



NARRATIVE REPORT  
FOR LER 50-321/1983-034

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH  
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.12.B.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

This event occurred on 4/7/83, with the mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2429 MWt (approximately 100% power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 4/7/83, while performing the "CONTROL ROOM AIR INTAKE ISOLATION VALVE OPERABILITY" procedure (HNP-1-3973), plant personnel noted that the isolation valve (1Z41-F011) closed in 12.88 seconds.. This event is contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.12.B (requires the valve to operate within 7 seconds).

Consequences of the event(s):

Plant operation continued under a 7-day LCO as per Tech. Specs. sections 3.12.A.1.a and 3.12.B. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

The redundant bypass isolation valve (1Z41-F012) remained operable during this event.

Justification for continued operation:

Plant operation continued under a 7-day LCO permitted by Tech. Specs. sections 3.12.A.1.a and 3.12.B.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This event is non-repetitive.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no effect on any other Unit 1 system; this event had no effect on Unit 2 due to the reactor being in cold shutdown and no fuel handling was in progress during this event.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

An investigation by plant personnel revealed that the failure of the valve to operate within the required time (i.e., within 7 seconds) was due to inadequate lubrication of the valve's operator cylinder shaft and damper shaft.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The valve's operator cylinder shaft damper shaft and miscellaneous parts associated with the mechanical closure of the damper were lubricated. The isolation valve (1Z41-F011) was then functionally tested satisfactorily as per HNP-1-3973 and returned to normal operable status on 4/10/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was sufficient and nothing more is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

The immediate corrective action was sufficient and no future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

This valve will be included in a preventive maintenance program.