Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 101, New Hill, N. C. 27562 April 29, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 3100) Atlanta, Georgia 30303

NRC-65

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1986-90 - 900,000 KW - UNITS 1 & 2 BASE METAL DEFECT IN A SPOOL PIECE SUPPLIED BY SOUTHWEST FABRICATING AND WELDING COMPANY, PURCHASE ORDER NY-435035 - ITEM 115

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached is our second interim report on the subject item which was deemed reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21, on February 15, 1983. CP&L is pursuing this matter, and it is currently projected that corrective action and submission of the final report will be accomplished by August 1, 1983.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Yours very truly,

R. M. Parsons by head most

Project General Manager

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

RMP/sh

Attachment

cc: Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. R. Prevatte (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. V. Stello (NRC)

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## CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

UNIT NO. 1

INTERIM REPORT

BASE METAL DEFECT IN A SPOOL PIECE SUPPLIED BY SOUTHWEST FABRICATING AND WELDING COMPANY ITEM 115

APRIL 29, 1983

REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.55(e)
REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR21

SUBJECT:

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant/Unit No. 1 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21, Reportable deficiency in base metal defect, minimum wall thickness violation purchased under purchase order NY-435035.

ITEM:

Deficiency and Disposition Report "DDR No. 1272". Spool piece No. 1-CX-65-4 was found to have base metal defects. Area has been buffed to remove defect causing minimum wall violation.

SUPPLIED BY:

Southwest Fabrication and Welding Company, Houston, Texas.

NATURE OF DEFICIENCY:

Pipe was found to violate minimum wall thickness per ASME Code requirements and site welding procedures.

DATE PROBLEM OCCURRED:

Refer to section above.

DATE PROBLEM REPORTED:

On January 26, 1983, N. J. Chiangi notified the NRC (A. Hardin) that this item was potentially reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR.21.

On February 5, 1983, N. J. Chiangi notified the NRC (D. Verelli) that this item was reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR.21.

On February 26, 1983, an Interim Report was filed with the NRC.

SCOPE OF PROBLEM:

The deficiency involves the safety-related chilled water piping.

SAFETY IMPLICATION:

Loss of safety-related chilled water could potentially jeopardize the environmental qualification operating temperature of certain safety components and the environment envelope of the main control room.

REASON THE DEFICIENCY IS REPORTABLE:

Failure of the piping could result in reduction of cooling to safety train B Air Handling Units. No means of automatic isolation is in vicinity of deficiency; therefore, all "B" train is sacrificed. Break would result in loss of all safety train B Air Handling Units. Incorporating additional single failure criterion-worst case is loss of safety train "A" chilled water. With loss of all safety-related chilled water, the environmental qualification of essential components could potentially be jeopardized due to exceeding of qualified operating temperature.

## CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The vendor - Southwest Fabrication and Welding - has been notified of this condition via telephone and directed to take corrective action and advise in writing what corrective action was taken. Corrective action has been taken and has been confirmed by letter.

Further investigation has proven that CP&L (Carolina Power & Light) construction will effectively replace the fitting on site and close out corrective action. Work is being documented by Pipe Spool Modification - PSM-1-CX-65-4.

## PREVENTIVE MEASURES:

The vendor - Southwest Fabrication and Welding - has been directed to show preventive measures and advise in writing what measures will be taken, which they have confirmed by letters.

Southwest Fabrication and Welding has indicated by letter, dated April 14, 1983, that diligent efforts are being made to perform visual inspections as required by ASME III, Class 3, 1971 Edition. Further, their inspectors have been cautioned to continue their efforts to detect surface flaws in materials. All information available concerning this spool piece has been discussed with the inspectors.

It has been noted by Southwest Fabrication that the circumstances surrounding this piece are unique. They indicate that this is the first complaint of this nature ever to be reported. Southwest Fabrication has supplied in excess of 46,000 nuclear items without such an occurrence.

## FINAL REPORT:

See Corrective Action and Preventive Measures above.

CP&L has issued Pipe Spool Modification "PSM-1-CX-65-4" to replace the spool piece. Final replacement will be accomplished and a final report submitted by August 1, 1983.

Southwest Fabrication has directed inspectors to continue their efforts to visually inspect according to ASME III, Class 3, 1971 Edition. Also, all information concerning this matter has been discussed with Southwest's inspector personnel.