



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAY 6 1983

50-272

NOTE TO: Vic Stello  
Tom Murley

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH NRR STAFF CONCERNING PROPOSED LICENSEE ACTIONS  
DERIVED FROM SALEM - NUREG-1000 (PROPOSED VOLUME 2 OF  
NUREG-1000 - SEE ATTACHMENT TO R. MATTSON LETTER DATED APRIL  
27, 1983 TO DIRECTORS NRR, IE, RES)

On May 3, 1983, members of the DEDROGR staff met with NRR staff for the purpose of further clarifying the scope and intent of proposed licensee actions stemming from the Salem Generic Implications Task Force Report (NUREG-1000, Vol. 2). Specifically, we wanted to determine those recommendations in Dr. Mattson's memorandum of April 27, 1983 concerning recommended licensee actions that warrant priority action and are sufficiently developed such that the CRGR might be able to make recommendations concerning those actions even though cost benefit information is not available.

In Dr. Mattson's absence, Mr. Case suggested that we meet with Mr. G. Holahan who in turn asked other concerned NRR staff involved with developing and implementing requirements to attend the meeting. In attendance were:

W. Schwink, DEDROGR Staff	T. Ippolito, NRR
M. Taylor, DEDROGR Staff	G. Holahan, NRR
J. Scinto, CRGR Member	E. Rossi, NRR
	D. Ziemann, NRR
	J. Zwolinski, NRR

Based on discussions at this meeting, the DEDROGR staff findings are summarized as follows:

1. The CRGR ongoing review of proposed Licensee and NRR Staff Actions is not on the critical path concerning NRC resolution and reporting of the Salem Generic Implications Task Force.
2. The full scope, intent and regulatory needs attendant to certain licensee actions are still evolving in NRR. Principal NRR recommendations requiring additional staff refinement regarding specifics are:
  - (a) Equipment classification requirements
  - (b) Vendor interface and technical information requirements (e.g, technical information at site for inspection)

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- (c) The recommendation that the diverse reactor trip features (e.g., SCR on B&W plants and the shunt trip attachments) are to be treated for some purposes as safety related components.
  - (d) The degree to which the staff will require specific test frequencies and on-line tests for optimal safety and system level availability.
  - (e) The need to specify and demonstrate further improvements in reliability of the under-voltage attachments by means such as redesign, replacement or vendor recommended modifications.
3. Although cost benefit information was not available, there appeared to be three of the recommended licensee actions that warrant priority attention and that are sufficiently developed such that the CRGR might be able to make recommendations. These three Task Force recommendations are:

a. Post Reactor-Trip Review

Licensees shall review their operating procedures and revise them as necessary to effect a systematic safety assessment of operating events leading to plant shutdown, including but not limited to, the analysis of reactor trips, prior to reaching a decision to resume power operation.

Licensees shall submit to the NRC for review their programs to ensure that events at their plants are adequately analyzed and evaluated. The post-trip evaluation program, including restart criteria, shall be defined; personnel and responsibilities and training shall be delineated; the process and criteria for identifying the plant parameters and other factors to be considered in a post-trip evaluation shall be determined; the need for independent assessment of the events by personnel outside the operation staff shall be assessed; special procedures shall be provided for cases in which the cause of a trip cannot be determined so that a competent group, such as the Plant Operations Review Committee, will be consulted before restart is authorized; and the equipment to be used in the analysis shall be specified. If the output from a sequence-of-events recorder or similar device cannot be assured, the licensee shall describe the measures and equipment that provide the necessary detail and type of information to reconstruct the event accurately and in sufficient detail for proper understanding.

b. Reactor Trip System Reliability Improvements

- 1.. The Westinghouse and B&W reactor trip system reliabilities shall be improved by providing automatic reactor trip system actuation of the breaker shunt trip attachments.

2. All vendor-recommended reactor trip breaker modifications shall be reviewed to verify that each modification has, in fact, been implemented. (For example, the modifications recommended by Westinghouse in NDC-Elec-18 for the DB-50 breakers and by Westinghouse in a March 31, 1983 letter and expected April 25, 1983, letter for the DS-416 breakers.) Modifications not previously made shall be incorporated.
  
4. We were advised that NRR's current thinking was to accomplish recommended licensee actions via generic 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to be followed up by confirmatory order rather than the initially proposed show cause orders.

Based on these findings, the DEDROGR staff recommends that the CRGR meet soon to develop its recommendations concerning those task force recommendations identified in item 3 above. Mr. Joe Scinto endorses this recommendation.

Mat Taylor  
DEDROGR Staff

Walt Schwink  
DEDROGR Staff

cc: J. Scinto  
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