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FEB 0 1 1990

Docket No. 50-341

The Detroit Edison Company ATTN: B. Ralph Sylvia Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI. 48166

Gentlemen:

This refers to the special inspection, conducted by Messrs. W. G. Rogers and M. J. Farber during the period of December 13 through December 28, 1989, of the circumstances surrounding the improper installation of a wide range reactor water level transmitter, at the Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Station authorized by NRC Operating License NPF-43 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. W. S. Orser and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.

During this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in violation of NRC requirements, as specified in the enclosed Notice. A written response is required. The violations resulted from an event involving the inverted installation of a differential pressure transmitter used to measure reactor water level causing inoperability of that instrument.

The violations in the enclosed Notice were carefully examined by NRC Region III management and staff with regard to their safety and programmatic significance to determine their potential for escalated enforcement action including consideration of a civil penalty. The decision to issue these violations at Severity Level IV is based on: (1) the availability of redundant signals to actuate the affected safety systems; (2) the lack of effect of the inoperable channel on the Reactor Protection System and Emergency Core Cooling System; and (3) the low core power history with reduced radiological consequences of an accident at the time of this event. In addition, the violations that contributed to this event do not appear to be programmatic, but appear to be isolated to selected instrument configurations for reactor water level safety signals for containment systems isolation protection.

Notwithstanding the classification of these violations at Severity Level IV, we are concerned with the multiplicity of errors contributing to the transmitter inoperability and the subsequent failure of the Nuclear Shift

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Supervisor to properly complete the required actions after the inoperable transmitter was identified. Your response to these violations should address the root causes contributing to: (1) the maintenance personnel improperly installing the transmitter; (2) the technical error in the postmodification (surveillance) procedure; (3) the Quality Control inspection activities not disclosing the problems; and (4) the operations staff not properly placing the instrument channel in the tripped condition after discovery of the inoperability of the instrument.

After review of your response and evaluation of your actions to strengthen controls in these areas, we will determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter, and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

Original signed by W. L. Forney

Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects

1. Notice of Violation 2. Inspection Report No. 50-341-89036(DRP) cc w/enclosures: D. Gipson, Plant Manager Patricia Anthony, Licensing P. A. Marguardt, Corporate Legal Department DCD/DCB (RIDS) Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Harry H. Voight, Esq. Michigan Department of Public Health Monroe County Office of Civil Preparedness J. Stang, NRR J. Clifford, EDO RIII RIIL DeFayette Farber Jaw 111 161

Enclosures:

RIII Axelson Grobe Forney



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