

JUDGE COTTER: At this point, would it be of benefit to discuss the party views on how we proceed after the Board has ruled on the matters that have been under review and

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discussion today.

I guess principally what we discussed and had in mind was that after we had issued our ruling, it might be useful if the parties were to propose a schedule for proceeding with discovery on whatever matters are admitted to the proceeding.

And, absent objection at this point, we would include a direction in whatever memorandum and order that we issue, setting a time for the parties to get together and establish some sort of schedule of proceeding for submission to the Board.

Is there any objection to that?

MR. WETTERHAHN: No objection.

MR. IRVING: No objection.

MR. REPKA: No objection.

of housekeeping items. I thought now that we had softened you up a little bit, we might mention a couple of things that we have in mind, the most significant perhaps of which is, we have under consideration, and should you wish to express you views on it, we would like to hear them, a procedure whereby we would ask you to file your findings of fact and conclusions of law at or about the time you file your testimony, before the hearing. And we would contemplate that we would get a number of benefits from that. One of them, hopefully, would be to better focus the evidence which comes into the proceeding.

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The second would be to better focus the crossexamination which takes place during the course of the hearing itself.

And then finally, there might be some saving of time after the proceeding, after the trial portion was complete. We would also contemplate that should the direct evidence or the cross-examination modify the record or evidence in the record in a particular issue as it develops, that consequently the findings which had been proposed would be modified as we went along.

Any comments on that at this point?

MR. CONNER: We would agree to that as an interesting approach, given no schedule problems that might arise at the end. I mean, I would assume the Board would want prefiled testimony roughly 30 days before the hearing. And it would seem that there might be a problem preparing findings until you had seen the other side's testimony which tends to put you in a little bit of a schedule bind right before the hearing.

Now, it might not exist. I'm just thinking out loud, since you asked for comments, and this could be a bit of a problem. Given the rather long-range we have here and now, it would appear to be something worth considering, absent such a problem.

In other words, it's just another version of a trial brief in effect, something we should all be familiar with.

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JUDGE COTTER: That's what I would expect. It would be somewhat more finely tuned than a trial brief, because presumably it would be an instrument that would be used in issuing the initial decision. But we certainly would be sympathetic to any scheduling problems that might arise, and we could adjust as we went along.

MR. REPKA: The Staff would greatly appreciate the schedule being established so that the testimony would be filed first, and we would have the testimony of all the parties before us before we wrote the findings.

We might propose something like 60 days prior to the hearing for testimony, and 30 days for a proposed findings, or something like that.

JUDGE COTTER: That might be feasible.

Mr. Irving?

MR. IRVING: I don't foresee that we would have any difficulty in submitting findings of fact concurrent with the testimony. We don't usually submit findings of fact that rely on the other guy's testimony anyway. If you do, you may crawfish.

JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Lindsey?

MR. LINDSEY: I have no objection to that approach.

JUDGE COTTER: Very good.

The only other procedural advice that occurs to me is that we would also contemplate the use of cross-examination

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plans, but I think we can reach that as we proceed through things. And presumably, we are going to end up, to a certain degree, with a segmented hearing. Some issues, I think, will clearly be ready before others, which may make the burden a little easier on the counsel preparing the cases.

MR. CONNER: As in most cases, we would assume that if there are other issues, the emergency plan would undoubtedly be the last. So anything that could be heard prior to any emergency plan, issues that might still exist, having discrete handling of contentions would be highly desirable.

JUDGE COTTER: We expect to proceed on contentions as they arrive. And, of course, with all this reasonableness going on in here, we see a slim chance of emegency planning contentions.

(Laughter.)

Is there anything further that we need to address at this time?

MR. LINDSEY: Mr. Cotter, I have one clarification. I am assuming that the phrase, "joint Intervenors" does not include the State of Louisiana. Is that a correct assumption?

> JUDGE COTTER: Is there any question about that? MR. WETTERHAHN: In our pleadings, we only meant

it to speak to the nongovernmental Intervenors or Petitioners at that time.

MR. LINDSEY: In that connection, I'd like to ask

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the Applicants if they have any objection to providing the State of Louisiana with an FSAR.

MR. WETTERHAHN: It's my understanding of the usual practice that the State is provided with a number of copies and --

MR. LINDSEY: My office doesn't have one.

MR. WETTERHAHN: If we can't get you one from the supply the State has, we will supply you with a copy of the application.

JUDGE COTTER: Where is the public document room in this area? Does anybody know?

MR. IRVING: There are two public document rooms -no, one. The one in St. Francisville has been closed. LSU
has some 30,000 students, I guess, during normal classes, and
of course maybe a third of that during the summer. And the
logistics of getting out to LSU and getting back are almost
impossible during those parts of the day when the students
are there, and it makes it very difficult for us to get there
and get the document.

We can't get the document any way, but we can look at it.

JUDGE COLE: I understand.

JUDGE COTTER: Is there anything further?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I understand the State Nuclear Energy Division has a complete copy of the application, and

AR:Ki 07:22 1 they are physically located within a mile or so of the Attorney General's office, and perhaps they could use the same document. MR. LINDSEY: No. It's more than a mile. 4 MR. WETTERHAHN: Fine. Then we'll investigate. 5 We'll get in touch with you. JUDGE COTTER: Mr. Wetterhahn, all things considered, 7 why don't you just give them a copy? (Laughter.) MR. WETTERHAHN: We'll give them a copy. 10 MR. IRVING: You see what I mean about my contention 11 about saving money? 12 JUDGE COLE: Is that an objection? 13 (Laughter.) 14 JUDGE COTTER: Is there anything further then? 15 (No response.) 16 All right. On behalf of the Board, I want to thank 17 all of the parties. I think this has been an efficient and 18 effective proceeding, and I personally put a high price on 19 intelligent counsel's presentation. So I thank you all very 20 much. 21 The proceeding is adjourned. 22 23

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(Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the proceeding was adjourned.)

## CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the NRC COMMISSION

In the matter of: River Bend Prehearing Conference Date of Proceeding: Tuesday, June 14, 1983 Place of Proceeding: Baton Rouge, Louisiana were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript for the file of the Commission.

> Ann Riley Official Reporter - Typed

Officiad Reporter

TAYLOE ASSOCIATES REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

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