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Docket Nos.: 50-327/328

Mr. H. G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

Subject: Request for Information on Sequoyah Fire Protection

Enclosed are requests for additional information on fire protection that are based on our review of your October 1, 1981, report. This information was also discussed in our October 27, 1981, meeting concerning differences in the Sequoyah plant design and the requirements of certain sections in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.

Your responses are requested by December 15, 1981.

Sincerely,

Elinor G. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: See next page

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SEQUOYAH

Mr. H. G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

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Tennessee Valley Authority
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Resident Inspector/Sequoyah NPS
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1 & 2 SAFE
SHUTDOWN IN THE EVENT OF FIRE
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH

1. The safe shutdown logic diagram (Figure 1-1) of the Sequoyah safe shutdown submittal dated October 1, 1981 indicates that credit is taken for the use of automatic control functions to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. During the meeting 10/27/81, the applicant indicates that all automatic control logic may be lost in the event of a fire in the auxiliary instrument room. Please provide a discussion of how hot shutdown will be achieved and maintained in the event of a fire in the auxiliary instrument room, or any other area in which automatic functions can be rendered inoperable. This discussion should address the use of alternate instrumentation and controls methods, and all systems to which automatic function or control will be disabled.
2. Provide a discussion of the auxiliary control room (ACR) with respect to electrical isolation from the main control room (MCR), dedicated instrumentation which will monitor required system parameters (i.e., pressure, temperature, tank levels), and manual actions required to transfer control from the MCR to the ACR.
3. Provide a list of system parameters which must be monitored to assure proper plant conditions during hot shutdown and cold shutdown operation. Provide a list of instrumentation/alarms which will monitor these system parameters and component functions in the event of fire (e.g., pressurizer pressure indicator, cold leg/hot leg temperature, steam generator pressure and level, pump running indicators, condensate storage tank level). Verify that the applicable indicators are available in the MCR, ACR and other remote shutdown boards.

4. In many instances, one control/actuation signal will cause the actuation of several functional components. Verify that the depressurization of the primary side via interfacing system will not occur due to the actuation of system components resulting from the fire induced generation of spurious signals from associated circuitry. Your discussion should include the means of preventing RHR isolation valve actuation, uncontrolled letdown, pressurizer PORV actuation, or operation of any valve or component which would prevent the system(s) from performing its functional objectives.

5. Verify that procedures which describe tasks that are to be performed to effect the shutdown method have been developed and are available to appropriate plant personnel. Also, demonstrate that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions in accordance with your procedures, as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical specifications.