U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-263/83-06(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN

Inspection Conducted: March 2 through April 1, 1983

Inspector: M J Jordan for C. H. Brown 4/28/83

Approved By: M J Jordan for R. D. Walker, Chief 4/28/83
Reactor Projects Section 2C

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 2 through April 1, 1983 (Report No. 50-263/83-06(DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety verification; onsite review committee; Licensee Event Reports followup; and regional requests relating to main steam safety valve excessive blowdown. The inspection involved a total of 55 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector, including four inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager
M. H. Clarity, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection
H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager
*D. D. Antony, Superintendent, Operating Engineering
W. E. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering
J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security and Services
F. L. Fey, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
W. W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance

The inspector also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.

*Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management interviews.

2. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of March. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of March, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Standby Liquid Control System to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

No items of noncompliance or deviatons were identified.

3. Onsite Review Committee

The inspector examined selected onsite review functions conducted during the month of March to verify conformance with Technical Specifications

and other regulatory requirements. The review included meeting frequency and that a quorum was present when required. The activities verified to be reviewed by the Committee included items of noncompliance and corrective actions, proposed facility and procedure changes, and proposed tests and experiments conducted per 10 CFR 50.59 including the test results. Other items required by Technical Specifications and facility procedures were verified to have been performed.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

a. (Closed) LER 263/83-02: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Woodward EGM Governor Power Supply Resistor Failure. During a surveillance test, the RCIC governor control system failed due to loss of DC power when a resistor failed. All required tests were performed.

b. (Closed) LER 263/83-03: Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Loops Inoperable. The RHRSW loops were made sequentially inoperable to repair the heat exchanger flow control valve on each loop. The original graphite rings on the valve were replaced with spring-loaded teflon rings. All required tests were performed.

c. (Closed) LER 263/83-04: Low Flow on Standby Gas Treatment System SBGT Train "B". The demisters in the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) "B" Train had become partially clogged and lowered the flow capacity to less than technical specifications minimum. The demisters were cleaned on both units and the surveillance procedure was revised to provide a DP measurement across the demisters. "A" Train SGBT flow satisfied technical specifications requirements.

d. (Closed) LER 263/83-05: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) No. 14 Pump Out of Service. No. 14 RHR pump was made inoperable to investigate a reduction in head capacity noted during Section XI surveillance tests. The pump was disassembled and the remains of a mop head (5-10%) were found in the pump suction. The results were satisfactory on the retest of the pump. The exact point of entry of the mop head could not be determined. The licensee is formalizing procedures for final inspection before closure of any safety-related system.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Main Steam Safety Valves

This is in response to a request for information concerning a potentially generic issue on main steam safety valves. The main steam safety valves

at Monticello are three-stage Target Rock valves. These valves are set up as safety/relief valves. A review of past operating history appears to show that the excessive blowdown is not a problem with these valves when they function normally.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 1, 1983, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.