ENCLOSURE CONTAINS
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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/89-34 Operating License: DPR-46

Docket: 50-298

Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
P.O. Box 499
Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499

Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)

Inspection At: CNS, Brownsville, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: October 16-19, 1989



Inspector: A. B. Earnest, Physical Security Specialist, Security and Emergency Preparedness Section — Date 11/22/89



Approved: Dr. D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and Emergency Preparedness Section — Date 11/24/89

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted October 16-19, 1989 (Report 50-298/89-34)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected within the physical security program included physical barriers - protected area; assessment aids; access control personnel and vehicles; compensatory measures; protection of Safeguards Information; detection aids - protected area; records and reports; and locks, keys, and combinations.

Results: Within the program areas inspected, three apparent violations were identified (inadequate access control, inadequate detection aids - protected area, and inadequate protection of Safeguards Information). An unresolved item involving compensatory measures is identified in paragraph 4.

The numerous problems experienced and reported by the licensee during the previous several months were the result of temporary personnel misperformance

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during an outage in the summer of 1989. The outage personnel granted access to the plant did not support the security program despite the efforts of the licensee management. The outage personnel left VA doors open, left designated vehicles unsecured, failed to turn in badges prior to exiting the PA, and failed to wear their badges inside the PA. Prior to the end of the outage, the licensee was unable to adequately enforce their security requirements on the outage personnel. The licensee should consider how to minimize these problems when preparing for the March/April 1990 outage.

The apparent Safeguards Information violation was the result of a lack of support for the corporate security department by corporate management staff at Columbus. The site Safeguards Information protection program was apparently adequate.

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