



Commonwealth Edison

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
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RLB-90-032

January 30, 1990

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 90-02, Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B): The Licensee shall report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

R. L. Bax
Station Manager

RLB/MJB/eb

Enclosure

cc: R. Stols
R. Higgins
INPO Records Center
NRC Region III

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Quad Cities Unit Two										Docket Number (2) 0151010102615					Page (3) 1 of 03				
Title (4) Missed Technical Specification Fire Valve Surveillance, valve not cycled due to procedure inadequacy.																			
Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)									
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)								
01	02	90	90	0012	00	01	30	90			01510101011								
OPERATING MODE (9) 4			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																
POWER LEVEL (10) 072			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)							
			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)							
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			Other (Specify							
			20.405(a)(1)(iii) X			50.73(-)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			in Abstract							
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			below and in							
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)			Text)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																			
Name E. Hayden Smith, Technical Staff, Ext. 2156										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 309 654-1224									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																			
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS										
				N															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										Expected Submission Date (15)									
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO																			
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																			

ABSTRACT:

At 1300 hours on January 2, 1990, Unit Two was in the RUN mode at 72 percent rated core thermal power. During review of QOS 4100-S12, Annual Suppression Systems Valve Operability Checklist, the Operating Engineer discovered that the procedure had not been completed within the Technical Specification time requirements. An in-line sprinkler system valve, 2-4199-72, had not been hand cycled to verify operability, thereby not complying with the requirements of Technical Specification 4.12. The Shift Engineer then instructed Operating personnel to cycle valve 2-4199-72.

This event occurred due to a procedural inadequacy. The associated procedure will be revised to ensure that this surveillance is completed on the required equipment within the required time limits. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year		Sequential		Revision				
				Number		Number				
Quad Cities Unit Two	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5	9 0	-	0 0 2	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3	
TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]										

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 Mwt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: Missed Technical Specification Fire Valve Surveillance, valve not cycled due to procedure inadequacy.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Two	Event Date: January 2, 1990	Event Time: 1300
Reactor Mode: 4	Mode Name: RUN	Power Level: 72%

This report was initiated by Deviation Report D-4-2-90-002

RUN Mode (4) - In this position the reactor system pressure is at or above 825 psig, and the reactor protection system is energized, with APRM protection and RBM interlocks in service (excluding the 15% high flux scram).

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 1300 hours on January 2, 1990, Quad Cities Unit Two was in the RUN mode at 72 percent core thermal power. During a review of QOS 4100-2, Annual Water Sprinkler System Valve Position Inspection, and associated checklist QOS 4100-S12, Annual Suppression Systems Valve Operability Checklist, the Operating Engineer (OE) discovered that valve [ISV] 2-4199-072 was not cycled in accordance with Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.12. Valve 2-4199-72 (72) was last cycled on April 20, 1988, and was required to be cycled before April 20, 1989. There was no outage report initiated.

After discovery of the incomplete surveillance, Operating personnel cycled the valve on January 2, 1990 to verify its operability.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which requires that the licensee report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

The cause of this event is procedural deficiency. QOS 4100-2 and associated checklist QOS 4100-S12 did not clearly require certain High Radiation area valves be inspected. The checklist stated that these valves did not have to be inspected when the applicable unit is in operation. For "ALARA" purposes, the surveillance checklist also stated that these valves should be tested while the unit is not operating.

The Operating department interpreted this to read that the valves listed did not have to be cycled at all to complete the surveillance and checklist. However, all valves with the exception of in-line isolation valve 72 had been cycled within the required time limit.

Isolation valve 72 is an in-line valve located on the wet pipe fire suppression sprinkler system [KP] located in the Low Pressure Heater Bay (LPHB). Besides being in a High Radiation area, it is located in an extremely difficult place to reach.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Quad Cities Unit Two	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5	9 0	- 0 0 2	- 0 0				0 3	OF	0 3

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D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety of the plant and the public were not affected by this event. Per Technical Specification 4.12.B.1.d, each Fire Suppression System shall be demonstrated operable at least once per year by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

Valve 72 is chain-locked in the open position and there is an additional valve located downstream that provides redundant isolation capabilities should valve 72 have been inoperable. The isolation valve was cycled as required by Technical Specification and found to be operable, thereby, proving that the fire suppression system was fully operable and would have been able to perform its intended function in the event of a fire.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to cycle the valve 2-4199-072. This was completed on January 2, 1990.

As further corrective action, QOS 4100-2 and checklist QOS 4100-S12 will be revised to clearly designate that all valves are to be cycled within the appropriate time, regardless of the location or mode of operation. (NTS 2652009000201)

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

Previously, LER 254/88-15 (Missed Fire Protection Valve Surveillance) was written due to a missed Technical Specification Surveillance. However, the cause of LER 88/15 was not similar to the event discussed in this report. Therefore the corrective actions described in this LER are considered sufficient.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

No component failures were involved with this event.