



NARRATIVE REPORT  
FOR LER 50-321/1983-036, Rev. 2  
Update Report - Previous Report Date 4-21-83

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH  
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

1. This LER is required by Tech. Specs. 6.9.1.9.c. (reference deviation report number 1-83-68).
2. This LER is required by Tech. Specs. 6.9.1.8.i due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Unit 1 Tech. Specs. 3.5.B.3 (reference deviation report number 1-83-74).
3. This LER is required by Tech. Specs. 6.9.1.9.c (reference deviation report number 1-83-27A).
4. This LER is required by Tech. Specs. 6.9.1.9.c (reference deviation report number 1-83-82).
5. This LER is required by Unit 2 Tech. Specs. 6.9.1.9.c. The above 4 items apply to Unit 1. (reference deviation report number 2-83-49).

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

1. This event occurred on 3-20-83, with the mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2424 Mwt (approximately 99% of full power).
2. This event occurred on 3-23-83, with the unit in steady state operation at 2433 Mwt (approximately 100% power).
3. This event occurred on 3-22-83 with the unit in steady state operation at 2430 Mwt (approximately 100% power).
4. This event occurred on 4-5-83 with the unit in steady state operation at 2429 Mwt (approximately 100% power).
5. This event occurred on 4-5-83 with the unit shutdown for refueling.

Detailed description of the event(s):

1. On 3-20-83, the Plant Review Board determined that there was a lack of administrative control concerning cable tray restoration. This determination was made due to the discovery of an inadequacy in procedural control and inspection of work performed on cable trays.
2. The "CABLE TRAY AND EQUIPMENT CONDITION INSPECTION" procedure was being performed. A four inch aluminum channel containing the power feed cables for RHR valve motor 1E11-F015B was found cracked. Also, a conduit support supporting the control cables for a RHR valve motor 1E11-F017A was found disconnected. The operability of both loops of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) LPCI system would be suspect during a seismic event which could be contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.B.3.

3. Safety related cables H11-P621-E57-C060 and H11-P621-E57-C061 were found routed in the non-seismic west cableway. These cables are associated with the automatic transfer of the RCIC suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression chamber.
4. Safety related cables R24-S025-ES7-C51C and R24-S025-ES7-C55C were found routed in the non-seismic west cableway. These cables provide for the automatic closure of Plant Service Water (PSW) valves 1P41-F310A and 1P41-F310D on a condenser room flooding signal.
5. Safety related cables PVE703C04 and PVE704C04 were found routed in the non-seismic west cableway. These cables provide for the automatic closure of Plant Service Water (PSW) valves 2P41-F316A and 2P41-F316D on a condenser room flooding signal.

Consequences of the event(s):

1. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
2. An orderly reactor shutdown was initiated per Tech. Specs. section 3.5.B.3. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
3. This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
4. This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
5. This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

1. N/A
2. The HPCI, RCIC, ADS, and CS systems were operable.
3. The HPCI, ADS, CS, and RHR systems were operable.
4. Each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independently of the west cableway. These redundant valves were operable.
5. Each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independently of the west cableway. These redundant valves were operable.

Justification for continued operation:

1. After the initial inspection, engineering determined that no operational problem existed; however, the cable tray discrepancies that were found during the initial inspection were restored to acceptable limits using a generic model as a guideline for determining the acceptance criteria.

2. The damaged four inch aluminum channel was replaced and the conduit supports reconnected. The system was returned to operable status within 24 hours. Also, the HPCI, RCIC, ADS, and CS systems were operable.
3. Bechtel Power Corp. performed a study which showed that a failure of the subject cables will not jeopardize primary containment integrity, will not have adverse safety implications on RCIC operability, and will not prevent a desired suction transfer. Also, the HPCI, ADS, CS, and RHR systems were operable.
4. Bechtel Power Corporation provided an analysis which covered the effects of failures of the subject cables regardless of redundant equipment. The analysis concluded that no adverse safety implications result from the routing of the subject cables in the west cableway. Also, each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independently of the west cableway.
5. Bechtel Power Corporation provided an analysis which covered the effects of failures of the subject cables regardless of redundant equipment. The analysis concluded that no adverse safety implications result from the routing of the subject cables in the west cableway. Also, each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independent of the west cableway.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

1. This is a non-repetitive event.
2. This is a non-repetitive event.
3. This is a non-repetitive event.
4. This is a repetitive event. LER 50-321/1983-036, Rev. 1 Item 3 discusses other safety related cables found in the non-seismic west cableway.
5. This is a repetitive event. LER 50-321/1983-036, Rev. 1 Item 3 discusses other safety related cables found in the non-seismic west cableway.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

1. Unit 2 was affected by this event due to the "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) being common to both units. An extensive inspection of the safety-related cable trays for Unit 2 is scheduled for the up-coming refueling outage (approximate start date 4-5-83).
2. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.
3. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.

4. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.
5. This event had no impact on Unit 1 and no impact to other systems on Unit 2.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

1. The cause of this event was due to the "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) not clearly defining the responsibilities of the responsible personnel. Additionally the necessary design detail information for determining acceptance criteria was not on hand at the time of this event.
2. The cause of this event was due to a construction and/or installation error.
3. The cause of this event was a design error.
4. The cause of this event was a design error.
5. The cause of this event was a design error.

Immediate Corrective Action:

1. When it was recognized that lack of administrative control existed, electrical modifications and cable pulling were stopped and the "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) was revised to require adequate supervision and quality control inspection when construction or maintenance work is performed on cables and cable ways. Inspection personnel (i.e., Quality Control, Engineers) were trained to enable them to recognize deficiencies related to proper installation and re-installation of cables and cable ways.
2. Upon discovery, the damaged four inch aluminum channel was replaced and the conduit support reconnected.
3. No immediate corrective action is required.
4. No immediate corrective action is required.
5. No immediate corrective action is required.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

1. No supplemental corrective action was required.
2. No supplemental corrective action was required.
3. No supplemental corrective action was required.
4. No supplemental corrective action was required.
5. No supplemental corrective action was required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

1. Future corrective action will include a revised quality assurance program checklist and an upgraded applicable quality assurance audit plan. Additionally, contractors will be provided with detailed directions with management acceptance criteria.
2. No further action is required.
3. Bechtel Power Corporation will provide a recommendation regarding the disposition of the subject cables.

Any further deviations identified as being reportable will be reported via revisions to this LER.

4. Bechtel Power Corporation will provide a recommendation regarding the disposition of the subject cables.
5. Bechtel Power Corporation will provide a recommendation regarding the disposition of the subject cables.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

1. The "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) has been revised to more clearly define the responsibilities of supervision, engineering and Quality Control inspection of all raceway installations, cable installations and raceway restoration. Maintenance, construction and Quality Control inspections require the completion of an appropriate procedure data package. Additionally, Quality Control personnel and supervision (foreman and above) of Engineering, Maintenance and Retrofit are being trained to recognize deficiencies related to proper installation and re-installation of cables and cable ways.
2. No further action will be required.
3. No further action will be required, other than the scheduled (future) action.
4. No further action will be required, other than the scheduled (future) action.
5. No further action will be required, other than the scheduled (future) action.