The mechanical indicator and the indicator lights for the vent valve and latch indicated the inner door was closed, but the indicator light for the inner door indicated that the door remained opened. This prevented the outer door from being opened electrically; however, the personnel were able to open the outer door manually. When the outer door was opened, the inner door was observed to be open about 8 inches. They entered the airlock and immediately closed the outer door. The ramp was removed and the inner door was properly closed.

The cause of this event involved a personnel error in the failure to close the inner door after entering containment. Procedure SOP-14, Containment Access System, requires both personnel airlock doors to be closed upon entering or exiting the containment. The licensee identified this event, Incident Report No. 1-89-387 was promptly written, the licensee evaluated the circumstances associated with this event and determined the appropriate actions to prevent reoccurrence. This licensee identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. This item is identified as NCA 348/89-31-02, Failure to maintain containment integrity via open containment air lock. The licensee is issuing an LER on this event.

(3) Unit 2 Reactor Trip

On November 18, at 4:33 p.m., Unit 2 tripped while operating at 100 percent power. The cause of the trip was due to a malfunction in the DEH. The malfunction resulted in an erroneous electrical overspeed turbine trip signal and a loss of DEH power signal. These signals called for a turbine trip which then caused a reactor trip. The malfunction was due to a power supply voltage spike that occurred in the DEH power supply inverter. All plant systems functioned satisfactorily during the reactor trip and shutdown operations.

The unit was returned to power on November 18 at 10:16 p.m. and reached 100 percent power on November 20 at 5:00 a.m. The licensee plans to issue an LER following completion of an evaluation to determine the cause of the trip.

(4) Unit 1 Uncoupled Main Turbine Governor Valves

On November 17, at approximately 10:30 p.m., a system operator found governor valve No. 1 on the Unit 1 main turbine uncoupled from the valve actuator. The unit was operating at about 94 percent power. The licensee initiated an evaluation to determine the action required to close this valve. Governor valves are required to be operable to meet the turbine overspeed protection requirements of TS 3.3.4. At approximately 2:45 p.m. on November 18, governor valve No. 1 was manually closed from the