| NRC FOR | U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
|------------------|--|
| (1:11) | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT |
| | CONTROL BLOCK: |
| 0 1 7 8 | G A E I H 1 20 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 |
| CON'T | REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 4 0 7 8 3 8 0 5 0 5 8 3 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 VENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 |
| 0 2 | While performing the "CONTROL ROOM AIR INTAKE ISOLATION VALVE OPERABIL- |
| 03 | ITY" procedure (HNP-1-3973), the isolation valve (1Z41-F011) was found |
| 04 | to close in 12.88 seconds. This event is contrary to Tech. Specs. |
| 0 5 | section 3.12.B (i.e., within 7 secs.). Redundant isolation valve (1Z41- |
| 06 | F012) remained operable during this event. Plant operation continued |
| 07 | under a 7-day LCO as per T.S. section 3.12.A.1.a. The health and |
| 08 | safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event. |
| 7 8 09 7 8 | SYSTEM CODE 9 10 1 E 12 B 13 V A L V E X 14 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION |
| | 17 REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO. |
| | $ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| 10 | The cause of this event was due to inadequate lubrication of the valve's |
| 11 | operator shaft and damper shaft. Both shafts and miscellaneous parts |
| 12 | associated with the mechanical closure of the damper were lubricated. |
| 13 | The isolation valve was functionally tested satisfactorily as per |
| 14 | HNP-1-3973 and returned to normal operable status on 4/10/83. |
| 7 8 | CILITY % POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 E 28 1 0 0 29 NA B 31 Surveillance Testing |
| 7 8 A RI | TIVITY CONTENT 12 13 44 45 46 80 EASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 80 Z 33 Z 34 NA 14 15 16 NA 80 |
| 17 | |
| 7 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (1) NA |
| 7 8 | 11 12 CSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) YPE DESCRIPTION (43) |
| 1 9 7 8 | Z 42 NA 10 80 |
| 20 | B30517043B B30505 PDR ADOCK 05000321 PDR ADOCK 05000321 |
| | 5 NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps PHONE (912)367-7851 |

NARRATIVE REPORT FOR LER 50-321/1983-034

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.12.B.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

This event occurred on 4/7/83, with the mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2429 MWt (approximately 100% power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 4/7/83, while performing the "CONTROL ROOM AIR INTAKE ISOLATION VALUE OPERABILITY" procedure (HNP-1-3973), plant personnel noted that the isolation value (1Z41-FO11) closed in 12.88 seconds.. This event is contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.12.B (requires the value to operate within 7 seconds).

Consequences of the event(s):

Plant operation continued under a 7-day LCO as per Tech. Specs. sections 3.12.A.1.a and 3.12.B. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

The redundant bypass isolation value (1Z41-F012) remained operable during this event.

Justification for continued operation:

Plant operation continued under a 7-day LCO permitted by Tech. Specs. sections 3.12.A.1.a and 3.12.B.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This event is non-repetitive.

Narrative Report for LER 50-321/1983-034 Page Two

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no effect on any other Unit 1 system; this event had no effect on Unit 2 due to the reactor being in cold shutdown and no fuel handling was in progress during this event.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

An investigation by plant personnel revealed that the failure of the value to operate within the required time (i.e., within 7 seconds) was due to inadequate lubrication of the value's operator cylinder shaft and damper shaft.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The value's operator cylinder shaft damper shaft and miscellaneous parts associated with the mechanical closure of the damper were lubricated. The isolation value (1Z41-FO11) was then functionally tested satisfactorily as per HNP-1-3973 and returned to normal operable status on 4/10/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was sufficient and nothing more is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

The immediate corrective action was sufficient and no future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

This value will be included in a preventive maintenance program.