

LFK

OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION



Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-6000 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

October 21, 1981


Mr. Ronald Haynes, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-46/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-46/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.2.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,



J. T. Carroll, Jr.
Acting Director Oyster Creek

JTC:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.



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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-46/3L

Report Date

October 21, 1981

Occurrence Date

September 20, 1981 and September 25, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

During the functional testing of hydraulic snubbers, three (3) snubbers in the Shutdown Cooling System were found with drag loads outside of acceptable limits, and one of the three also failed in the compression mode. This condition is permitted per Technical Specifications section 3.5.A.8 as a limiting condition for operation.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in the cold shutdown condition.

Description of Occurrence

On September 20 at 1600 hours, hydraulic snubber #51/18 (serial #477253) located in Shutdown Cooling System Loop B, failed its functional test in the compression mode and also could not obtain drag load within acceptable limits. Also, snubber #51/17 (serial #487438) in Shutdown Cooling System Loop C failed to obtain drag load within acceptable limits. On September 25 at 1600 hours, snubber #51/19 (serial #F93502) in Shutdown Cooling System Loop A could not obtain drag load within acceptable limits. All snubbers were disassembled and inspected to determine failure mechanisms.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

An inspection of snubber 51/18 revealed rust on the piston head, dirty oil, and a crack in a brass ring on the head cover. Snubber 51/17 was found with a faulty O-ring, dirty oil, and a scored piston cylinder. Snubber 51/19 was found to have oil leakage around the piston at the top seal assembly.

Analysis of Occurrence

Hydraulic snubbers are installed to limit piping movement during seismic events and during transient conditions. Another function is the ability of the piston to move freely during normal operation to compensate for thermal expansion or contraction. All 3 snubbers are mounted in the same manner for each loop; all are perpendicular to the piping and are mounted from the floor to the piping

almost horizontally. The piping lines are the discharge lines from the Shutdown Cooling heat exchangers, which run horizontally for approximately 20 feet and then vertically approximately 10 feet to a common outlet header. There is a snubber on each vertical line downstream of the failed snubbers and a pipe support upstream of the failed snubbers.

Considering the fact that the plant was in cold shutdown and the Shutdown Cooling System was out of service for maintenance work, the safety significance of the event is considered minimal. If the plant had been shutdown with the Shutdown Cooling System in operation, the safety significance would have been minimal because the piping movement due to thermal expansion/contraction would have been in a direction which would not be affected by the failure of the snubbers. In the event of a seismic event, the safety significance would be minimal because the snubbers would have acted as a rigid support and would properly restrict piping movement.

Corrective Action

All 3 snubbers were replaced with operable spares. The present number of snubber failures requires 100% testing of snubbers in accordance with the Technical Specifications. Present plans are to complete testing of the remaining snubbers, or replace them with new units, by December 15, 1981.

Failure Data

Manufacturer - Bergen-Patterson Pipesupport Corp.
Model - HSSA-10 (max. 10,000 lbs force)