NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| 0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: G A E I H 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5) |

CON'T

| 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 (7) | EVENT DATE: 1 0 0 9 8 1 (8) | REPORT DATE: 1 0 2 0 8 1 (9) |

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During steady state power operation the site discovered the HNP-1 & 2
0 3 torus-to-rx. bldg. d.p. sw., 1T48-N210, N211, 2T48-N210 and N211 respect-
0 4 ively, had proof press. of 10 & 20 PSIG respectively. This results in
0 5 inoperability of the sw. (T.S. 3.7.A.3 (HNP-1) and 3.6.4.2 (HNP-2)) and
0 6 a potential loss of prim. cont. integrity (3.7.8.2 (HNP-1) and 3.6.1.1
0 7 (HNP-2). Neither plant operation nor the health or safety of the public
0 8 was affected. This is a non-repetitive event.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	S H (11)	B (12)	A (13)	I N S T R U (14)	S (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 1	—	1 1 2	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
F (18)	F (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	B 0 6 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this event has been attributed to mis-application of sw.
1 1 during initial design. The HNP-2 DP sw. were replaced with Barton sw.
1 2 which have acceptable proof press. The HNP-1 DP sw. were replaced with
1 3 a single Barton sw. The unit was S/D prior to expiration of the 7 day
1 4 LCO for the fuel recon. outage. Both HNP-1 DP sw. will be replaced.

| 1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 0 4 5 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Engineering Evaluation |

| 1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA |

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

| 1 7 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA |

PERSONNEL INJURIES

| 1 8 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA |

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

| 1 9 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA |

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PUBLICITY

| 2 0 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY |

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LER #: 50-321/1981-112
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1981-112

On October 9, 1981, while the plant was in steady state operation, the site discovered the HNP-1 and 2 Torus-to-Rx. Bldg. diff. press. switches 1T48-N210 and N211 made by Barksdale and 2T48-N210 and N211 made by static o-ring had proof pressures of 10 psig and 20 psig respectively. This results in technical inoperability of the switches which is required per Tech Specs (HNP-1) 3.7.A.3 and (HNP-2) 3.6.4.2 and a potential loss of primary containment integrity which is required per Tech Specs (HNP-1) 3.7.8.2 and (HNP-2) 3.6.1.1. Neither plant operation nor the health or safety of the public was affected. This is a non-repetitive event.

The cause of this event has been attributed to mis-application of switches due to oversight in initial design. The HNP-2 diff. press. switches were replaced with Barton switches that have an acceptable proof pressure. The HNP-1 diff. press. switches were removed and replaced with a single Barton switch. The unit was shutdown prior to expiration of the 7 day LCO, for the scheduled fuel reconstitution outage. Both HNP-1 diff. press. switches will be replaced prior to startup.